Suchergebnisse

List of figures -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on transliteration and bibliography -- Introduction : rethinking "the West" -- King Mu (Mu Tianzi) and the journey to the West -- "illusionary" and "realistic" geographies -- Easternizing the West, Westernizing the East -- Chaos and the West -- "Western Territories" (Xiyu), India, and "South Sea" (Nanhai) -- Beyond the seas : other kingdoms and other materials -- Islands, intermediaries, and "Europeanization" -- Conclusion : towards other perspectives of the other -- Postscript -- Notes -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index.

India's Indo-Pacific diplomacy is born out of its 'Look East' policy, initially aimed at extending its influence into the Asia-Pacific region. Modi's June 2018 address at the Shangri La Dialogue marked New Delhi's full embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept. Thereafter, Indo-Pacific diplomacy, or such a vision, has become a new pillar of Indian foreign policy, and a new angle through which it is observed. India's Indo- Pacific diplomacy will continue to put emphasis on its relationship with ASEAN and respect for ASEAN's centrality in regional security cooperation. Meanwhile, India is expected to strengthen multilevel exchanges and cooperation in different areas with like-minded countries such as the US, Japan, and Australia, and continue to engage in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – but probably keep a relatively low profile. Though it may share common interests with the US in dealing with a rising China, India so far seems to prefer hedging its bets on both China and the US, and is reluctant tochoose a side too early. Consequently, India's Indo-Pacific diplomacy will maintain a relatively clear-cut strategic independence. Limitations of India's Indo-Pacific diplomacy include: the kind of competition and confusion that seems to exist between its two ambitions, i.e. the Indian Ocean region as India's paramount strategic focus, and the Asia-Pacific as the hub of its Indo-Pacific diplomacy; ASEAN's centrality may be diminished by the Indo-Pacific; and India's simultaneous engagement with Quad and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may leave the awkward impression of straddling two boats. ; 印度的印太外交脱胎于其东向政策,初心是为融入亚太。以莫迪2018 年6 月香格里拉论坛讲话为标志,印度已全面接受"印太"概念,印太外交或印太构想将成为印度对外政策的新视角和新支柱。印度的印太外交将继续重视东盟外交,尊重东盟在地区安全合作中的中心地位。同时,印度将与美、日、澳这些"志同道合"的国家在多个层面、多个领域强化互动与合作,会继续参与四国集团但会适度保持低调。尽管在应对中国崛起上印度与美国有共同利益,但印度目前仍希望在中美间采取对冲战略,不想过早选边站队,因此其印太外交将保持较强的战略自主性。印度印太外交的局限在于:印度的主要战略方向印度洋与其印太外交的主要方向——亚太之间似乎存在某种矛盾;印太本身冲击东盟的地区中心地位;以及印度同时参与四国集团和上合组织也让人感觉印度"脚踩两只船"。