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Marxist and free-market economists and historians have tended to agree in regarding the peasantry as an obstacle to progress, hence doomed to vanish. Rediscovery of the indirect resistance (as opposed to insurrection) has revised this tendency to underestimate the resourcefulness of peasants. In view of this more favorable estimate of peasant resistance, the article examines peasant revolts from the fourteenth to early-sixteenth centuries. The best-known of these is the German Peasants' War of 1525, a failure that had permanent effects on the nature of the Lutheran Reform and the internal politics of the Empire. Other revolts were rather more successful. The peasants' uprising in Catalonia (1462-1486) led to the abolition of serfdom as did the English Rising of 1381 which was put down but which marked the beginning of a precipitous decline of servitude. Such revolts should not be seen as spasmodic manifestations of despair but rather as perceived opportunities that went beyond the everyday means of peasant evasion of the seigneurial system. The ideological context of these insurrections is more sophisticated than normally thought. Peasant were not trapped in a mentality that was closed off from all elite influence. An investigation into the nature and formulation of their grievances shows an ability to appropriate notions of Christian equality and human liberty that were widely shared and argued over by the higher order of society. ; Marxist and free-market economists and historians have tended to agree in regarding the peasantry as an obstacle to progress, hence doomed to vanish. Rediscovery of the indirect resistance (as opposed to insurrection) has revised this tendency to underestimate the resourcefulness of peasants. In view of this more favorable estimate of peasant resistance, the article examines peasant revolts from the fourteenth to early-sixteenth centuries. The best-known of these is the German Peasants' War of 1525, a failure that had permanent effects on the nature of the Lutheran Reform and the internal politics of the Empire. Other revolts were rather more successful. The peasants' uprising in Catalonia (1462-1486) led to the abolition of serfdom as did the English Rising of 1381 which was put down but which marked the beginning of a precipitous decline of servitude. Such revolts should not be seen as spasmodic manifestations of despair but rather as perceived opportunities that went beyond the everyday means of peasant evasion of the seigneurial system. The ideological context of these insurrections is more sophisticated than normally thought. Peasant were not trapped in a mentality that was closed off from all elite influence. An investigation into the nature and formulation of their grievances shows an ability to appropriate notions of Christian equality and human liberty that were widely shared and argued over by the higher order of society.

First ed. published in 1884 under title: Illustrations of the history of medieval thought in the departments of theology and ecclesiastical politics. ; Mode of access: Internet.

First edition published in 1884 under title: Illustrations of the history of medieval thought in the departments of theology and ecclesiastical politics. ; Mode of access: Internet.

First edition published in 1884 under title: Illustrations of the history of medieval thought in the departments of theology and ecclesiastical politics. ; Includes bibliographical references and index. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Russia is a very specific country, enjoying huge territories and the great variety of ethnic groups, that's why the attempt of studying the history of all, or just the largest regions is doomed to failure; that's why it's necessary to create a special course (or just a separate textbook) of historical ethnology. The study of the regional history in the school course of the medieval history of Russia is connected with the topic "The period of Feudal Partition of Rus"; traditionally Russian schools study the history of Kiev princedom, Galicia and Volhynia, Novgorod lands, Vladimir-Suzdal princedom. In the traditional Soviet text-books the history of princedoms in the period of partition was considered mainly static, only few concrete events were mentioned; in the modern text-books much more detailed concrete historical data are provided. The Northwest and the Southwest of Russia in the text-books is presented in fewer details because their role in the general history of Russia is less important. The study of Novgorod is focused mainly in peculiarities of economy, social structure and political system; the weak point of all contemporary textbooks is that tlie evolution of Novgorod from the 12th to the 15th century is hardly shown in them. In the chapters covering the epoch of the Golden Horde Yoke (Tatar rule) and the formation of the united Russian state school text-books naturally become Moscow-oriented. In the later editions, the advantage of the Moscow's position is proved more cautiously. Contemporary textbooks state, that in the end of the 13th - beginning of the 14th centuries several centres of unification of Russian lands could be found - Galicia - Volhynia, Lithuania, Tver and Moscow Princedoms. While studying the material dealing with the 16th century the students get acquainted with the history of Russian regions with the population of Kazan and Astrakhan khanates - for the first time. In the textbooks of the Soviet period the history of those states was never revealed; in the contemporary textbooks this period is covered with the sufficient degree of objectivity. The history of Siberia before the 17th century is covered in the text-books pretty fragmentarily: all the textbooks without exception first mention Siberia only regarding Ermak's raid, and later - in connection with the actions of Russian travellers. Thus, the last years show the achievement of some progress in the study of the medieval history of Russian regions. But it's necessary to emphasise that in a country like Russia the complete study of history not only of each, but even of the majority of the regions is impossible in the comprehensive course of the national (state) history, which requires teachers' and local textbooks authors' constant attention to the regional material.

Historians have documented that in medieval Europe, bargaining over the loyalty of lay magnates and high clergy was most intense during successions and that this often forced monarchs to give political concessions. We argue that matters related to succession predict short-term power-sharing concessions by rulers but that – because they do not permanently alter the balance of power between ruler and elite – they only trigger lasting changes of political institutions if these changes are in the mutual interest of the ruler and the elite groups. It follows that successions are unlikely to have long-term effects on representative institutions but that they may consolidate the rules regulating succession (the succession order). Using the natural deaths of monarchs as an instrument for successions, we confirm these claims with a new dataset that includes fine-grained data on succession and parliament-like assemblies in 16 European polities between 1000 and 1600. These findings shed new light on the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe, on the changes in succession orders that brought about clear rules about primogeniture and on the political leeway of legislatures in authoritarian regimes more generally.

Written to supply the need of a sketch of Italian history from the barbarian invasions to the present day. . The authors have taken a broad view of their subject and have dealt with political and ecclesiastical history, the achievements of the Italian spirit in art, philosophy and science, and the evolution of the national unity of Italy. ; Preface signed: H. W. C. Davis. ; Bibliography: p. [512]-519. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Over the past 30 years, few sources have been the subject of more scholarly attention than medieval and early modern pardon letters. These charters, issued by the royal or princely chancery in response to a petition addressed to the monarch and his council, were the strongest manifestation of the sovereign's right to remit crimes in many European polities, including France, England, the Low Countries, Castile, and Portugal. Following the paradigmatic interpretation of ordinary violence as the expression of well‐integrated social behaviours, historians of crime and criminal justice have found in petitions and pardon letters records of powerful narratives describing episodes of violence in the population's everyday life. Yet scholars have also debated the reliability of these stories, as they were obviously designed to support the petitioners' claim for pardon. Another major historiographical controversy concerns the articulation between the power to pardon and the criminal policies of the monarchs. While some historians considered the granting of pardon letters as the product of a weak or corrupted justice system that preferred to remit crimes in exchange for money rather prosecuting the perpetrators, others argued that the rise of the power to pardon followed the process of early modern State‐building and served to temper criminal prosecutions and assert the sovereign's right over the life and death of his subjects. This essay introduces the reader to the historiography of pardon letters and shows its connections with the recent developments in the history of crime and criminal justice in late medieval and early modern Europe.

Over the past 30 years, few sources have been the subject of more scholarly attention than medieval and early modern pardon letters. These charters, issued by the royal or princely chancery in response to a petition addressed to the monarch and his council, were the strongest manifestation of the sovereign's right to remit crimes in many European polities, including France, England, the Low Countries, Castile, and Portugal. Following the paradigmatic interpretation of ordinary violence as the expression of well‐integrated social behaviours, historians of crime and criminal justice have found in petitions and pardon letters records of powerful narratives describing episodes of violence in the population's everyday life. Yet scholars have also debated the reliability of these stories, as they were obviously designed to support the petitioners' claim for pardon. Another major historiographical controversy concerns the articulation between the power to pardon and the criminal policies of the monarchs. While some historians considered the granting of pardon letters as the product of a weak or corrupted justice system that preferred to remit crimes in exchange for money rather prosecuting the perpetrators, others argued that the rise of the power to pardon followed the process of early modern State‐building and served to temper criminal prosecutions and assert the sovereign's right over the life and death of his subjects. This essay introduces the reader to the historiography of pardon letters and shows its connections with the recent developments in the history of crime and criminal justice in late medieval and early modern Europe.

The complex relationship between women and arms in Europe, from Roman times to about 1200, is reexamined in light of literary traditions, historical records, and the modern preoccupation with women warriors that inevitably inflects historical judgments. Overall, the issue has suffered from a scarcity of hard evidence and an abundant politics of interpretation. Some historical examples indicate an acceptance of female hereditary governance in Europe during the early middle ages, including the command of troops. Yet many historians have greeted the idea of a woman wielding a sword in battle with skepticism. Figures such as Boudicca who led a revolt against the Romans in Britain, the Anglo-Saxon queen Aethelflaed, and the later women who fought in the crusades, or defended their own property, have been politicized. Narratives like that of the Old Testament Judith and the Nibelungenlied became ideological tools to raise the alarm about phallic women. By the thirteenth century, Saxon law declared that a widow must immediately surrender her husband's sword to the male heir. Female fighters were increasingly vilified, culminating in the accusation of heresy against Joan of Arc, and her execution.

From the early tenth to the early twelfth century the northern and eastern periphery of Europe was composed of polities which had recently adopted Christianity as the official religion. Here a special type of veneration of saints or martyrs emerged. This type of sainthood refers to historical personalities characterized by a martyr's death caused out of political self -interest by Christians themselves—not by members of other religions as a result of hatred against the Christian faith as such. The veneration of martyr rulers was unknown both in (Latin) southern Europe and the Byzantine Empire of the time. This article is dedicated to a historical, theological, and literary analysis of three saints: Boris and Gleb (died in 1015) from Kievan Rus', Jovan Vladimir (died in 1016/1018) from Dioclea, and Magnus Erlendsson (died in 1115/1117) from the Orkney Isles, at the time a part of Norway. All of these saints share the same fundamental characteristics: in the face of mortal danger, they did not resort to revenge or fratricide as a means of struggle for power, but rather voluntarily accepted their deaths for the benefit of peace in their homelands. The phenomenon of ruler martyrs focuses on the example of their voluntary sacrifice, highlighting a duality between the righteousness of an innocent victim and an unfair act of a murderer. Ruler martyrs were regarded by their contemporaries as promoters of a new ideal of Christian monarchs and as symbols of the rejection of the recent pagan past. This phenomenon is also connected with the self -esteem of the ecclesiastical and secular elite of the newly Christianized peoples—they saw their homelands, despite their relatively late adoption of Christianity, as religiously »mature« and therefore on equal footing with others, which was to a large extent possible due to the emergence of the first local saints. ; Od početka 10. do početka 12. stoljeća sjevernu i istočnu periferiju Europe činile su političke tvorevine koje su nedavno primile kršćanstvo u svojstvu službene religije. Na tim prostorima pojavio se poseban tip štovanja svetaca, odn. mučenika. Ovaj tip svetosti odnosi se na povijesne osobe za koje je karakteristična mučenička smrt kao posljedica političkih interesa samih kršćana – ne pripadnika drugih religija zbog mržnje prema kršćanskoj vjeri kao takvoj. Kult vladara mučenika nije bio poznat ni u tadanšjoj (latinskoj) južnoj Europi, ni u Bizantinskom carstvu. Ovaj članak posvećen je povijesnoj, teološkoj i literarnoj analizi triju svetaca: Borisa i Gljeba (poginuli 1015. godine) iz Kijevske Rusije, Jovana Vladimira (poginuo 1015/1018. godine) iz Duklje i Magnusa Erlendssona (poginuo 1115/1117. godine) sa Orkneyskih otoka, u ono doba dio Norveške. Sve upomenute svece povezuju iste temeljne karakteristike: uoči smrtne opasnosti, nisu se zatekli ka osveti ili bratoubojstvu kao sredstvu borbe za vlast, nego su dobrovoljno primili svoju smrt u korist mira u njihovim domovinama. Fenomen vladara mučenika usredotočava se na primjer njihove dobrovoljne žrtve, naglašavajući dvojnost između nevine žrtve i nepravednog postupka ubojice. Vladare mučenike njihovi suvremenici tumačili su kao promotore novog ideala kršćanskog monarha i simbol odbijanja nedavne paganske prošlosti. Ovaj fenomen povezan je također sa samosviješću crkvene i svijetovne elite novopokrštenih naroda – oni su svoje domovine, nezavisno od njihovog relativno kasnog primljenja kršćanstva, doživljavali kao religiozno »zrele« i, stoga, jednakopravne drugima, što je bilo u velikoj mjeri moguće upravo zbog pojavljivanja prvih domaćih svetaca.

"Priced list of the more important English and American works on subjects connected with political economy, published from January, 1848, to April, 1880": p. 587-590. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Priced list of the more important English and American works on subjects connected with political economy, published from January, 1848, to April, 1880": p. 587-590. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

We analyse how two different inheritance systems might affect the creation of centralised and administratively capable states. We use a multi-country overlapping generations model in which country rulers want to expand the lands they control by military conquests. An administration is required to raise taxes upon which partially fund an army. The characteristics of inheritance rules allow to identify two mechanisms that affect the creation and development of the administrative apparatus: the probability that lands stay under the control of the ruling family, which stimulates investments in state capacity; and marriages between heirs. If rulers prefer theirs lands to belong to their family, inheritance systems that privilege men over women encourage a direct development of the administration. On the contrary, gender egalitarianism generates more marriages between heirs because both genders will be equally represented in the marriage market. Countries originating from a marriage between heirs can benefit from higher taxation income due to an scale effect. To assess the importance of each mechanism, we simulate an economy under each (exogenously given) system. According to our results, inheritance rules that privilege men favour investments in state capacity in the long run compared to rules that give the same probability of inheriting to men and women.

We analyse how two different inheritance systems might affect the creation of centralised and administratively capable states. We use a multi-country overlapping generations model in which country rulers want to expand the lands they control by military conquests. An administration is required to raise taxes upon which partially fund an army. The characteristics of inheritance rules allow to identify two mechanisms that affect the creation and development of the administrative apparatus: the probability that lands stay under the control of the ruling family, which stimulates investments in state capacity; and marriages between heirs. If rulers prefer theirs lands to belong to their family, inheritance systems that privilege men over women encourage a direct development of the administration. On the contrary, gender egalitarianism generates more marriages between heirs because both genders will be equally represented in the marriage market. Countries originating from a marriage between heirs can benefit from higher taxation income due to an scale effect. To assess the importance of each mechanism, we simulate an economy under each (exogenously given) system. According to our results, inheritance rules that privilege men favour investments in state capacity in the long run compared to rules that give the same probability of inheriting to men and women.