<i>In this article, hybrid warfare challenges and their impact on the evolution of warfare in the new dynamic security environment are analysed. The aim of the research was to identify hybrid threats, explore the complexity of the hybrid conflict that involves professional Armed Forces and irregular (paramilitary) forces. The research has been conducted through two case studies of hybrid warfare: the Israeli - Lebanese conflict in 2006 and the Lebanese militia organisation Hezbollah as a prototype of hybrid opponents; and the contemporary hybrid conflict in Ukraine through the Russian paradigm of hybrid warfare. The conducted research showed that the decisive role that influenced the outcome of the conflict belonged either to rapidness or inertia in of the making of political decisions. The research results showed further that revision of the existing strategic and doctrinal documents are required, as well as reorganisation of the national security system (and the Armed Forces as part of it), without which they will not be able to deal successfully with the dynamic nature of future conflict and complexity of threats ("synergy of threats"). The political decision is the most essential parameter for sizing military organisation. The rapidity of response in the event of emergencies (especially outside the national territory) also depends on the promptness of political decisions in order to activate the Armed Forces.</i>
Hybrid threats use conventional and unconventional means to achieve their goals. This paper explores the cyber threat as one possible aspect of hybrid threats. It also discusses the background of the term hybrid warfare, how it emerged and travelled as the empirical situations evolved and needed new definitions. Russia aims at attaining this by applying a holistic mix of military, political and economic means to weaken the West and to strengthen its own role as a global player (with the "West" I for simplicity mean the states which constitute EU and NATO, but it is really more a cultural approach than an organizational). The Russian approach builds on a strategy of reflexive control which as such is an old method, but the outcome of the application of this approach results in hybrid warfare which as such is a new emerging concept of warfighting. This short article looks at one particular aspect of this Russian strategy, namely using Hybrid, or non-linear, Warfare against its Western direct neighbors in particular and the West in general. The cyber arena is very important in this practice. The attack of this weaponized situation is that the trust in the West. Primarily the EU (European Union) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), is eroded for every day which these countries challenges the international system which the western democracies say that they present and defend. This is part of what can be described as an example of reflexive control, exercised by Russia. ; Las amenazas híbridas utilizan medios convencionales y no convencionales para lograr sus objetivos. Este documento explora la ciberamenaza como un posible aspecto de las amenazas híbridas. También se analizan los antecedentes del término guerra híbrida, cómo surgió y viajó a medida que las situaciones empíricas evolucionaron y necesitaron nuevas definiciones. Rusia apunta a lograr esto aplicando una combinación holística de medios militares, políticos y económicos para debilitar a Occidente y fortalecer su propio papel como actor global (con "Occidente", para simplificar, me refiero a los estados que constituyen la UE y la OTAN, pero es más un enfoque cultural que organizativo). El enfoque ruso se basa en una estrategia de control reflexivo que, como tal, es un método antiguo, pero el resultado de la aplicación de este enfoque da como resultado una guerra híbrida que, como tal, es un nuevo concepto emergente de lucha bélica. Este breve artículo analiza un aspecto particular de esta estrategia rusa, a saber, el uso de Guerra Híbrida, o no lineal, contra sus vecinos directos occidentales en particular y Occidente en general. La arena cibernética es muy importante en esta práctica. El ataque de esta situación armada es que la confianza en Occidente. Principalmente la UE (Unión Europea) y la OTAN (Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte), se erosiona cada día que estos países desafían el sistema internacional que las democracias occidentales dicen que presentan y defienden. Esto es parte de lo que puede describirse como un ejemplo de control reflexivo, ejercido por Rusia. ; Ameaças híbridas usam meios convencionais e não convencionais para atingir seus objetivos. Este artigo explora a ameaça cibernética como um aspecto possível das ameaças híbridas. Ele também discute o pano de fundo do termo guerra híbrida, como surgiu e viajou conforme as situações empíricas evoluíram e precisaram de novas definições. A Rússia pretende atingir isso aplicando uma mistura holística de meios militares, políticos e econômicos para enfraquecer o Ocidente e fortalecer seu próprio papel como um ator global (com o "Ocidente" I para simplificar significa os estados que constituem a UE e a OTAN, mas é realmente mais uma abordagem cultural do que organizacional). A abordagem russa se baseia em uma estratégia de controle reflexivo que, como tal, é um método antigo, mas o resultado da aplicação dessa abordagem resulta em uma guerra híbrida que, como tal, é um novo conceito emergente de combate. Este breve artigo examina um aspecto particular dessa estratégia russa, a saber, o uso da guerra híbrida ou não linear contra seus vizinhos diretos ocidentais em particular e o Ocidente em geral. A arena cibernética é muito importante nesta prática. O ataque desta situação armada é que a confiança no Ocidente. Principalmente a UE (União Europeia) e a OTAN (Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte), estão corroídas a cada dia que esses países desafiam o sistema internacional que as democracias ocidentais dizem que apresentam e defendem. Isso faz parte do que pode ser descrito como um exemplo de controle reflexivo, exercido pela Rússia.
Hybrid warfare has almost become new orthodoxy in the defense community. The term is regarded as a new phenomenon that allegedly interprets the characteristics of contemporary warfare. Furthermore, within the international community, ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is almost unanimously referred to as a model for hybrid warfare. However, hybrid warfare as a term itself or the referring Russia's war to a model for hybrid warfare might lead analysts, defense planners, and policymakers down an unhelpful path. There is a risk of rediscovering old ideas in the efforts of defining the parameters of modern warfare, which might fall short of expectations.
Hybrid warfare has almost become new orthodoxy in the defense community. The term is regarded as a new phenomenon that allegedly interprets the characteristics of contemporary warfare. Furthermore, within the international community, ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is almost unanimously referred to as a model for hybrid warfare. However, hybrid warfare as a term itself or the referring Russia's war to a model for hybrid warfare might lead analysts, defense planners, and policymakers down an unhelpful path. There is a risk of rediscovering old ideas in the efforts of defining the parameters of modern warfare, which might fall short of expectations.
Abstract As Montenegro sough to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2015, an attempted coup erupted within the country in October of that year. The Telegraph's Ben Farmer reported that, 'An officer with Russia's GRU military intelligence service, is accused of running a web of Serbian and Russian nationalists and paramilitaries who plotted to assassinate the Montenegrin prime minister.' Farmer, B. (2017, February 26). Montenegro to Indict Russian Spy Behind Coup Plot. The Telegraph. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/26/montenegro-indict-russian-spy-behind-coup-plot/. [accessed 5 March, 2017]. The failed coup and attempted assassination were conducted by Russian intelligence in support of Russian President Vladimir Putin's vision for a modern Eurasia in which NATO discontinues encroaching on Russia's sphere of influence and in which Russia ascends to regional hegemony. Knezevic, G. (2017, January 2). Montenegro's NATO-Russia Chess Match. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-nato-russia-chess-match/28210094.html. [accessed 5 March, 2017].
Although unsuccessful, this covert operation—conducted by Russian intelligence working in conjunction with disaffected Russian partisans within Montenegro—to stymie NATO's expansion captures the essence of modern Russian hybrid warfare. Nevertheless, Montenegro is not unique, but instead is one of many recent hybrid conflicts propagated by the Russian government. Speaking on the spectre of Russian operations in Eastern Europe, American general Michael Williamson commented, 'In terms of state-based challenges, Russia's purported annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine demonstrated a sophisticated combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means to achieve objectives below a threshold that the Russian leadership believe would elicit a concerted NATO response.' Lt. Gen. Michael Williamson, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, and Lt. Gen. John Murray, statement to the Subcommittee on AirLand, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on Army Modernization in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017, Second Session, 114th Congress, 5 April 2016.
Since 2008, Russia's operations throughout Europe, its Near Abroad and Syria signal an evolved approach to the conduct of war. Many terms and phrases have been attributed to Russia's evolved model of war to include Grey Zone conflict and new generation warfare. However, hybrid war or hybrid warfare is quite useful, despite the contention the term generates. The term hybrid warfare is useful because it speaks of the bundling of capabilities, technology and ideas in a coherent, purposeful manner to accomplish tactical, operational and strategic objectives on behalf of policymakers and strategists. The work starting position is that the Russian hybrid warfare is in fact an applied way of war. Despite many arguments to the contrary, Russia's applied way of war introduces important nuances to the conduct of war. Resultantly, the purpose of this work is to clarify the concept of Russian hybrid warfare and to identify the characteristics that make it worthy of examination. Two basic methods exist to explain an observable way of war. The first is to paraphrase existing primary source information on the subject. This method requires access to primary source information and the physical ability to read that material. That method is not employed in this work because access to Russian strategic and tactical doctrine is not readily available to the layperson. Furthermore, in many cases doctrine is a preferred way of war-fighting, a narrative and tied to procurement strategies, and thus, not an applied method. Therefore, merely relying on doctrine or policy statements can mislead the researcher about the true character of a given way of war. That notwithstanding, the second method is to observe the phenomenon in multiple situations over a period of time. In doing so, the observer seeks to identify trends, inconsistencies, rules, relationships, reactions and boundaries that surface and recur therein and then generate an over-arching assessment about that phenomenon's boundaries and inner workings. That is the technique employed here.
