Suchergebnisse

Problems facing the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, which in Oct. 1990 was voted in to replace the Communists.

Of all the post-Soviet states, the challenge of managing ethnic diversity has perhaps been the most problematic in Georgia. Following the secessions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s, Georgia has recent experience not only of the radicalization of ethnic relations but also of defeat in violent ethnic conflict. Current debates surrounding the conceptualization and management of ethnic diversity are thus inseparable from urgent questions concerning the future of the Georgian state, and explanations of the conflicts and questions of power and domination. Perceptions of the issue are further overshadowed by memories of the chauvinist rhetoric and illiberal policies of the early phase of sovereignty under President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Abroad, perceptions of Georgia as a "micro-empire" continue to be fuelled by references to the Gamsakhurdia era, above all in the Russian press, and short-sighted recourse in Western sources to theories of "ancient hatreds." Defeat also means that contrary to demographic evidence of a proportional expansion of the ethnic Georgian population, independence has not imparted to the Georgian majority a sense of security associated with majority status. As a result of Georgia's apparent inability to influence outcomes in either the peace processes or internal developments in the seceded territories, and the decline in the Georgian population in real terms, the attainment of sovereignty has not allayed Georgian fears of either permanent territorial fragmentation or ethnic "degradation." Georgians consequently approach issues of majority-minority relations from a position of perceived weakness, coupled with as yet unfulfilled "post-colonial" desires for Georgianization.

Something amazing happened in Georgia's 1 October 2012 parliamentary elections. The government lost and it gave up power, aside from the now-weakened presidency that it will hold for another year. A new coalition known as Georgian Dream ran under the leadership of Georgia's richest man, the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and won 85 seats in the unicameral, 150-member Parliament. Georgia's post-Soviet background and circumstances make the 2012 opposition win and subsequent orderly handover of power truly remarkable. Indeed, among the "competitive authoritarian" regimes found in what used to be the USSR, it is nearly unheard of. Georgia is lucky to be getting a fourth chance at democracy, after the opportunities under Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990–92), Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003), and Saakashvili faded. But this chance remains a fragile one.

Examines various issues of conflict and tension between post-Soviet Georgia and Russia after introducing Georgia's seeming lack of good luck with its leadership exemplified by Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shavardnadze. It is hoped that the third and current president, Mikhail Saakasvilli, who replaced Shavardnadze, will more successfully address Georgia's realities and potentials and not fail after an initial rule of extreme popularity as did the first two presidents. Rocky Russian-Georgian relations, the "rose' revolution, Georgia's approach to terrorism, border-crossing visas between the countries, a framework agreement, Russian military bases in Georgia, the rights of Meskhetian Turks, territorial issues regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, United States' policy interests toward Georgia, and Russia's future relations with Georgia are scrutinized. It is concluded that the desire for improved Russian-Georgian relations exists, but it is clear Georgia's foreign policy strategy must yet clarify its real policy interests against its idealistic objectives in order to quicken the process of moving from mistrust to reliable dialogue and effective cooperation.

In this article, I tell the history of the "national form" of Georgian socialist realism, in light of a theoretical question: Was a national (peripheral) socialist realism possible, or did it only vary the forms created at the center? If it was possible, then what were its specifics, its differences from "central" socialist realism? Furthermore, did it have a reverse impact on multinational Soviet literature? I will demonstrate that "peripheral" socialist realism not only varied the forms created at the center but generated its own forms in a complex interaction of national tradition, modernism (national, European, and Russian), and central socialist realism. I examined a form that is specific to Georgian socialist realism, the "Great Georgian Novel," an amalgam of history and myth that interprets the history of Georgia; its "metanarrative." I analyze the development of the national form from the beginning of the socialist realism exemplified by the poetic collection The New Colchis (1937) (the historicization of mythology), the historical novels of Konstantine Gamsakhurdia (1939–56), the mythologization of history to the literary de-Stalinization exemplified by the Novels by Otar Chiladze (A Man Went Down the Road, 1973), and Chabua Amirejibi (Data Tutashkhia, 1972–75).