Suchergebnisse

This article focuses on the solidarity of EU member states with the so-called "front" country, Greece, which found itself during the migration crisis in 2015 and in the following years on the most burdened East-Mediterranean route, i.e. the route by sea from Turkey to Greece and onwards to various European Union countries. Refugees from Syria but also from Iraq and
Afghanistan continue to arrive along this route. The destinations for boats carrying immigrants and refugees via Turkey to Greece are the islands in the Aegean Sea including the island of Lesbos whereon the infamous Moria camp still plays a special role. The island which hosts Moria is the subject of European solidarity research with Greece. The structure of this article consists of three parts. The fi rst discusses the principle of solidarity which, like any community, lies at the heart of the European Union. Part Two deals with the migration crisis and its challenges regarding the solidarity of EU Member States from Greece. The third part focuses on the humanitarian consequences of the lack of solidarity between EU member states and Greece. The source material is scientifi c publications on the EU, information from EU portals and press agencies and their recordings of developments in Greece related to the infl ux of immigrants along the Eastern Mediterranean route along with the author's own observations
of the Moria camp during a visit at the end of November 2019. This article also partly refers to the new humanitarian challenges arising in the context of the situation of immigrants on their way to Europe during the Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19).

Unia Europejska od dekady podejmuje działania na rzecz konsolidacji rynków zbrojeniowych. Jednak istotną przeszkodą w tym procesie są zróżnicowane interesy, strategie bezpieczeństwa i możliwości poszczególnych państw członkowskich. Polska i Grecja są nielicznymi członkami UE, którzy w ostatnich latach zwiększają swoje wydatki obronne. Oba kraje jednak w swoich zakupach zbrojeniowych kierują się innymi celami. Polska obawia się lądowego starcia z przeciwnikiem posiadającym broń masowego rażenia i demonstrującym lekceważenie dla norm prawa międzynarodowego. Natomiast dla Grecji potencjalnym przeciwnikiem jest członek tego samego sojuszu wojskowego, bardziej przewidywalny w swoich zachowaniach, a ewentualne starcie miałoby charakter powietrzno-morski. Grecja natomiast bardziej niż Polska narażona jest na ataki terrorystyczne i niekontrolowane migracje. Polska posiada liczący się przemysł zbrojeniowy i część zapotrzebowania wojskowego może wyprodukować o własnych siłach. Grecja jest zmuszona do importowania o wiele większej ilości broni. Trudno więc liczyć na standaryzację uzbrojenia na europejskich rynkach czy też na znaczące zbliżanie strategii bezpieczeństwa rozmaitych członków UE. ; The European Union has been acting to consolidate arms markets for a decade. These endeavours have been seriously impeded by the diverse interests, security strategies and potential of individual member states. Poland and Greece are among the few EU members that have been increasing their defence expenditure in recent years. They are driven by different objectives when making their arms purchases, though. Poland fears a land confrontation with an enemy possessing weapons of mass destruction and demonstrating disregard for the norms of international law. Greece, in turn, sees a potential enemy in a member of the same military alliance, whose behaviour is more predictable, and where the potential confrontation would occur in the air and at sea. Greece is also at a greater risk of terrorist attacks and uncontrolled immigration than Poland. Poland has a considerable arms industry and is able to produce a part of its military supplies on its own. Greece is required to import weapons to a much greater extent. It is therefore difficult to assume the standardisation of weapons in European markets or any considerable convergence of security strategies implemented by different EU members. ; 8 ; Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

The Greek Civil War of 1946-1949 divided the Greek society into allies of the monarchy and supporters of the Communist Party of the Greece-led Transitional Democratic Government of Free Greece. The military arm of the leftist center was the Democratic Army of Greece. Until some time, the communist forces were actively supported by the countries of the Eastern Bloc: Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. However, the Stalin-Tito conflict, which intensified from 1948 onwards, contributed to the defeat of the Democratic Army of Greece, caused by the overwhelming military advantage of the monarchist forces. In mid-1949, a decision was made to evacuate partisan units and the civilian population that had been under their control to Albania. Also, Poland, a country that suffered greatly as a result of World War II, helped Greece. First, by providing food, military and medical equipment, and later by accepting over 13,000 children and adults, fighters and civilians from the areas covered by the war, all terribly tired of war and wandering. The group of migrants was organized from scratch, provided medical and social care, work, education, and access to culture. Migrations of people in search of shelter from conflicts, persecution, and poverty are not only a contemporary problem of the European Union. This article presents the reforms initiated by the government of the Polish People's Republic as a result of the escalation of the crisis in the Balkans. In Poland refugees from Greece found completely new living, civilization, cultural, geographical, and economic conditions. Gradually, they managed to settle in this foreign country. Today many of them are grateful to Poland for their help.

In 2015, global public opinion was shaken by the migration crisis, as wave after wave of refugees from the Middle East, primarily from Syria, tried to get from Turkey and Greece to Western Europe via the so-called 'Balkan Route'. In time, the situation only seemed to be resolved. In the Balkan countries, there still are, according to estimates, tens of thousands of migrants who failed to get farther west, and more are constantly arriving. Meanwhile, since 2018, one can speak of a new, though a much smaller wave of immigrants who are trying to get from Greece to Croatia (and thus to the European Union), increasingly often bypassing Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina along the way. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to the phenomenon of the so-called 'New Balkan Route' and the problems it creates for the Balkans.

Polish Presidency in spite of numerous attempts to meet the current European problems in 2011, had no significant impact on the planning of the next steps to avert finance crisis in Greece and other euro zone countries. Undoubted problem during the Presidency of RUE was intensified doubts about the accepted formula for aid to Greece. Over the period of the Polish presidency will be remembered as the time the severity of the crisis in the euro zone, which eclipsed the ambitious objectives of the Presidency flammable and, above all, the development of the concept of the Eastern Partnership, and the commitment to strengthen the EU's energy security. Lacking a coherent approach to the reform of the EU financial system Poland based its policy on blaming the responsibility for the current situation mainly strongest EU countries, including Germany. The controversial head of Polish diplomacy speech in Berlin at the beginning of the end of the first half of Polish emphatically demonstrates that the authorities in Poland a chance to deal with the current economic situation in the EU's strong commitment to see Germany than in the possibility of reaching a common position among the other members. Although Poland is not due to the state of the euro group in Warsaw authorities tried to exert political pressure to guarantee our country the opportunity to participate in meetings concerning the reform of the Community's financial policy. Is this goal has been achieved? Is Poland in the course of his presidency earned a positive evaluation of its commitment to the fight against the crisis? These questions are answered below article.

The article's objective is to analyse the process of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy towards North Macedonia. The author has attempted to present the main conceptual assumptions regarding this process, pointing to the multiplicity of definitions and research directions, and has subsequently highlighted the evolution of Greek foreign policy towards North Macedonia in the context of the Europeanisation of Greek diplomacy. In the conclusions, the author has emphasised that this particular Europeanisation is somewhat sinusoidal and is conditioned upon a number of factors, including the nature of relations between the Greek political elites and the society of that country. The article has also highlighted that Greece has gradually been shaping its image as a Europeanised country with a credible and predictable foreign policy.

The main purpose of the article is to present how the Greek- -Macedonian naming dispute influenced the problem of implementation the international identity of Macedonia. Despite the initial problems of the government in Skopje related to determining their international identity, Macedonians managed to define the principles regarding the identification of a new state on the international stage. As a small country with limited attributes to shape its international position, Macedonia has basically been determined to seek guarantees for its existence and security in stable and predictable European international structures such as NATO and the European Union. The main obstacle for Macedonians on the road to Euro-Atlantic structures was the veto of Greece, a member of these organizations, resulting from Athens' refusal to accept the name the Republic of Macedonia. The Prespa Agreement of 2018 gave a new impetus to the realization of the international identity of North Macedonia.

The last two years of development of the Russian political system were characterised by the protest mood increasing. Social discontent and various forms of political protest have become a noticeable element of social and political life. It is symptomatic that the protest mood develops during electoral campaigns (that predetermined the victory of the opposition in the elections in a number of regions), and also as a result of development and implementation of the current governmental processes. Considering that elections have been held in the majority of Russian regions during 2017-2019, the attention to the protest movement from various political actors will increase. The authors analyze the forms, main actors and technologies of protests, worked out their typology based on case studies. The current protest mood in Russia is compared with the situation in several EU countries (primarily in France, as well as in Portugal, Poland, Serbia and Greece). In conclusion of the article will be presented the forecasts of the socio-political situation development in the Russian Federation.

The European Union made the decision to launch the EULEX Kosovo mission on February 4, 2008. Its mandate was envisaged for 28 months from the approval of the Operation Plan (OPLAN), i.e. from February 16, 2008. As scheduled, the mission commenced on June 15, 2008, yet it failed to take over the responsibility for the tasks from the UNMIK mission of the United Nations. Owing to delays, the EULEX Kosovo mission achieved initial operational capability on December 9, 2009 and became fully operative on April 6, 2009. EULEX Kosovo is the largest mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The mission's status has aroused serious controversies as out of 27 EU member states, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, Romania and Cyprus have not recognized Kosovo as an independent state. As an organization, the European Union officially refers to the province as "Kosovo – under UN Security Council Resolution 1244." Since EULEX Kosovo remains operational and is an 'open' mission it is difficult to unanimously assess the efficiency of its operation. The mission has been operating under complicated political circumstances which result from the fact that Kosovo's independence has been approved by some of the EU states. ; The European Union made the decision to launch the EULEX Kosovo mission on February 4, 2008. Its mandate was envisaged for 28 months from the approval of the Operation Plan (OPLAN), i.e. from February 16, 2008. As scheduled, the mission commenced on June 15, 2008, yet it failed to take over the responsibility for the tasks from the UNMIK mission of the United Nations. Owing to delays, the EULEX Kosovo mission achieved initial operational capability on December 9, 2009 and became fully operative on April 6, 2009. EULEX Kosovo is the largest mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The mission's status has aroused serious controversies as out of 27 EU member states, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, Romania and Cyprus have not recognized Kosovo as an independent state. As an organization, the European Union officially refers to the province as "Kosovo – under UN Security Council Resolution 1244." Since EULEX Kosovo remains operational and is an 'open' mission it is difficult to unanimously assess the efficiency of its operation. The mission has been operating under complicated political circumstances which result from the fact that Kosovo's independence has been approved by some of the EU states.

The European Union made the decision to launch the EULEX Kosovo mission on February 4, 2008. Its mandate was envisaged for 28 months from the approval of the Operation Plan (OPLAN), i.e. from February 16, 2008. As scheduled, the mission commenced on June 15, 2008, yet it failed to take over the responsibility for the tasks from the UNMIK mission of the United Nations. Owing to delays, the EULEX Kosovo mission achieved initial operational capability on December 9, 2009 and became fully operative on April 6, 2009. EULEX Kosovo is the largest mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The mission's status has aroused serious controversies as out of 27 EU member states, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, Romania and Cyprus have not recognized Kosovo as an independent state. As an organizaSP 2 '10Misja EULEX Kosowo17tion, the European Union officially refers to the province as "Kosovo – under UN Security Council Resolution 1244." Since EULEX Kosovo remains operational and is an 'open' mission it is difficult to unanimously assess the efficiency of its operation. The mission has been operating under complicated political circumstances which result from the fact that Kosovo's independence has been approved by some of the EU states.