How to influence Government policy
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation
ISSN: 1471-5430
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation
ISSN: 1471-5430
In: Concepts of Transportation Economics, S. 237-258
In: The Secret War Against Sweden; Naval Policy & History, S. 191-228
In: Public administration: the journal of the Australian regional groups of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 104-116
ISSN: 1467-8500
In: Chicago-Kent Law Review, Band 94, Heft 593
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In: The political quarterly, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 283-295
ISSN: 1467-923X
Defence date: 20 November 2015 ; Examining Board: Professor Russell Cooper, Penn State University, Supervisor; Professor Elena Carletti, EUI & Bocconi University; Professor Yan Bai, University of Rochester; Professor Alexander Guembel, Toulouse School of Economics ; This thesis consists of two chapters exploring how even benevolent governments may struggle to convince their citizens that they will stick to the policies that ensure the best outcomes in equilibrium. If people believe that the government will optimally choose a different policy in the event of a crisis, their reaction to that belief may in fact bring about just such a crisis. This thesis investigates the circumstances in which these kinds of commitment problems can be overcome. The first chapter is on bank resolution, where the choice between resolving insolvent banks and bailing them out creates a time inconsistency problem. To deter banks from taking excessive risks, governments want to convince them that they will choose resolution. However, when facing the costs of liquidating banks, governments may be tempted to bail them out instead. By strengthening their bank resolution regimes, governments reduce these costs, thus credibly committing themselves to choosing resolution over bailouts. Governments with greater resources face a more severe commitment problem. When banks interact strategically, improving the resolution regime can eliminate equilibria in which they coordinate on risky investment strategies. In the second chapter, Antoine Camous and I present a theory linking the cyclicality of fiscal policy to inherited public debt. When debt is low, fiscal policy is countercyclical, in the sense that the government responds to reductions in output by cutting the tax rate. Above a threshold level of debt, however, optimal fiscal policy becomes procyclical. This creates the possibility of self-fulfilling crises, in which output is low because workers expect high taxes, and the government sets high taxes because output is low. Our model suggests why highly indebted governments might implement procyclical fiscal policy during recessions, even without facing high sovereign risk premia.
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__Abstract__ What ought government to do? This has been the guiding question of the research that resulted in this Dissertation. In it, the author makes a number of contributions to the field of public economics by challenging conventional wisdom on optimal taxation, optimal redistribution, and optimal minimum wages. Among other things, it is shown how government should use corrective taxation when people do not always act in their own interest, why a decrease of the minimum wage is part of a reform that would make everybody better off, and that income taxation and unemployment benefits should be higher in times of high involuntary unemployment. __In Dutch__ Verlaag het minimumloon en compenseer mensen met een laag inkomen via lastenverlichting. Dat advies geeft econoom Aart Gerritsen de overheid in zijn proefschrift 'Essays in Optimal Government Policy'. Volgens hem kan herverdeling van inkomens beter worden georganiseerd door middel van progressieve belastingen dan met het wettelijk minimumloon. Gerritsen verwerpt verder een aantal conventionele wijsheden over zowel het wettelijk minimumloon als optimaal belastingbeleid. Zo pleit hij voor hogere inkomstenbelasting en werkloosheidsuitkeringen ten tijde van economische tegenspoed. Gerritsen analyseerde voor zijn proefschrift de effecten van minimumloon en lastenverlichting op het netto-inkomen van laagbetaalden. Hij stelt dat discussies over het minimumloon doorgaans gebrekkig zijn omdat ze niet ingaan op alternatieve manieren van herverdeling. Volgens Gerritsen is er echter een andere manier om het netto-inkomen van laagbetaalden te verhogen: via de belastingen. Op basis van zijn analyse komt hij tot de conclusie dat een verlaging van het minimumloon, gecompenseerd door lastenverlichting voor lage inkomens, sociaal wenselijk is. Net als een hoger minimumloon kan ook een lastenverlichting leiden tot een hoger netto-inkomen voor laagbetaalden. Er zijn echter twee punten waarop een minimumloon cruciaal verschilt van een belastingverlaging voor deze groep. Aan de ene kant leidt een minimumloon tot hogere loonkosten en daardoor tot hogere werkloosheid onder laaggeschoolden. Dit is een welvaartsverlies. Aan de andere kant biedt deze hogere werkloosheid onder laaggeschoolden hen prikkels om meer te investeren in scholing om op die manier aan de hogere werkloosheid te ontkomen. Dit is een welvaartswinst, omdat hoger geschoolden doorgaans meer belasting betalen. Op basis van data van een groot aantal OESO-landen concludeert Gerritsen dat voor vrijwel ieder land de winst van het scholingseffect te klein is om de schade van het werkloosheidseffect te kunnen compenseren. Gerritsen adviseert dan ook een lager minimumloon met compensatie via lastenverlichting. Hogere uitkeringen Gerritsen ontwikkelde daarnaast nieuwe inzichten op het gebied van de inkomstenbelasting. Zowel belastingen als uitkeringen geven werknemers prikkels om minder te werken. Normaal leidt dit tot minder economische activiteit en zijn ze daarom schadelijk voor de economie. Gerritsen laat zien dat deze logica niet opgaat tijdens perioden van hoge werkloosheid. Er zijn dan immers al teveel mensen op zoek naar werk die het niet kunnen vinden. Het ontmoedigende effect van belastingen en uitkeringen leidt er in dat geval toe dat mensen die weinig belang hechten aan werk vrijwillig uittreden of minder gaan werken. Dit is sociaal wenselijk omdat zij hiermee ruimte creëren op de arbeidsmarkt voor mensen die meer belang hechten aan een baan. Om die reden zouden de inkomstenbelasting en werkloosheidsuitkeringen hoger moeten zijn ten tijde van economische tegenspoed, aldus Gerritsen. Tot slot breekt Gerritsen met de standaard economische welvaartsanalyse, die aanneemt dat mensen altijd in hun eigen belang handelen. Hij analyseert data over het subjectieve welzijn van Britten en komt tot de conclusie dat werknemers met een laag inkomen gemiddeld minder werken dan goed is voor henzelf. Werknemers met een hoog inkomen werken gemiddeld juist meer dan goed voor hen is. Om dit te corrigeren, zou de Britse overheid lagere marginale belastingtarieven voor de onderkant en hogere marginale belastingtarieven voor de bovenkant van de inkomensverdeling moeten doorvoeren.
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by Wong Hong Man Thomas. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-69). ; Acknowledgements ; Abstracts ; Chapter Chapter1 --- Introduction ; Chapter 1.1 --- Appropriate Role of Government in Economic Development 1 - --- p.3 ; Chapter 1.2 --- Government and Infrastructure --- p.3-4 ; Chapter 1.3 --- "Division of Labor, Intermediate Inputs and Economic Development" --- p.4-6 ; Chapter 1.4 --- "Relationships Among Infrastructure, Intermediate Inputs and Final Goods" --- p.7-11 ; Chapter Chapter2 --- Literature Review ; Chapter 2.1 --- The related Work in Literature of Development Economics --- p.12-14 ; Chapter 2.2 --- The Related Work in Literature of Economics of Infrastructure --- p.14-15 ; Chapter 2.3 --- The Related Work in Literature of Increasing returns to Scale and Multiple Equilibria --- p.15-19 ; Chapter Chapter3 --- The Basic Model ; Chapter 3.1 --- Basic Assumption of the Model --- p.20-20 ; Chapter 3.2 --- Technology and Increasing Returns to Scale --- p.21-23 ; Chapter 3.3 --- Market Equilibrium Conditions --- p.23-25 ; Chapter 3.4 --- Relative Cost Function --- p.25-33 ; Chapter Chapter4 --- Government Policy and Production Cost ; Chapter 4.1 --- Relative Cost Function and the Selection of Equilibrium --- p.34-43 ; Chapter Chapter5 --- Government Policy and National Income ; Chapter 5.1 --- Optimal Level of Public Input --- p.44-50 ; Chapter 5.2 --- The Ranking of Equilibria --- p.50-54 ; Chapter 5.3 --- The Mismatch --- p.54-56 ; Chapter Chapter6 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.57-61 ; Figure 1 --- p.62-62 ; Appendix A --- p.63-63 ; Appendix B --- p.64-66 ; Reference --- p.67-69
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In: Ekonomičnyj visnyk universytetu: zbirnyk naukovych pracʹ učenych ta aspirantiv = Ėkonomičeskij vestnik universiteta : sbornik naučnych trudov učenych i aspirantov = University economic bulletin : collection of scientific articles of scientists and post-graduate students, Heft 52, S. 84-89
ISSN: 2414-3774
Relevance of the research topic. Ensuring purposeful influence on social development requires the formation and implementation of effective state policy in social protection, taking into account the adaptive changes of institutional support in the financial and budgetary sphere. Reasonable choice of instruments of state policy in social protection will help stabilize socio-economic processes and improve the welfare of citizens. Formulation of the problem. Essential tasks in current conditions are: increasing social efficiency and ensuring social justice; improving the tools of state regulation of social processes; optimal choice of tools to strengthen financial security in social protection; optimization of the structure of budget expenditures on social protection and social security. Analysis the latter research and publications. Problems of formation and implementation of government policy of social protection are pretty common in research. These are the works of famous foreign and domestic scientists: J. Keynes, F. Lassalle, P. Samuelson, A. Smith, V. Tanzi, L. Barannik, S. Kachula, L. Kozarezenko, E. Libanova, L. Lysyak, I. Lukyanenko, A. Mazaraki, V. Makogon, O. Nasibova, M. Pasichny, D. Polozenko, I. Chugunov and others. Selection of unexplored parts of the general problem. The above issues are relevant in connection with the deteriorating trend of socio-economic development, which requires the solution of some specific tasks related to improving the soundness of state policy in social protection. Problem setting, research goals. The objectives of the study are: to reveal the role of public policy in the field of social protection at this stage of development of public relations; to substantiate the peculiarities of the formation and implementation of state policy in the field of social protection; to analyze and evaluate the state budget expenditures on social protection and social security. The study aims to reveal the strategic directions of state policy in the field of social protection in the context of institutional change. Methods. The article uses a set of research methods: a systematic approach, statistical analysis, structuring, synthesis, etc. Results. The role of government policy of social protection at the current stage is revealed. The peculiarities of the formation and implementation of social protection are substantiated. Furthermore, we analyzed and assessed central budget expenditures on social protection and social security. Finally, the strategic directions of the state policy in the field of social protection of the population in the conditions of institutional transformations are determined. Practical implications. The study results can be used in the process of forming and implementing budget policy. Conclusions. Developing an effective government policy in social protection implies the need to adapt its tools to socio-economic processes. In the development of social relations, strengthening the role of social protection in stabilizing social processes is an important task to improve the financial mechanism of social security based on in-depth analysis and evaluation of budget expenditures on social protection and social security.
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Working paper
This paper asks: What is the effect of government policy on output and inequality in an environment with education and labor-supply decisions? The answer is given in a general equilibrium model, consistent with the post 1960s facts on male wage inequality and labor supply in the U.S. In the model, education and labor-supply decisions depend on progressive income taxation, the education system, the social security system, and technology-driven wage differentials. Government policies affect output and inequality through two channels. First, a policy change leads to an asymmetric adjustment of working hours and savings of schooled and unschooled individuals. Second, there is a redistribution of the workforce between schooled and unschooled workers. Using a battery of proposed government policies, we demonstrate that skill redistribution dampens the response of wage inequality to a policy change and amplifies the response of output by an additional 1 to 2 percent.
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In: Government publications review: an international journal, Band 9, Heft 5, S. 401-406
In: Voprosy ėkonomiki: ežemesjačnyj žurnal, Heft 11, S. 51-61
Russian government has prepared the package of measures to help the country's financial system maintain financial stability. The paper discusses the state measures and formulates the propositions of Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). The most important ones include coordination of regulators, unsecured refinancing and refinancing of external debts, guarantees of interbank loans, budget deposits in banks. The author analyzes subordinated loans for Russian banks from the state budget, nationalization of several banks and the future of government intervention in the stock market. Special attention is paid to the Deposit Insurance, the development of national credit rating system and the official information policy. The author believes that state measures need the following fine-tuning.
In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 69-70
ISSN: 1471-5430