Suchergebnisse

Inhalt: Von einer Politik der Ausrottung der Religion zu einer Politik der Legalisierung
und Kontrolle der Religionsgemeinschaften; Die Rede von der Toleranz und die Realität staatlicher Kontrolle; Die rechtliche Lage der Religionsgemeinschaften; Wie funktioniert das System der staatlichen Kontrolle der
Religionsgemeinschaften?; Der Kampf der Religionsgemeinschaften um Selbstbestimmung; Welchen Beitrag kann die internationale Gemeinschaft leisten?

Hazewinkel, H. J.: Religious freedom in the OSCE/CSCE process. - S. 9-16. Tahzib-Lie, B.: The European definition of freedom of religion or belief. - S. 17-24. Martinez-Torron, J. ; Navarro-Valls, R.: The protection of religious freedom in the system of the European Convention on Human Rights. - S. 25-37. Gunn, T. J.: Majorities, minorities, and the rights of religion and belief. - S. 38-44. Lord, K. S.: The European retreat from religious liberty. - S. 45-51. Noll, R.: Religion and conflict (prevention). - S. 52-61. Smyslova, E. A.: Freedom of religion in Russia. - S. 62-79

Issues raised by the Tennessee court decision in Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools; scope of parental authority to teach or indoctrinate children about religious matters.

Abstract
Tertullian first coined the phrase 'the freedom of religion'. This article considers what this entails. I argue that Tertullian's discussion of religious liberty derives its theoretical significance from his creative repurposing of the Roman idea of liberty as non-domination. Tertullian contends that the Roman magistrates' treatment of Christian citizens and loyal subjects amounts to tyrannical domination characterized by the absence of the traditional conditions for non-domination: the rule of law, rule in and responsive to the interests of the people, and citizens' rights. On his reworking of these criteria, he argues that citizens and loyal subjects should have the right to act publicly on the convictions of their conscience even if these actions conflict with the state's civil religion. Tertullian shows that non-domination is a highly flexible idea that does not necessarily entail the participatory 'free state' of republicanism. Moreover, by applying the logic of non-domination to questions surrounding religious liberty, he opens up an important avenue of investigation largely ignored in the contemporary republican literature on non-domination.