Book (electronic)
Freedom of religion (2010)
in: Studies in reformed theology, v. 19
The idea of freedom of religion was developed in Europe in the 16th and 17th century in the context of religious diversity as an alternative for religious wars.
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in: Studies in reformed theology, v. 19
The idea of freedom of religion was developed in Europe in the 16th and 17th century in the context of religious diversity as an alternative for religious wars.
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in: "Freedom of Religion" in Nathalie Des Rosiers, Patrick Macklem and Peter Oliver, eds., Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 755-776.
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SSRN
in: The American enterprise, Volume 4, Issue 1, p. 34
ISSN: 1047-3572
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in: Journal of church and state: JCS, Volume 54, Issue 3, p. 455-458
ISSN: 0021-969X
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Working paper
in: A journal of church and state: JCS, Volume 54, Issue 3, p. 455-457
ISSN: 2040-4867
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in: Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights, p. 57-61
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in: Library of essays on law and religion, v. 2
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in: Nicholas Aroney & Ben Saunders, 'Freedom of Religion in Australia', in Matthew Groves, Daniel Meagher and Janina Boughey (eds), The Legal Protection of Rights in Australia (Hart Publishing, Forthcoming).
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Working paper
in: Polis: the journal for ancient greek political thought, Volume 37, Issue 1, p. 145-175
ISSN: 2051-2996
Abstract
Tertullian first coined the phrase 'the freedom of religion'. This article considers what this entails. I argue that Tertullian's discussion of religious liberty derives its theoretical significance from his creative repurposing of the Roman idea of liberty as non-domination. Tertullian contends that the Roman magistrates' treatment of Christian citizens and loyal subjects amounts to tyrannical domination characterized by the absence of the traditional conditions for non-domination: the rule of law, rule in and responsive to the interests of the people, and citizens' rights. On his reworking of these criteria, he argues that citizens and loyal subjects should have the right to act publicly on the convictions of their conscience even if these actions conflict with the state's civil religion. Tertullian shows that non-domination is a highly flexible idea that does not necessarily entail the participatory 'free state' of republicanism. Moreover, by applying the logic of non-domination to questions surrounding religious liberty, he opens up an important avenue of investigation largely ignored in the contemporary republican literature on non-domination.
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