What is freedom of religion? What is its relation to other values in society? How do we respect religious heritage in democracies - particularly in multi-cultural democracies that contain many potentially conflicting - values? How far can one express one's religious heritage? In what follows, I want to discuss these issues with a view to determining whether some kind of secularism is the best public policy to pursue in order to respect and promote freedom of religion and one's religious heritage, particularly in contemporary liberal democracies.
In the paper the new hungarian constitutional regulation and related statues on the right to conscience and religion and establishment of churches are examined and compared to the previous regulatory framework. The comparism seems necessary as in 2011 the Hungarian Parliament adopted a new Fundamental Law and new statue on these fundamentak rights. Due to the changed constitutional framerwork concerning the establishment of churches, it seems possible that in Hungary there may be a serious deficit in promoting human rights.
In: Forthcoming, Anna-Bettina Kaiser, Niels Petersen and Johannes Saurer (eds.), The U.S. Supreme Court and Contemporary Constitutional Law: The Obama Era and Its Legacy, 2018
Chapter 1 Paul Babie and Neville Rochow, Protecting Religious Freedom under Bills of Rights: Australia as Microcosm Chapter 2 Ngaire Naffine, How Religion Constrains Law and the Idea of Choice Chapter 3 Bruce Kaye, Is the Emperor Wearing the Wrong Clothes? Human Rights and Social Good in the Context of Australian Secularity: Theological Perspectives Chapter 4 Alan Cadwallader, Anniversary overlap: or what happens when St Paul meets the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Chapter 5 Neil Foster, Defamation and Vilification: Rights to Reputation, Free Speech and Freedom of Religion at Common Law and under Human Rights Laws Chapter 6 Robert C Blitt, Should an Australian Bill of Rights Address Emerging International Human Rights Norms? The Challenge of 'Defamation of Religion' Chapter 7, Patrick Parkinson, Christian Concerns About an Australian Charter of Rights Chapter 8 Asmi Wood, Apostasy in Islam and the Freedom of Religion in International Law Chapter 9 David M Kirkham, Political Culture and Freedom of Conscience: A Case Study of Austria Chapter 10, Cornelia Koch, The Sky is Falling if Judges Decide Religious Controversies! – Or is it? The German Experience of Religious Freedom Under a Bill of Rights Chapter 11 Nicky Jones, Religious Freedom in a Secular Society: The Case of the Islamic Headscarf in France Chapter 12 Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the UK After the Human Rights Act 1998 Chapter 13 Frank S Ravitch, Judicial Interpretation, Neutrality and the US Bill of Rights Chapter 14 Brett G Scharffs, Protecting Religious Freedom: Two Counterintuitive Dialectics In US Free Exercise Jurisprudence Chapter 15 Barbara Billingsley, Walking the Tightrope: The Struggle of Canadian Courts to Define Freedom of Religion Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Chapter 16 Charles J Russo, Quo Vadis The Free Exercise of Religion? The Diminishment of Student Religious Expression in US Public Schools Chapter 17 Kris Hanna, Freedom From Discrimination on the Basis of Religion Chapter 18 Rex Tauati Ahdar, Ruminations from the Shaky Isles on Religious Freedom in the Bill of Rights Era Chapter 19 Paul Rishworth, Indigenous Peoples and Bills of Rights
How can a nation protect fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, within a liberal democratic context? The objective of the essays presentedin this volume is to provide an overview of the principal modelsused to protect fundamental freedoms, and especially the right to freedom of belief,expression and practice of one's religion, in major liberal democratic systems. A range of viewpoints are presented in a comparative way in orderto obtain insights, reveal strengths, weaknesses and differences of opinion, and tolearn from the lessons of others, how religion might be and has been protected
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Abstract Tertullian first coined the phrase 'the freedom of religion'. This article considers what this entails. I argue that Tertullian's discussion of religious liberty derives its theoretical significance from his creative repurposing of the Roman idea of liberty as non-domination. Tertullian contends that the Roman magistrates' treatment of Christian citizens and loyal subjects amounts to tyrannical domination characterized by the absence of the traditional conditions for non-domination: the rule of law, rule in and responsive to the interests of the people, and citizens' rights. On his reworking of these criteria, he argues that citizens and loyal subjects should have the right to act publicly on the convictions of their conscience even if these actions conflict with the state's civil religion. Tertullian shows that non-domination is a highly flexible idea that does not necessarily entail the participatory 'free state' of republicanism. Moreover, by applying the logic of non-domination to questions surrounding religious liberty, he opens up an important avenue of investigation largely ignored in the contemporary republican literature on non-domination.
Exploring the relationship between religion and the stateFocusing on the intersection of religion, law, and politics in contemporary liberal democracies, Blackford considers the concept of the secular state, revising and updating enlightenment views for the present day. Freedom of Religion and the Secular State offers a comprehensive analysis, with a global focus, of the subject of religious freedom from a legal as well as historical and philosophical viewpoint. It makes an original contribution to current debates about freedom of religion, and addresses a whole range of hot-button issues that.
Despite the international recognition of religious freedom as a fundamental human right, recent developments in the United States and Europe reveal that the Islamic faith has been singled out qua Islam for special prohibitions. The question is whether this sectarian approach is compatible with the normative liberal approach to religious freedom that emphasizes egalitarianism and neutrality. The answer to this question is, no. Although religion within the paradigm of liberal political philosophy does not warrant special legal protection qua religion, this article contends that it is equally troublesome to single out religion qua religion for special disfavored treatment, even if the justification is facially neutral. This article uses facially neutral examples, such as: the French burqa-ban case, the Travel Ban project of President Trump, and the anti-Sharia debacle in the state of Oklahoma. This article draws on the dichotomous approach of liberal political philosophy to religion and develops a non-sectarian framework of arguments to defend religious liberty.
Intro -- Blackwell Public Philosophy -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Dedication -- 1 Motivation and Overview -- Introduction -- Liberal Democracies -- What is Religion, Anyway? -- Religion in the Courts: The Scientology Case -- Religion and its Conflicts -- The Plan -- Conclusion -- 2 A Short History of Religious Intolerance -- Introduction -- Pagans and Monotheists, Tolerance and Persecution -- The Record of Christianity -- Reformation and Wars of Religion -- Conclusion -- 3 Hobbes, Locke, and their Legacy: Models of the Modern State -- Introduction -- The Hobbesian Analysis -- Locke's Alternative -- Arguments for the Lockean Model -- Implications -- Legacy -- Conclusion -- 4 Religious Impositions and Endorsements -- Introduction -- Religious Establishment -- Religious Endorsement -- Religious Endorsements in Education -- Conclusion -- 5 Religion-Based Morality and the Secular State -- Introduction -- From Secularism to Liberalism -- Personal Freedom and the Harm Principle -- Objections -- Perry's Arguments -- Justiciability -- Humanitarian Catastrophe -- Conclusion -- 6 Persecution, Accommodation, and Conscientious Objection -- Introduction -- Laws of General Application -- Religious Persecutions -- Religion, the Individual, and the Modern State -- Accommodation of Religion -- Barry's Fork -- Considering Exemptions -- Conscientious Objection -- Services Required by the State -- Conclusion -- 7 Private Power, Religious Communities, and the State -- Introduction -- Private Power and the Secular State -- Anti-Discrimination Law, Religion, and the Workplace -- Religious Employers and Associations -- How Free is Free Association? -- Policy Implications -- The Marriage Business -- The Battle of the Burqa -- Religious Communities and the Angst about Islam -- Conclusion -- 8 Religious Freedom and the Interests of Children -- Introduction.
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In Italy, Catholicism was the dominant faith for about two thousand years and until recently almost the only one. This has meant that it has taken root in the country as a primary socio-cultural element also for the laity and non-believers. Every legal system in a democratic state must find the normative mechanisms to guarantee and protect the religious phenomenon. With the advent of the Republican Constitution, the religious phenomenon is foreseen and regulated in four articles: Articles 7, 8, 19, 20 of the Constitution, to which we must add the guarantees deriving from articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. These Articles sanction the principle of equality of all confessions and non-discrimination on a religious basis, the freedom to profess one's beliefs both individually and collectively, in public or private, ect. The analysis aims to understand the capacity of these provisions to guarantee all dimensions of the religious phenomenon. In this regard, the question arose whether these articles protect freedom of conscience, conscientious objection and atheism. It is also important to analyze those are the limits that this freedom encounters.