For many years, advocates of a Scottish Parliament hoped that its eventual arrival would mark a new phase in local government: an increase in local autonomy and a redressing of the creeping centralization of the Conservative years. This article addresses the question: to what extent, if any, has there been a shift in the balance of power between centre and local government since the advent of a Scottish Parliament in 1999? It examines the pre- and post-1999 periods in this area of Scottish governance, focusing particularly on the legal/constitutional, financial and policy parameters set by the centre. It argues that continuity has been more important than change, and that reasons for the continued domination of the centre lie particularly with (a) the pervasive influence of the UK Union (b) a relative continuity in political actors and (c) the ongoing self-interest of the 'centre'.
PurposeParallel with business and society relationships, the business and government relationship needs greater attention. Business and government relations beyond short‐term lobbying could be seen as a strategic activity aimed at creating sustainable value for the company. As such it would become much easier to achieve competitive advantage and align the company's commercial with the public interest. This paper seeks to examine this issue.Design/methodology/approachThe paper aims to scan the issue with a view to further research.FindingsThe economic crisis and the imminent new wave of regulation make a new approach to lobbying more pressing.Originality/valueThe paper is based on political and economic writings and on practical experience in the public and private sector.
For the business and government relationship in Japan, the pre-war period was an era of considerable change. Framed by Japan's nation-building efforts, the relationship adapted and evolved with the often fluid economic and political circumstances. As both business and government had vested interests in the direction and success of Japan's industrialization process, on one level they became partners. At the same time, though, they were both stakeholders in the fiercely competitive iron and steel industry. This book explores how that partner-competitor relationship worked during the am.
In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 183-198
Due to its endurance, the Mexican political system is a highly interesting case study. This article analyzes the relations between the government and the ruling party, the well-known Institutional Revolutionary Party. Among other issues, it examines the patterns of recruitment, the clientelistic networks, and the decision-making processes. The study concludes with a series of observations on the future of the relations between the government and the ruling party in Mexico.
There is a tendency in the literature on business‐government relations in Canada to divide the post‐war era into two periods: that of elite accommodation comprising the 1950s and 1960s, and that of "mutual misunderstanding" beginning in 1968. This article argues that before this periodization thesis is accepted, we must acknowledge that the nature of business‐government relations is such that they will often be tension‐filled. Expectations of continuous harmony are unrealistic. Moreover, at any one time relations between business and government will vary widely in terms of form, substance, and the degree of mutual understanding. The article outlines the content of the periodization thesis and draws on 102 interviews with federal public servants at a variety of ranks and in a number of departments to examine its basic tenets. This research indicates that, contrary to the periodization thesis, relations between business persons and bureaucrats are close and often characterized by a sense of mutual dependency. Many bureaucrats depend heavily on business for the information needed to do their jobs, and very few are willing to undertake changes to existing policy without business support. Differences do exist among bureaucrats and the final section of the article identifies three policy types and outlines the style and form of business‐government relationships that bureaucrats in regulatory, distributional, and state management bureaus maintain. The article concludes with some general observations about business and government in advanced capitalist systems, drawing particular attention to the contradictory responsibilities of the state in these systems and arguing that those few expressions of state autonomy detected in the research are entirely in keeping with the nature of the state in capitalist systems.RésuméIl existe une tendance dans les textes qui traitent des relations entre l'Etat et le secteur privé au Canada de diviser l'après‐guerre en deux périodes; la période d'ac‐commodation de l'élite au cours des années 50 et 60 et la période de "méscntente mutuelle" qui a commencé en 1968. Cet article revendique qu'avant d'accepter cette thèse des périodes, nous devons accepter que la nature des relations entre le secteur privé et le secteur public rend inévitables les tensions. Des attentes d'harmonie continuelle ne sont pas réalistes. De plus, selon le moment, ces relations varient selon leur forme, leur contenu ct le degré d'entente mutuelle. Le présent article décrit le contenu de la thèse des périodes et utilise 102 entrevues effectuécs auprès des fonctionnaires fédéraux de différents niveaux et affectés à des services divers pour en examiner les fondements. Cette recherche indique que, contrairement à la thèse des périodes, les relations entre les hommes d'affaires et les bureaucrates sont étroites et souvent caractérisées par un sentiment de dépendance mutuelle. Plusieurs bureaucrates dépendent du secteur privé pour obtenir les renseignements nécessaires pour faire leur travail et très peu d'entre eux sont prêts à opérer des changements dans les politiques existantes sans l'appui du secteur privé. Il existe toutefois des différences chez les bureaucrates et la dernière portion de l'article identific trois types de politiques et décrit le style de rapports entre l' Etat et le secteur privé que maintiennent les bureaucrates dans les agences de réglementation, de distribution et de gestion gouvernmentale.L'article se termine sur des observations générales concernant le secteur privé et le gouvernement dans un système capitaliste, et porte une attention particulière sur les responsabilités contradictoires de l'Etat dans un tel système et note que les quelques expressions d'autonomie de la part de l'Etat décelées dans la recherche correspondent entièrement à la nature de l'Etat dans un système capitaliste.