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Who is afraid of incommensurability?
In: Organization: the critical journal of organization, theory and society, Band 5, Heft 2
ISSN: 1350-5084
Who is Afraid of Incommensurability?
In: Organization: the interdisciplinary journal of organization, theory and society, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 273-275
ISSN: 1461-7323
Incommensurability and judgment
In: Theory and society: renewal and critique in social theory, Band 10, Heft 4
ISSN: 1573-7853
Proportionality and Incommensurability
In: Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 40/2012
SSRN
Value incommensurability
In: Equality and diversityValue incommensurability and the politics of recognition, S. 31-56
Incommensurability and Judgment
In: Theory and society: renewal and critique in social theory, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 521-546
ISSN: 0304-2421
Paradigms and Incommensurability
In: Theory and society: renewal and critique in social theory, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 37-61
ISSN: 0304-2421
Paradigms and incommensurability
In: Theory and society: renewal and critique in social theory, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 37-61
ISSN: 1573-7853
Incommensurability and moral value
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 237-268
ISSN: 1741-3060
Some theorists believe that there is a plurality of values, and that in many circumstances these values are incommensurable, or at least incomparable. Others believe that all values are reducible to a single super-value, or that even if there is a plurality of irreducible values these values are commensurable. But I will argue that both sides have got it wrong. Values are neither commensurable nor incommensurable, at least not in the way most people think. We are free to believe in incommensurability or not, depending on what particular conception of morality we want to embrace. Incommensurability is accordingly not a theory about value. It is a presupposition that provides a necessary background condition for a certain kind of value to exist. It is therefore not the kind of view that can be morally true or false. As a presupposition, it can only be accepted or rejected on grounds that do not presuppose that morality already exists. Incommensurability is, like the rejection of hard determinism, one of the presuppositions on which morality as we know it happens to be based.
Incommensurability and moral value
In: Politics, philosophy & economics, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 237-268
ISSN: 1741-3060
Some theorists believe that there is a plurality of values, and that in many circumstances these values are incommensurable, or at least incomparable. Others believe that all values are reducible to a single super-value, or that even if there is a plurality of irreducible values these values are commensurable. But I will argue that both sides have got it wrong. Values are neither commensurable nor incommensurable, at least not in the way most people think. We are free to believe in incommensurability or not, depending on what particular conception of morality we want to embrace. Incommensurability is accordingly not a theory about value. It is a presupposition that provides a necessary background condition for a certain kind of value to exist. It is therefore not the kind of view that can be morally true or false. As a presupposition, it can only be accepted or rejected on grounds that do not presuppose that morality already exists. Incommensurability is, like the rejection of hard determinism, one of the presuppositions on which morality as we know it happens to be based. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
Incommensurability and Issue Voting
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 115-131
ISSN: 1460-3667
In this article, I examine several models of voter behavior that are consistent with recent work in political psychology (Fiske and Tetlock, 1997) concerning incommensurability and individuals' reluctance to make decisions involving explicit trade-offs between competing ideals or principles. In so doing, I show that one ramification of such cognitive dissonance is policy convergence in multidimensional (i.e. multi-issue) electoral competition between two parties or candidates. Furthermore, the predicted policy outcome is a weighted median, which represents, on each issue, each voter's preferences to the degree that he or she is likely to use that issue to choose between the candidates.
Incommensurability And Issue Voting
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 115-131
In this article, I examine several models of voter behavior that are consistent with recent work in political psychology (Fiske and Tetlock, 1997) concerning incommensurability and individuals' reluctance to make decisions involving explicit trade-offs between competing ideals or principles. In so doing, I show that one ramification of such cognitive dissonance is policy convergence in multidimensional (i.e. multi-issue) electoral competition between two parties or candidates. Furthermore, the predicted policy outcome is a weighted median, which represents, on each issue, each voter's preferences to the degree that he or she is likely to use that issue to choose between the candidates. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]
Equality, Incommensurability, and Rights
In: Rights, Culture and the Law, S. 119-126
Incommensurability and Issue Voting
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 115-132
ISSN: 0951-6298