Suchergebnisse

Peacebuilding; EULEX; Kosovo; European Union; Conflict prevention; Normative power; Post-conflict; IECEU

Peacebuilding; EULEX; Kosovo; European Union; Conflict prevention; Normative power; Post-conflict; IECEU

This report draws together information and analyses from the preceding eight reports of IECEU Work Package 3 that examine the effectiveness of EU civilian crisis management operations in Libya, South Sudan, CAR and DR. Congo. The four cases are examined in separate sections. The following is based on the findings in the eight previous deliverables, and pools together the conclusions from these previous eight deliverables in WP3. ; This report draws together information and analyses from the preceding eight reports of IECEU Work Package 3 that examine the effectiveness of EU civilian crisis management operations in Libya, South Sudan, CAR and DR. Congo. The four cases are examined in separate sections. The following is based on the findings in the eight previous deliverables, and pools together the conclusions from these previous eight deliverables in WP3.

This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

Part of this IECEU project deliverable 3.5, The DR Congo Field Trip report, assesses the contributions of the EU CSDP missions Operation Artemis, EUFOR RDC, EUPOL and EUSEC to the overall security of the state of the DR Congo, in particular by taking into consideration the perspectives of mission personnel, representatives of the Congolese authorities, NGOs and other IOs. EU involvement started with the deployment of Artemis in 2003, and the study ends with the closure of EUSEC in July 2016. All EU missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been part of EU support for the transition and implementation of the 2002 Peace Agreement in the country. A key challenge was that the sheer size of the DRC, the lack of infrastructure and the non-permissive environment made it a very difficult and complex undertaking. The Congolese partner has been resistant to reform, and the EU has found it difficult to undertake its SSR (security-sector reform) initiatives successfully. Some informants even called the EU project generally a failure. Applying the methodology of the IECEU project, in particular DL 1.4. and DL 1.5, the success of the mission will be examined by describing the main capabilities deployed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the mission will be analysed by looking at the attainment of both internal and external goals and their appropriateness. This combines both the findings of the field trip and the conducted interviews, as well as comprehensive desktop research. The findings were tested and refined at an expert round table held in Copenhagen on 31 October 2016 with relevant experts. ; Case study evaluating EU security management initiatives in DRC

This IECEU project deliverable 3.1, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Review, assesses the existing literature and academic and policy research on the contemporary security situation in the DRC, as well as the responses to this situation. Deliverable 3.1 therefore functions as a foundation for the analysis in deliverable 3.5. to arrive at a better assessment of the internal and external impact on the EU's CSDP and ESDP missions to the overall security of the DRC. The first EU mission, Operation Artemis, was deployed in the Ituri provincial capital of Bunia in 2003 with the aim of stabilizing a deteriorating security situation. The force was deployed parallel to the existing UN PSO mission in the DRC, and after six months became part of the international community's overall assistance to the country. In 2005 the EU launched both a EUPOL and a EUSEC mission, which were supposed to help train the Congolese police and military institutions as part of the SSR and state-building project initiated after the signing of the two peace agreements. The EUPOL project was ended in 2014, EUSEC in 2016. The EU has therefore been involved in a wide range of post-conflict state-building initiatives as part of larger efforts to address the vast range of causes of conflict in the DRC. As documented in the review, conflict and wars in the DRC go back beyond1996, have had different expressions, been internationalized and linked to regional security dynamics, and exemplify the debate on the role and importance of natural resources in conflict and the impact of international responses to this type of conflict. The security situation in the DRC is better today than it was five years ago, though in North Kivu alone there are still more than twenty non-state armed groups, and the debate over political secession surrounding President Kabila has moved conflict in the country into a new and potentially very dangerous phase. ; This IECEU project deliverable 3.5, The DR Congo Field Trip report, assesses the contributions of the EU CSDP missions Operation Artemis, EUFOR RDC, EUPOL and EUSEC to the overall security of the state of the DR Congo, in particular by taking into consideration the perspectives of mission personnel, representatives of the Congolese authorities, NGOs and other IOs. EU involvement started with the deployment of Artemis in 2003, and the study ends with the closure of EUSEC in July 2016. All EU missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been part of EU support for the transition and implementation of the 2002 Peace Agreement in the country. A key challenge was that the sheer size of the DRC, the lack of infrastructure and the non-permissive environment made it a very difficult and complex undertaking. The Congolese partner has been resistant to reform, and the EU has found it difficult to undertake its SSR (security-sector reform) initiatives successfully. Some informants even called the EU project generally a failure. Applying the methodology of the IECEU project, in particular DL 1.4. and DL 1.5, the success of the mission will be examined by describing the main capabilities deployed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the mission will be analysed by looking at the attainment of both internal and external goals and their appropriateness. This combines both the findings of the field trip and the conducted interviews, as well as comprehensive desktop research. The findings were tested and refined at an expert round table held in Copenhagen on 31 October 2016 with relevant experts.

One round-table event was organised within the framework of Work Package III, part of the IECEU project. The events focused on the WP3's four case studies: Libya, CAR, South Sudan and DRC. This report provides information on the round-table event and presents the main points of discussion that emerged during it. The round-table discussion and the subsequent seminar on the Effectiveness of International Assistance and Local Ownership in the four case studies was organised by the Royal Danish Defence College on 31 October-1. November 2016. The round-table participants included experts on Africa in general, sub-matter experts, experts on peace and conflict studies, and practitioners in crisis management. A total of eighteen speakers explored the effectiveness of international assistance to the four African examples from different perspectives, drawing a rather pessimistic picture of the current situation in the four countries in question, but also highlighting the difficulties for the EU in working as a conflict manager in this context. Libya is plagued by international strife to such an extent that the EU had to withdraw from that mission. South Sudan has returned to civil war, and while the technical impact of the small EU airport mission is not in doubt, the larger strategic and medium to long-term impacts are not visible. In CAR the EU force managed to stabilise a critical security situation, thus allowing international humanitarian action and political dialogue to take place. The EU force took the form of a robust bridging mission that was replaced by a UN force, and it largely managed to fulfil its mandate. However, the EU force mission also highlights a number of internal EU challenges that need to be addressed, as well as the medium to long-term impact of this type of military intervention. In the case of the DRC, four cases were debated. The first was Operation Artemis, the EU-led military intervention in the town of Bunia, to stop and pre-empt an unfolding ethnic conflict. The operation was limited in size and time, and it managed to achieve its objectives, but it did not prevent the conflict flaring up after it had left. The significance of Artemis was that it was the first ESDP mission, a trendsetter for the more independent role for the EU that some member states wanted in the future. In 2006 the EU again deployed a robust military force primarily to Kinshasa, mandated to assist the UN force MONUC in securing the DRC elections in that year. Again the EU force deployment was limited in size and time, and managed to achieve its mandate. However, the deployment highlighted a number of lessons for the EU in future operations, especially around national caveats in operations and logistics, but also the different priorities of member states in EU-led military operations, compared, for instance, to NATO operations. This was very visible in the later CAR deployment, for which it was difficult to get EU members to commit and deploy forces. The two other EU missions in the DRC were the EUPOL and the EUSEC missions, which focused on helping implement the SSR program, which constituted a central element of the peace agreement. Even though the EU was involved for many years and introduced a whole range of new initiatives, the missions did not manage to achieve their medium to long-term objectives. The study shows that there was a discrepancy between project formulation and ambitions, as well as between the available budget and reality. The EUPOL and EUSEC missions were plagued by being over-ambitious and by not taking the DRC context into consideration. Furthermore the study shows that there is a slippage between what happens in Brussels and what happens on the ground in the DRC, as well as an urgent need to secure better communications and cooperation between the two levels.