Contrary to expectations that the election results would necessitate a new coalition government, the recent parliamentary elections in Georgia have secured a constitutional majority for the Georgian Dream. This is evidence that Georgia remains steadfast in its Euro-Atlantic course, as well as signalling growing political stability and a sustained commitment to reforms. However, concerns are rising over the new government's super-majority and the recent introduction of constitutional amendments that could threaten the system of checks and balances. Upholding its democratic credentials will also depend on the government's ability to preserve political pluralism, ensure the development of media freedoms, continue work towards a depoliticized judiciary, and move beyond its retributive style of governance. Moreover, enduring economic problems and the unresolved issue of the breakaway territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where local governments have been deepening their relations with Moscow, remain key challenges. These will all need to be addressed, at home and among Georgia's Western partners, as the country continues to aspire to EU and NATO membership.
Since 2011 Bidzina Ivanishvili and the "Georgian Dream" Coalition started large-scale lobbying activity in the United States of America. In its firsts stage, the lobbyists were tasked to argue for fair, open and honest elections in 2012 and to organize meetings of the Georgian Dream representatives with the high-rank officials of the US. These efforts were aimed to conduct PR, to raise Ivanishvili's recognition in the West and "to show the real face" of Mikheil Saakashvili.The Georgian Press actively covered the controversial topics of lobbying efforts of Mikheil Saakashvili and Bidzina Ivanishvili. With the appearance of billionaire Ivanishvili in the Georgian politics, the fact that Georgia has been using lobbying assistance in the United States since 1991 has become widely known to the Georgian Society.Bidzina Ivanishvili began hiring lobbyists in the US right after his appearence on the Georgian poliical stage. As use of his financial assets were limited in Georgia, he directed his funds to the West. From November 2011 until his emergence in the government of Georgia, 6 lobbying companies were paid USD 1 095 635 in total.Lobbying activities of Bidzina Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream can be reviewed in two phases: the pre-election period, before the Georgian Dream came to the government of the country and after its emergence in the government of Georgia. Unlike its predecessor, with assuming political leadership of the country, the Georgian Dream abruptly reduced both, the number of hired lobbyists and the amount of money paid for their service. The contracts signed with most of these lobbying companies were terminated and only two companies - Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP and the Harbour Group - were maintained in the US for further partnership. They rotects the interests of Georgia in the US and are tasked to increase support of Georgia among the political and civil leaders of the US and to back-up its foreign policy throiugh media coverage. According to the signed contract these companies are paid USD 320 000.The study proves that Bidzina Ivanishvili managed to neutralize the nine-year-long lobbying campaign of its main opponent – the United National Movement's political force. There was no such precedent before 2011, as the oppositon parties did not have enough funds to carry out lobbying campaign on such scale against Mikheil Saakashvili's government.
Something amazing happened in Georgia's 1 October 2012 parliamentary elections. The government lost and it gave up power, aside from the now-weakened presidency that it will hold for another year. A new coalition known as Georgian Dream ran under the leadership of Georgia's richest man, the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and won 85 seats in the unicameral, 150-member Parliament. Georgia's post-Soviet background and circumstances make the 2012 opposition win and subsequent orderly handover of power truly remarkable. Indeed, among the "competitive authoritarian" regimes found in what used to be the USSR, it is nearly unheard of. Georgia is lucky to be getting a fourth chance at democracy, after the opportunities under Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990–92), Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003), and Saakashvili faded. But this chance remains a fragile one.
The main hypothesis, making me to write this article was about the importance of archetypes, sounded as the following: when political brand is losing its archetypes it dies. To confirm or deny this hypothesis the goal was to explain the importance of video tape of abuse in a prison released during 2012 Parliament Elections of Georgia. The question is why it was so effective and damaging for the governing "United National Movement of Georgia"? The comparison of TV advertisement budgets of the main rival political organizations is very surprising. It shows that the governing political party - "United National Movement" spent 10 times more than (approximately 11 million GEL - more than 6 million USD) its main competitor "Georgian Dream", (having spent only 123833 GEL - around 71000 USD) but lost historical elections, against the fresh political alliance. "Opinion polls taken by the U.S. National Democratic Institute in June and August 2012—before the release of the videos-seemed to indicate that more Georgianspreferred United National Movement to Georgian Dream and that support for GD may have weakened" (Nichol, 2012). The survey of focus group members was conducted for the purposes of this article to know their attitude to subjects of elections – political parties and their leaders - five focus groups consisting of the total of 63 people before and after the elections.
Except historical Diasporas, more than million citizens of Georgia live abroad at present. Majority of them shall be considered as temporary migrants who are gone abroad, looking for jobs. The diasporas have a great importance as for its representatives' family also for Georgian economics. In accordance with the abovementioned Georgia needs well-planned policy regarding to Diaspora. One of the most important challenges for Georgian political parties is study of interests of Diaspora members, their problems and ways for more close relationships with Georgia, and relevant political elaboration of the mentioned issues. In the article based on the content analysis of the pre-election platforms of political subject which participated in the 2016 parliamentary elections is discussed their visions regarding to the relationship with Diaspora. Namely, in the work is discussed that part of the election programs of those political parties, which overcame 5% threshold and got into parliament. ("Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia"; "United National Movement", "Alliance of Patriots of Georgia"). Also is presented the programs of those parties which overcame 3% threshold ("Nino Burjanadze - Democratic Movement"; "Irakli Alasania – Free Democrats"; "Georgian Labour Party"; "Paata Burchuladze-State for the People"); "Georgian Dream" related with the other parties paid great attention to diaspora in its election program. Party fixed its attention on those projects which had been already fulfilled or were planned to be implemented after their win in elections. In the Article the part of pre-election platform of "Georgian Dream" related to the Diaspora is compared with the "Migration Strategy of Georgia of 2016-2020", which was drafted during their government period. In the election programs of "United National Movement" and "Irakli Alasania – Free Democrats" nothing was said about the Georgian citizens living abroad. "Alliance of Patriots of Georgia" in their pre-election program paid attention only on the historical Diaspora of Georgia living in Turkey. "Nino Burjanadze – Democratic Movement" regarding to the Diaspora was talking about the importance of the creation of "Georgian Houses" abroad, which would be focused on the promotion of Georgian culture. "Georgian Labour Party" discussed the importance of the "Returning Fund", which served to the return back of Georgia to its past, their arrangement and adaptation. "Georgian Dream" in its policy regarding Diaspora may take into account initiatives of other parties. For example "Georgian Houses" and "Returning Fund".
Even though the country is a regional frontrunner, Georgian democracy is not yet consolidated. Parliamentary elections in 2016 saw the governing Georgian Dream returned with a constitutional majority. The October 2017 local elections brought the ruling party another sweeping victory. Despite Georgian Dream's overwhelming electoral successes, the country faces voter apathy. Alongside lack of parliamentary controls and a fragmentation of the party-political spectrum this does not bode well for consolidating democracy in the near future.
В статье рассматриваются расклад политических сил перед парламентскими выборами в Грузии 2016 г., их ход и итоги, а также влияние на текущее состояние российско-грузинских отношений. За 25 лет грузинская политическая система прошла непростой путь становления. К началу 2010-х гг. в стране фактически сложилась однопартийная система, на базе которой и сформировался режим М. Саакашвили. Но на парламентских выборах 2012 г. система рухнула. Вопреки многочисленным прогнозам, победила новая политическая сила оппозиционная коалиция «Грузинская мечта» во главе с Б. Иванишвили. Тем не менее выборы 2016 г. показали, что старая система воспроизводится: речь снова идет о доминировании одной политической партии, обладающей при этом невнятной идеологией и программой. Главное достоинство «Грузинской мечты» ее прагматизм и реалистичность. Проигравшие же политические силы оказались в ситуации глубокого и практически безвыходного кризиса. Однако перед правящей партией стоят серьезные вызовы. Грузинская экономика переживает не лучшие времена. Перспективы интеграции страны в западное экономическое и военно-политическое пространство также неочевидны. Отношения с Россией, несмотря на ряд положительных тенденций, имеют ряд существенных политических ограничений, которые вынуждена учитывать любая политическая сила, оказавшаяся у власти в Грузии. Диаметрально противоположные позиции Москвы и Тбилиси в отношении проблемы Абхазии и Южной Осетии не позволяют надеяться на фундаментальные изменения в политическом диалоге, который находится в полузамороженном состоянии.The article deals with the distribution of political forces before the parliamentary elections in Georgia in 2016, their process and results, their influence on the current status of the relations between Georgia and Russia. For 25 years, Georgian political system has passed a difficult way of development. By the early 2010s in fact the country had developed a one-party system on the basis of which the regime of Saakashvili was formed. However, at the parliamentary elections in 2012 the system collapsed. Contrary to numerous predictions a new political force "Georgian Dream " led by V Ivanishvili won. Nevertheless, the elections of 2016 has shown that the old system is recurring: the question is about the dominance of one political party without obvious ideology and program. The main advantage of "Georgian Dream" is its pragmatism and realism. The defeated political forces have tackled a situation of deep and almost desperate crisis. However, the ruling party is facing serious challenges. The Georgian economy is going through hard times. The perspectives of integration in western economic, military and political space for the country is unobvious. The relations with Russia despite some positive tendencies have some significant political constraints which every ruling political force in Georgia shall take into consideration. Diametrically opposite positions of Moscow and Tbilisi related to the problem of Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not allow to expect a fundamental change in the political dialogue which has a semi-frozen status.
Studying the external policy of the king Erekle II is a topical issue for the modern historiography. The information maintained in the archives of various European cities, namely of Vienna, Vatican and Venice, convey to us the fact that while exercising pragmatic attitude toward relations with the European countries the King of Kartli and Kakheti considered the interests of both his own country and of those European countries as well. Over the years 1781-82 Erekle II sends his ambassadors to Europe twice: first he sends a Capuchin monk Domenique who dies in Constantinople in uncertain circumstances not having reached the destination; after him Erekle II sends another Capuchin Mauro the Veronese who also dies for unknown reasons while still on his way. It is a very important fact that the letters sent by the King Erekle, unlike the ambassadors, reach their destination which is the Emperor's Court in Austria. The present article shows the international political background that the king Erekle II had at that time and that he attempted to use for the interests of his country. The plan of dividing Europe anew, officially developed by the relevant imperial authorities of Saint Petersburg and Vienna, aimed at neutralizing the Ottoman Empire and dividing its territories. According to the Greek Project, it was supposed to resurrect the Byzantine Empire that would be formally independent from Russia but factually acting as a marionette with the Romanov dynasty ruling in it and build Dacia Kingdom as a buffer between the Ottoman and the Austrian Empires. This project was topical for Erekle II who was trying to get involved in the international political processes to the maximum level as the king of a sovereign and independent country, as in the result of implementation of the Greek Project Georgia would obtain an environment of Christian countries instead of the previous encirclement by Muslim countries. Thus, Georgia would find herself in an absolutely different qualitative dimension that had been a sacred dream of the ...
The author looks at the key foreign policy trends and changes that became obvious after the parliamentary elections of October 2012. The article's first part describes Georgia's foreign policy under President Saakashvili when Georgia received its first conceptual documents-the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine-both geared toward Europe and the closest possible cooperation with NATO, revised regional relations, and a new agenda. The second part deals with the changes in Georgia's foreign policy that took place after the presidential elections of 1 October, 2012, when the opposition Georgian Dream Coalition won the majority of seats in the Georgian parliament and the post of prime minister for its leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili. The newly emerging relations between Georgia and Russia and the efforts of the Georgian leaders to resume their dialog with Moscow are also analyzed. The concluding part offers an overview of Georgia's relations with the European structures, its progress toward an association with the European Union, the course of the talks, and the way this association will affect the main spheres of the country's life.
Հոդվածը նվիրված է հետխորհրդային շրջանում Վրաստանի արտաքին քաղաքականության կայացման, զարգացման և հետագա փոփոխությունների ուսումնասիրությանը։ Վերլուծվել են Վրաստանի արտաքին քաղաքականության հայեցակարգային փաստաթղթերը և հիմնական գերակայությունները (եվրոպական և եվրատլանտյան ինտեգրում) Միխայիլ Սաակաշվիլու կառավարման տարիներին։ Դիտարկվել են նաև արտաքին քաղաքական այն բոլոր փոփոխությունները, որոնք կատարվել են 2012թ. հոկտեմբերի խորհրդարանական ընտրություններից հետո, այդ թվում և ուղղակի երկխոսության հաստատումը Ռուսաստանի հետ։ Դիտարկվել են այն փաստաթղթերը, որոնք ընդունվել են Վրաստանի նոր ղեկավարության կողմից՝ «Վրացական երազանք» կոալիցիայի գլխավորությամբ։ ԱՄՆ Ազգային դեմոկրատական ինստիտուտի վերջին սոցհետազոտության տվյալների հիման վրա վերլուծվել են Վրաստանի բնակչության կողմից երկրի արտաքին քաղաքականության և դրա հիմնական գերակայությունների վերաբերյալ ընկալումները։ ; The article studies establishment, development and further transformation of Georgia's foreign policy in the post-Soviet period. The study analyzes the concept papers and main priorities of Georgian foreign policy – European and Euro Atlantic integration, in the period of Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency. The study also considers the foreign policy changes that occurred after the parliamentary elections in 2012, including involvement in a direct dialog with Russia. The author reviews the documents adopted by the new Georgian leadership under the Georgian Dream coalition. In addition, an analysis of Georgian population's perceptions of the country's foreign policies and its priorities is provided based on the data of a recent social survey conducted by the US National Democratic Institution.
In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed "Rose revolution". This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia's eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili's party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement "Georgian Dream", led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili's electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters' trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter's efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow's economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia's agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country's economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition "Georgian Dream".
In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed "Rose revolution". This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia's eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili's party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement "Georgian Dream", led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili's electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters' trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter's efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow's economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia's agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country's economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition "Georgian Dream".
In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed "Rose revolution". This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia's eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili's party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement "Georgian Dream", led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili's electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters' trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter's efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow's economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia's agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country's economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition "Georgian Dream".
In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed "Rose revolution". This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia's eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili's party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement "Georgian Dream", led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili's electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters' trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter's efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow's economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia's agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country's economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition "Georgian Dream".
We have got a problem of fair,free and democratic elections in Georgia today. The battle between political parties is a battle for gaining the authority what is out of ethic and fairness and all in all, humpers to stabilize the political process. It is important that politicians can't get used to this situation and it is happened regularly to lay down the "party behavior ethical code" from political parties in pre-election period.The target of this article is to research the attempts of laying down the party behavior ethical code in Georgia 2012-2016 years. The method of research is content-analyze. The question which is discussed in this article hasn't been studied yet.On 14 july in 2012 the governmental party ''National Movement" was published the declaration with its 4 stages about the rules of political party behavior during the election company in the reason of fair, free and peaceful elections.All in all, this declaration consisted 5 stages and 17 recommendations after including political parties and nongovernmental sector. This declaration was realized as a PR action of government by the main opposition coalition ''Georgian dream".The same happened before the parlament elections in 2016. On 20 june in 2016, the presenters of ''Free Democrates" were presented the project '' about ethical rules in election period" by Viktor Dolidze at the parlament session. This project wasn't approved by ''National Movement". Admittedly, this party was an initiator of the similar document several years ago when it was the government party.On 21 September, in 2016, the leading party ''Georgian dream-Democratic Georgia'' was published " Peace Memorandum". This document was called just a blank paper by the main opposition party which is "National movement" and didn't join them.Above-mentioned initiatives can't be called the ethical code of political party behavior, because it is an idea of not hampering political parties to each other in election companies, but ethical behavior in politics shouldn't be run out of it. Ethic's aim is to study moral behavior practically and prove fairness in society what isn't realized from political parties in this initiatives.
