Suchergebnisse

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

Danmark var frem til Første Verdenskrig et af verdens rigeste lande med høj økonomisk vækst. I 1930 var Danmark fortsat et velstående land, men den økonomiske vækst lå ikke længere i toppen.00Denne bog afdækker, hvorfor Danmark så længe havde økonomisk succes, og hvorfor succesen ikke fortsatte. Bogen gør op med den gængse kollektive fortælling, at gårdmænd og andelsbevægelse var de dynamiske aktører bag Danmarks vej til velstand.00Det var byernes virksomheder inden for handel, søfart, finansiering og industri, der i samspil med udlandet, herunder udenlandske multinationale virksomheder, var bærere af innovation og erhvervsmæssig dynamik. De var en del af det internationalt orienterede videnssamfund, som staten siden enevælden havde bygget op.00Gårdmændene var i opposition til det moderne og urbane Danmark og kæmpede med Grundtvig i hånden for et agrart samfund domineret af mellemstore landbrugsvirksomheder. Ifølge dem ville Danmark blive et bedre og rigere land uden storkapitalister og selskabskapitalisme. I bondekapitalisternes fortælling repræsenterede andelsvirksomheder en særlig form for demokratisk kapitalisme, der var selskabskapitalismen moralsk overlegen. Og de havde stigende succes med at fremstille sig som heltene bag periodens økonomiske vækst og den nationale modernisering, politisk, økonomisk og kulturelt.00I kampen mod byerne og storkapitalisterne fik bondekapitalisterne hjælp af socialisterne. Og i 1920'erne fik de utilsigtet hjælp af byernes bankkapitalister, der gennem tvivlsom bankpraksis bragte bankerne i miskredit. Sparekasser med tættere forbindelse til landbruget fik fremgang og bidrog yderligere til bondekapitalismens ideologiske sejr