Suchergebnisse

A review essay on books by (1) Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe. Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford: Oxford U Press, 2008); (2) Ian Bache & Andrew Jordan [Eds], The Europeanization of British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006/08). Adapted from the source document.

This article examines whether the thesis of classical realism that political states are primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power applies to the British Empire (1815-1914). The article questions to what extent the emergence of the British Empire (1815-1914) was driven by Britain's foreign policy to alter existing power structures in international relations. The article offers an overview of pre-imperial, imperial, and post-imperial strategies within the theory classical realism, and then applies these strategies to analyze the pre-imperial (1600-1815), imperial (1815-1914) period of the British Empire. A discussion of the post-imperial period focuses on Britain's maintenance of status quo and its alliance with the U.S. The article concludes that the theory of classical realism in international relations is useful to the discussion of the emergence, use, and maintenance of political power of the British Empire (1814-1915). This article is one in a series of articles on the topic of empires. References. E. Sundby

The rebirth of the Liberal Party (LP), which has taken place in recent yrs in GB, can be explained, according to certain experts, by the upheaval in pol'al life due to the revolt of the Mc's Mc's against the 2 major parties. The Conservatives are decadent with power, but their decline has not profited the worker. This phenomenon has its roots in the evolution of the society. About 1890, a rupture in the core of the LP occurred which was followed by the replacement of the LP by the Labor Party after 1920. After a new 30 yr cycle the line of separation between the major tendencies of British pol'al life is again a question. In effect, the Laborites have realized their program after 1945 & are therefore in a defensive position. The Conservatives have not made an issue of the Welfare State & have tended to be pol'ly moderate. However, the effect of the soc reforms has been to increase the numbers of the Mc while reducing the standard of living of the wealthy & improving that of the Wc. This Mc is not satisfied with the programs of the major parties, as has been demonstrated by various minor elections & opinion polls. However, it must be remembered that the voters behave differently in general elections than they do in minor elections. Be that as it may, the possibility of a Parliament without a majority, & with some 40 or so LP members making the diff between the 2 major parties, must not be ignored as an eventuality in the near future. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

If the struggle for power becomes a matter of decision for a pol'al party or pol'al figure in a democracy, the ensuing action may not be in accord with previous behavior. The British pol'al scene shows an actual example of this kind of applied psychol. The Suez affair & its subsequent crisis created a serious psychol'al crisis in GB, a crisis so severe that Harold Macmillan had to deal with it by original methods. Forced to take measures, such as the one giving British shipowners the right to again use the canal, which really indicate the decline in British power, he nevertheless succeeded in restoring public confidence. He took his cabinet ministers in hand by allowing them a large measure of individual initiative, unlike Eden who supervised the most minute details of admin'tion. His authority over the Conservative party was very rapidly reaffirmed, to the point where he was able to force Lord Salisbury to leave the Cabinet. In the end he managed to get the Conservatives in Parliament behind him, by channeling their dislike toward the Labor Party, & by also directing their animosity toward the US & the UN. His apparent calm & indifference allowed him to take a neutral position toward these scapegoats, leaving vindictiveness to his partisans by this device. All of his efforts, however, did not succeed in restoring his prestige with the public who are less sensitive to the psychol'al techniques of the leader than the politicians, & who measure a politician in terms of his accomplishments, which have not been, so far very favorable. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.