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Richard Rorty (1931-2007) stood out as a relevant thinker of contemporary political life, in addition to building a framework of ideas of language, culture, freedom and solidarity. One of his most recurrent banners was the primacy of literature over philosophy and freedom over truth. For the purposes of this article, we start with excerpts from Rorty's interview by Helmut Mayer and Wolfgang Ulrich, compiled in the text It's good to persuade, in Take care of freedom that the truth will take care of itself. In addition to this text, we also use Philosophy and social hope (from 1999), and, in particular, Education as socialization and individualization (from 1989), a text in which the author, moving away from the enchantment of traditional philosophy and defending the adoption of a philosophizing, primacy of freedom the edifying truth, by dogmatic, over a markedly essentialist and anti-foundationist posture.

The article assumes that the philosophers known as "pre-Socratics" should be understood for analyzing their fragments and for a critical analysis of the testimonies about them that have come to us. The Aristotelian reading prevailed, but today we are able to understand the Ionian philosophy in its particularity, each of its philosophers and the ideas common to them. We approach these philosophers together as members of a historical tradition, as this undoubtedly seems unavoidable for their proper understanding, and we pay attention to the fundamental notions of necessity, evolution and freedom, a kind of backbone of Anaximander's thought to that of Lucretius. Especially in contrast to the idea of final cause (basilar for Aristotle, but also for Plato), we consider that the Ionians followed the opposite path to the Aristotelian and that the Epicureans are their main heirs, hence the expression "Ionian-Epicurean philosophy", for us created to designate what we believe to have been a long and legitimate philosophical tradition.

Abstract: The terms "university", "teaching" and "research" are closely related. The reason for the establishment of a community of learners and students were, on the one hand, the formation of man, and on the other the search for the truth about man, life, society and the world. In the face of technological development and access to information, including the development of legislation that allows the individual, without going through formal institutions, data acquisition, the question arises whether the university is needed, and if so, what is its role in realizing the right to education and freedom of scientific research. Implementation of freedom of scientific research and freedom of teaching in times of universal information access and modern technology can do without the university. However, this is university that can benefit from innovative research methods and teaching remains the most important forum for the exchange of ideas and the search for truth and knowledge transfer, vocational skills and social attitudes.Keywords: Right to education. Freedom of scientific research. Constitution. Cultural rights. Freedom of teaching. Resumo: Os termos "universidade", "ensino" e "pesquisa" estão intimamente relacionados. A razão para o estabelecimento de uma comunidade de alunos e estudantes foram, por um lado, a formação do homem, e por outro a busca da verdade sobre o homem, a vida, a sociedade e o mundo. Em face de desenvolvimento tecnológico e do acesso à informação, incluindo o desenvolvimento de uma legislação que permite que o indivíduo, sem passar por instituições formais, tenha acesso a dados e a informações, gera a questão de saber se a universidade é necessária, e em caso afirmativo, qual é o seu papel na realização dos direitos à educação e à liberdade de pesquisa científica. A implementação da liberdade de investigação científica e liberdade de ensino em tempos de acesso à informação universal e tecnologia avançada pode se realizar sem a universidade. No entanto, a universidade pode se beneficiar de métodos inovadores de pesquisa e de ensino e continuar a ser o mais importante fórum para a troca de ideias ea busca da verdade e da transferência de conhecimentos, competências profissionais e as atitudes sociais.Palavras-chave: Direito à Educação. Liberdade de Pesquisa Científica. Constituição. Direitos Culturais. Liberdade de Ensino.

The general objective of this article is to investigate, in Foucault's perspective, the relations between government and subjectivity, through the arts of government and the constitution of the modern state. In this task, we consider the courses given by Foucault, Security, Territory, Population and The birth of biopolitics, to deal with the presence of pastoral power in the constitution of governmentality. The specific objective is to research other possibilities of social organization, associated with democratic principles, such as solidarity and self-management in opposition to the effects generated by neoliberalism, with a generalization of market values ​​in individual and collective practices. In our hypothesis, we consider an anarchist perspective as the vital counterpoint in the production of other forms of social and political life, beyond exclusively economic principles. At this point, we present the basic concepts of anarchist values, such as an idea of ​​self-management, mutual support, an idea of ​​freedom, found in Bakunin, Kropotkin and Goldman, and a possibility of thinking about resistances and practices in the present, as reflected by Rago. We also went through a critique of the model of social organization and the very idea of ​​democracy, based on Graeber's indicators in A project of democracy. Finally, our effort aim to reflect on the possibilities of another world, from a perspective that is radically opposed to the political and social practices that are found nowadays. We intend, therefore, to think about the present time and the possibility of new forms of existence.

This article aims to analyze the notion of creation in Sartre's thought. This notion is not predominant in the first texts. We try to demonstrate their place in the philosopher's thinking. First, we turn to the text Cahiers pour une morale where such a notion occupies a fundamental place. Then, we show how this analysis is resumed in the Critique of Raison Dialectique. This analysis will explain the content of creation as a process of singularization so that the being of the individual or his freedom is taken as a singular quality, this is, as meaning of being while it is finitude. Finally, this configuration alludes to relations according to his gift and generosity as existence in the world.

Angola Cinema' honors the fantastic, unique and unknown architecture of movie theaters in Angola, built in the decades before the end of Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. Initially designed as traditional closed spaces, later in the 1960s open air cinemas with terrace bars became the order of the day, so much better adapted as they were to the tropical climate. The arrival of these cinemas brought elegance to the business of going to the movies.0But it is not only this exceptional architecture which impresses us and mirrors the experimental spirit of its ambitious and visionary builders. Visiting the cinema was a communal act—it was a place where young met old, where people fell in love and where liberation from colonialism was a feasible option.0Examining the architectural history of these buildings, this book is also a document of urban organization in the 20th century, as well as the changing mentalities of a society living with the possibility of its foreseen independence. What has changed since then, and what is the future of these urban cathedrals? 'Angola Cinema' poses such questions in a book that both preserves these architectonic treasures and reflects on their cultural, social and affective heritage

The current study investigates the consistency between the claims of the Dialectic and those of the Canon concerning the problem of freedom, and does so through a comparative analysis of three interpretations, showing why two of them (Carnois and Allison) would be mistaken, and a third (Esteves), defensible. Carnois points out that there would be an incompatibility between Dialectic and Canon in considering that the freedom of the Canon would be a limited and empirical freedom, whereas in the Dialectic it would have an absolute spontaneity. Allison believes that the texts would be compatible, although both present relative and ambiguous practical freedom (dependent on a sensitive incentive), and therefore there would be a pre-critical morality in KrV. Esteves's interpretation seems to us to be more sustainable and allows us to understand the coherence and contemporaneity of texts (both present freedom with absolute spontaneity), showing that, although practical freedom is a relational freedom (applied to human beings and therefore in contact with the empirical), it is not an empirical but hybrid concept.

The considerations that will do in this article are going to analyze how the metabolism becomes mechanism that represents the first gesture of freedom of life, in Hans Jonas' philosophy. From this perspective this discution is in fact that life is a self-maintenance process where freedom shows up since the simplest structures of the organism to the most developed ones. Our goal is showing, from analyzes of the ideia of freedom and necessity, how life open it self to transcendence or, technically speaking, to new ontology.

The article aims to find points of approximation on the definition of subjectivity that Sartre exposes in 'Being and nothingness' to the analogue conceptualization from Fichte in 'Science of knowledge'. In order to do so, the strategy adopted here, first, is to analyze how the notion of I as ground arises in the Fichtean thought and culminates in a theory of practical reason that implies in the ontological primacy of action. From this, it will be possible to draw certain points of convergence (and divergence) with the Sartrean operation of founding the cogito in a pre-reflective instância, whose deployment is close to that drawn by Fichte. In a word, the intention is to show how the thought of both authors results in a practical philosophy whose 'leitmotiv' is the purge of any index of reification of consciousness, thus, in the proclamation of the absolute freedom of the subject.

In this article I try to bring to light the convergences and divergences between the German reformer Marthin Luther and the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard. For this purpose, the text was subdivided into four chapters so that it could be possible to bring the main ideas of the authors. The dialogue between Luther and Kierkegaard, where the author defends freedom of conscience as being a freedom from, as Luther does, since our freedom is only found when we love Christ, with a passion so distinct that we are willing to risk everything for him and at the same time sacrifice everything for him. According to Kierkegaard (1978) the subject who is able to be alone in the world, consulting only his conscience is a hero. Kierkegaard appeals to Luther, the solitary monk who faced the Emperor and the Pope, leading first to the creation and strengthening of consciousness in silence and solitude. Thus, only the lonely subject before God, willing to make all sacrifices for God can be free, while the second Luther led to a vision that leads subjects to the abolition of conscience, seeking the forgiveness of sins in Christ so that it is possible to have fun in life. The love of God, which for Luther leads us to freedom for Kierkegaard, keeps us imprisoned and anguished, because the subject will be aware that he will never be able to reciprocate such love. In order to be able to appease such anxiety, you must have a life totally surrendered to Him.

The main aim of this paper is to understand the fundamental concepts that were part of what we all nowadays as the republican tradition and collate them with the sense of politics that underpins the current liberal democratic societies. The proposal has as a path of theoretical analysis a set of political themes that served as the foundation for the construction of republican ideals which contemporary scholars will call as republicanism.

The present paper brings a reading of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (1788), seeking support on two central axes: a) the formulation of the categorical imperative; b) the doctrine of the fact of reason. The choice of this course supports the position that, despite the innumerable formulations given to the imperative of morality throughout the GMS, there would be, in the terms of the second Critique, a clearer and more precise formulation of this principle. Regarding the doctrine of the fact of reason, it will be treated in two ways: on the one hand, from an attempt to reconstruct Kant's original theses, based on the philosopher's textual course; on the other, showing to what extent this doctrine represents a change of position in relation to the impossibilities found in the GMS. The aim will be to show how Kant fails to engage in the task of analytically deducing the concept of freedom from the concept of will, and the appeal to the fact of reason is precisely the distinguishing feature of this change. From this, it will be concluded that not only pure reason can be practical, but only pure reason, not empirically constrained reason, is unconditionally practical. Finally, we will talk about the distinction between will and arbitrariness, emphasizing its meaning for the understanding the concept of autonomy and its relation to Kant's concept of anthropology and human nature.