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Ius in bello requires concrete measures in order o protect specific groups such as the civilian population. One of the project guaranteeing the fast deployment of satellite communication in context of humanitarian crises is emergency.lu. The article analyses its legal framework.

Aldo Moro certainly undergoes, in his training as a Catholic intellectual, the influence of Mounier and Maritain's personalism and is part of the personalist philosophy with a remarkable stature and authority, precisely because of the depth and richness of his thought with the which he has been able to philosophically establish the concept of person in respect of which he has developed a conception of ethical and humanitarian law. For Moro the law is justice and has the task of ordering and humanizing the life of relationships on democratic bases, not leaving aside the ethics that is the essential prerequisite and also aiming to direct life itself to seek the truth that always illuminates and makes brave. With this essay we want to highlight how the conception of law in Aldo Moro connotes itself as a humanitarian right that humanizes relations between men orienting them to the search for truth. Humanitarian law retains its identity even when the juridical ideal translates as force, never identifying itself with brute power, but always remaining a real ideal.

The Diplomatic Conference Convened by the Swiss Government on the reaffirmation and development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in armed conflicts opened in Geneva on 20 February 1974. Plenipotentiary representatives of 118 States including 29 African States, parties to the: Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Members of the United Nations, as well as many observers from inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations attended.

Until recently, German officials denied that the Bundeswehr was at war in Afghanistan, insisting that its role was to stabilize rather than to fight. In November 2009, Federal Minister of Defense Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg first referred to »warlike circumstances« and described the situation as a »non-international armed conflict« taking place in parts of Afghanistan. This position was now specified by Federal Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, who in an official government address to the German Bundestag stated that even the situation in the north of Afghanistan was to be qualified as an armed conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law. But the search for appropriate terminology is much more than a matter of clear communication. It is above all a question of maximizing legal security for the forces on the ground

The obligation to train troops in international humanitarian law (IHL) is simply stated and its implementation delegated to State discretion. This reflects a past assumption that mere dissemination of IHL would be an effective contribution to the prevention of violations. Academic literature has evolved so that dissemination alone is now known to be insufficient for compliance, while the ICRC's integration model emphasizes the relevance of IHL to all aspects of military decision-making. A separate process, the ICRC/Government of Switzerland Initiative on Strengthening Compliance with IHL, is still in its consultative stages at the time of writing, but may result in voluntary State reporting and/or thematic discussions at meetings of States. This article synthesizes academic and practitioner insights on effective IHL training, and suggests a collaborative rubric for informative, standardized reporting on IHL training. Such a rubric could enable States and researchers to share best practice and future innovations on IHL training, using a streamlined, cost-effective tool.

States must disseminate international humanitarian law (IHL) and integrate it into military instruction. Implementation of the IHL training obligation was delayed in the UK; when the government asserted that IHL was inapplicable to colonial warfare, resisted the development of the IHL of non-international armed conflict, and was keen to maintain the nuclear deterrent. Absent or perfunctory IHL training correlated with recurrent violations of the prohibitions of torture and inhuman treatment, from the 1950s to the 2000s. Despite official assertions that the British Army's training in IHL was being reformed following the death of Baha Mousa in British military custody in 2003, there were gradual changes from 2004 to 2011, and more thorough improvements from 2012 to 2017. Training materials for soldiers and officers now offer breadth and detail on IHL, with elements of international human rights law. They implement the 71 recommendations in the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report which the Ministry of Defence accepted, and are supplemented by practical training. Yet these are reactive reforms, which still lack norm-by-norm evaluation of soldiers' understanding. Prohibitions on humiliating or degrading treatment of a sexual nature, and on the intentional infliction of severe mental pain and suffering are (respectively) under-emphasised and absent. References to the necessity of restraint positions (as opposed to the prohibited stress positions) may cause confusion. There is a simplistic suggestion that reprisals are lawful if they are politically authorised. Training reforms have been cited as one reason to close criminal investigations into alleged war crimes: a response which neglects coexistent investigatory obligations.

Es scheint eher paradox, allerdings ist es evident, dass es selbst für Zeiten der Kriegsführung immer einen gewissen Verhaltenskodex gegeben hat. Einen Kodex, der Kombattanten führen soll, indem er diverse Verhaltensregeln aufstellt. Im Mittelalter war es das Prinzip der Ritterlichkeit, das ein Minimum an Anstand und Vertrauen zwischen Gegnern etablieren sollte. Heute ist das Prinzip der Ritterlichkeit unter anderem in dem Perfidieverbot des humanitären Völkerrechtes verankert. Diese Arbeit wird die Entwicklung des Perfidieverbotes über die Jahre analysieren. Dabei wird besonders die Fortentwicklung des Verbotes von rechtshistorischen Werken bis zur heutigen Kodifikation in den Genfer Konventionen durchleuchtet. Die Frage, ob das Überdeterminieren von Normen positive Auswirkungen auf die Anwendung dieser Normen hat wird bearbeitet. Folglich wird der Anwendungsbereich des Perfidieverbotes in der heutigen Zeit untersucht; hierbei werden Grauzonen und Unklarheiten der Regulierung aufgewiesen und letztendlich sein Status als Völkergewohnheitsrecht in Frage gestellt. ; It seems rather paradox that for times of warfare it can be observed that there has always been some kind of code of conduct that is supposed to guide combatants by setting behavioural rules. In medieval times it was the principle of chivalry that was meant to establish a minimum level of decency and trust between adversaries. Nowadays, this code of conduct is inter alia enshrined in the prohibition of perfidy within the Geneva Conventions. This paper will analyse how the prohibition of perfidy has been developed over the years. The prohibitions evolvement from early legal texts to todays codification will be meticulously assessed. Question arising being, whether over stipulation of principles in legal texts might rather be harmful then helpful, as they might narrow the scope of application of the prohibition tremendously. Ultimately, the narrowing of the prohibitions scope of application will lead to the question whether the prohibition of perfidy is still of actual relevance in todays warfare and if it is, whether it can be seen as international customary law. Along the way challenges and ambiguities within the prohibition and arising controversies to it may be disclosed. ; Charlotte Genschel ; Graz, Univ., Dipl.-Arb., 2015 ; (VLID)752876

In recent years, national governments have started to use the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda to advocate for increasing women's participation in national militaries. This has raised questions regarding women's potential impact on compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). In this article, we examine existing evidence and arguments on the potential impact of women's increased participation in national militaries and decision-making on international security and IHL compliance. We find some theoretical support for the idea that increasing the participation of women in the national security sector and national militaries may lead to increased IHL compliance through the prioritization of non-violent policies and improved decision-making. However, a substantive body of research on the limits imposed by the substantive gendering of institutions and idealization of masculine traits and practices calls women's potential impact on IHL compliance into question.

International humanitarian law has developed through a pluralistic process. Its history reveals a pattern of rough proportionality between State opinio juris and non-State expressions of law. These diverse sources have maintained a respectable yet realistic balance between humanity and military necessity. However, current IHL dialogue presents a stark contrast to the vibrant and pluralistic exchanges of the past. The substantive input of non-State actors such as non-governmental organizations, tribunals, and scholars far outpaces the work of States. Parity of input, especially in quantitative terms, is surely too much to demand and surely not necessary given the special status of State opinio juris. However, States' legal agencies and agents should be equipped, organized, and re-empowered to participate actively in the interpretation and development of IHL. This article, extracted from a larger work, argues that reinvigorating opinio juris would reestablish the pluralistic IHL dialogue that formerly tested, updated, and enriched the balance between military necessity and humanity.

The 2013 publication of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare confirmed the view of the majority of the international group of experts that data was not an object and therefore not subject to the rules of targeting during an armed conflict. Intuitively, a number of scholars reacted negatively to this view, and instead were drawn to the Tallinn Manual minority position that data did constitute an object. The significance of data, particularly personal data, is only increasing, and the purpose of the law of armed conflict is to reduce the deleterious impact of armed conflict on the civilian population. Focusing on tangibility, on corporeal physicality, as a prerequisite for the application of the law of targeting is anachronistic and unnecessary. However, an intuitive response to the majority view can easily overlook the nuances inherent in the view. First, whenever physical consequences—death, physical damage, or loss of functionality—accompany or result from the targeting of data, the rules of targeting apply. Second, special legal protections in the law of armed conflict apply to data whether or not data constitutes an object. Third, it is fallacious to assume that if data is not an object military data cannot be targeted. Either data is not an object and targeting rules do not apply such that military and civilian data can both be targeted, or data is an object and only military data can be targeted. In either situation, military data can legitimately be targeted and destroyed during an armed conflict. The key point of difference is the targeting of civilian data where no physical destruction or other damage occurs. Here, targeting is permissible if data is not an object, and impermissible if it is. States are yet to clarify their views on this scenario and it is likely that such clarification will only come in response to a major incident involving the destruction of civilian data without accompanying physical damage.

The International Committee of the Red Cross published a study in 2005 identifying rules of customary international law applicable to armed conflict and theoretically binding on all nations. This study found that customary state practice has come to encompass and in some cases exceed protections contained in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, regardless of their applicability to a given conflict. These findings may impact the domestic law enforcement practices of states not parties to Additional Protocol II, which regulates non-international armed conflict. Furthermore, the study may have indirect effects on military cooperation and legal reform worldwide. By strengthening the legal criticism of domestic laws not compliant with international humanitarian law, the study directly challenges non-party states seeking to obtain unqualified military assistance during internal conflicts. However, this same effect will lend support to increased observance of international humanitarian law as intervening states' militaries apply pressure to realize compliance with customary international law. This comment identifies these implications by considering a hypothetical future counter-insurgency in Malaysia in which the United States offers military assistance to the Malaysian government.

This chapter contains an overview of the modern law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) in all its main aspects, from the scope of application of the law through methods of warfare, weapons and targeting operations, to protection of victims and issues of enforcement and implementation.

Humanitarian law was conceived by legal and moral normativism founded on universal principles. Despite its undeniable universal moral content, its formulations and application methods are however the result of historical conflicts. This article aims to analyze how the universality of humanitarian law is produced by highly controversial conflicts. It is necessary to overcome the antagonism between an analysis that focuses on the moral undeniable value of humanitarian law by ignoring its controversies and an analysis that focuses on social antagonism questioning the achievability of the moral and universal value of humanitarian law. For this, we must consider that humanitarian law is a construction. It appears as autonomous and independent of power relationships, as based on the rationality of morality and thus worthy of universal recognition. Yet its development is only possible when one considers the historical roots of reason. It is only through political struggle that humanitarian law is realized in history. The aim of this paper is to analyze how the universal nature of humanitarian law is produced by highly controversial conflicts. Firstly, an analysis is offered on the universal but at the same controversial character in the codification of humanitarian law, recalling controversies around the creation of the Additional Protocols of 1977 (Section 1). Next, an analysis is given on the conflictual character of organizations supporting humanitarian law, taking in account conflicts between the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders and controversies around the ambitions to pass from an humanitarian law to a right of humanitarian intervention (Section 2). Finally, a reflection is offered on how the theories of international relations that most appropriately grasp the universal nature of humanitarian law must be complemented by a "historical sociology of the universal" that embraces the conflicting historical dimension in the construction of the universal (Section 3).

Commentary:Organisations like the International News Safety Institute (INSI), formed in 2001 and based in Brussels, have created an impressive global network to help news workers facing danger on assignment; as well, big networks such as the BBC, CNN and the ABC have adopted measures including battlefield security courses, protective gear, first-aid training, and carefully-rehearsed exit strategies. Despite all this, reporters are still being targeted, and too many governments are still ignoring, and even giving support to, the killing of journalists.

This article explores whether it is possible to apply the law of occupation beyond land territory, to maritime areas characterized here as "maritime territory." The article argues that the definition of territory under Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations comprises internal waters, territorial sea, and archipelagic waters, whereas other areas such as the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and high seas fall outside the scope of Article 42. Accordingly, internal waters, the territorial sea, and archipelagic waters may be placed under occupation if a hostile force exercises actual authority over them without valid legal title. The article describes how the actual authority test embodied in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations applies to maritime territory and maintains that maritime territory may be occupied only in connection to an occupation of land territory. The article then addresses why applying the law of occupation to maritime territory may solve some of the current problems regarding the duties and rights of occupying powers in relation to the sea off the coasts of the areas they occupy. In particular, the application of the law of occupation can affect the exploitation of natural resources at sea and the regulation of the use of armed force. Finally, the article explores how the rules embodied in the law of occupation interact with the rules on naval warfare in the occupied maritime territory.