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Incumbent vs. Incumbent in Connecticut's Fifth District
The 2002 House race in the newly created Fifth District of CT was unique in that the two moderate incumbents -- from the former Fifth District, Democrat James Maloney, & the now defunct Sixth District, Nancy Johnson -- challenged each other. The incumbent vs. incumbent race forced interest groups to choose sides, more often with Johnson than Maloney. Despite CT laws against the use of soft money, including national party money, the race witnessed the most money spent in CT history. Similar to other state races, the campaign tone was negative, there was national party soft money spent on issue advertising, & interest groups were involved in issue advocacy. Republicans devoted more money & effort to the ground war than previously. Johnson won the race with a good margin, & outspent Maloney with her large war chest & Maloney's inability to supplement his campaign with national party money. Tables. M. Pflum
Incumbent takeovers
In: Journal of peace research, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 373–386
ISSN: 1460-3578
The expansion of power by incumbent political leaders has become the subject of increased scholarly attention. In democracies, this is known as 'subversions by the ruling executive', 'executive aggrandizement', or 'autogolpe'; in autocracies, researchers study 'personalization', 'transition to personal rulership', or 'power-grabbing'. While the terminological landscape is rich, there is little conceptual agreement of what leader-driven power expansion is (and is not). Furthermore, we still lack broad data that allow us to investigate the phenomenon systematically across democracy and autocracy. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it offers a unified approach to study leader-driven power expansion – incumbent takeovers – across the political regime spectrum. Second, drawing from 11 datasets and original data collection and coding, we introduce a new, comprehensive dataset on 495 individual takeover events carried out by 279 political leaders in 132 countries in the period 1918–2019. We provide estimates of the takeover onset years, the time to takeover, the length of the takeover spells, and discuss the differences between distinct indicators, inter alia. Future research may leverage these data for a better understanding of the drivers of incumbent takeovers as well as the role of takeovers in regime change, civil wars, coups, and uprisings.
World Affairs Online
Incumbent takeovers
In: Journal of peace research, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 373-386
ISSN: 1460-3578
The expansion of power by incumbent political leaders has become the subject of increased scholarly attention. In democracies, this is known as 'subversions by the ruling executive', 'executive aggrandizement', or 'autogolpe'; in autocracies, researchers study 'personalization', 'transition to personal rulership', or 'power-grabbing'. While the terminological landscape is rich, there is little conceptual agreement of what leader-driven power expansion is (and is not). Furthermore, we still lack broad data that allow us to investigate the phenomenon systematically across democracy and autocracy. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it offers a unified approach to study leader-driven power expansion – incumbent takeovers – across the political regime spectrum. Second, drawing from 11 datasets and original data collection and coding, we introduce a new, comprehensive dataset on 495 individual takeover events carried out by 279 political leaders in 132 countries in the period 1918–2019. We provide estimates of the takeover onset years, the time to takeover, the length of the takeover spells, and discuss the differences between distinct indicators, inter alia. Future research may leverage these data for a better understanding of the drivers of incumbent takeovers as well as the role of takeovers in regime change, civil wars, coups, and uprisings.
Incumbent security
In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 4-6
ISSN: 1542-7811
Will the Incumbents Hold?
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 173
ISSN: 0163-660X, 0147-1465
Will the incumbents hold?
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 171-182
ISSN: 1530-9177
HOW TO BEAT AN INCUMBENT
In: Campaigns and elections: the journal of political action, Band 16, Heft 6, S. 20-25
ISSN: 0197-0771
Incumbent vs. Incumbent in Connecticut's Fifth Congressional District
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 405-405
Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa
The African party literature, especially research prescribing to the long-dominant ethnic voting thesis, has asserted that African party systems exhibit low levels of party nationalization. However, systematic research on nationalization across parties and party systems is still lacking. This study argues that the prospects for building nationalized parties vary substantially between incumbent and opposition parties. Incumbent parties, with their access to state resources, have been successful in creating nationwide operations, even in countries where geographical factors have been unfavorable and ethnic fractionalization is high. The analysis utilizes a new data set of disaggregate election results for 26 African countries to calculate nationalization scores for 77 parties and study the correlates of party nationalization. The results show that factors like ethnic fractionalization, the size of the geographical area, and urbanization affect party nationalization, but only in the case of opposition parties. Incumbent parties, on the other hand, generally remain nationalized despite unfavorable structural conditions.
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Risk, Race and Incumbents: The Effect of Authoritarianism on the Vote for Incumbents in 2012
In: International Relations and Diplomacy, Band 3, Heft 9
ISSN: 2328-2134
The Incumbent Spending Puzzle*
In: Social science quarterly, Band 93, Heft 4, S. 932-949
ISSN: 1540-6237
ObjectiveThis article seeks to explain the puzzle of why incumbents spend so much on campaigns despite most research finding that their spending has almost no effect on voters.MethodsThe article uses ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and fixed‐effects regression to estimate the impact of incumbent spending on election outcomes. The estimation includes an interaction term between incumbent and challenger spending to allow the effect of incumbent spending to depend on the level of challenger spending.ResultsThe estimation provides strong evidence that spending by the incumbent has a larger positive impact on votes received the more money the challenger spends.ConclusionCampaign spending by incumbents is most valuable in the races where the incumbent faces a serious challenge. Raising large sums of money to be used in close races is thus a rational choice by incumbents.
What Happens to Incumbents in Scandals?
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 447-456
ISSN: 1554-0634