Suchergebnisse

As a figure of thought, the concept of freedom tends to shuttle between abstraction and ideal -- the first exemplified by Isaiah Berlin's contrast between negative and positive liberty, and the second by Philip Pettit's neo-republican conception of freedom as non-domination. Located within the realm of lived experience however, freedom is invariably forged from context-specific constraints, hence the title of the proposed pamphlet: degrees of freedom. The point of departure is to approach freedom as a practice which is 'conditioned' by enclosures of power/knowledge which are also enclosures of the imagination. In terms of destination, the objective is to explore the question of how to breach such enclosures, thereby opening out spaces for alternative ways of practising freedom to emerge. The analysis will encompass three fields of practice and examine how freedom is drawing inwards around the freedom to compete in a zero-sum game among winners and losers. To get to grips with the 'how' of this requires dispensing with analytical tools that operate on the basis of dichotomy (such as power/resistance, freedom/domination, top-down/bottom-up) while also stretching the analysis across distinct-yet-related fields of action. The book will thus begin with a brief discussion that sets out key concepts and ideas before putting these to work through an analysis of 1. Sport & Academia, and 2. Art.

To rescue the concept of freedom for the soc sci's, one must distinguish between its purely emotive usages & its various descriptive meanings. Operational definitions are given for freedom & unfreedom in the interpersonal sense (for expressions such as: 'A leaves B free to do either (mean - average) or y or z'; 'With respect to A, B is unfree to do x'. E.g. the latter expression is defined as follows: 'A makes it impossible for B to do x, or A would punish B if B did x'). Thus defined, statements about interpersonal freedom & unfreedom can be empirically tested. Interpersonal unfreedom is not identical with control or power; A may make B unfree to do (mean - average) without controlling B's behavior, & vice versa. The concept of freedom of action does not refer to someone's freedom, but to his ability to do something. The distinction between 'negative' & 'positive' freedom is therefore untenable. (AA - IPSA).