Suchergebnisse

Dès le xixe siècle, l'individu est l'objet de nombreuses études, dans les champs des sciences sociales, humaines et biologiques. Si l'individu est souvent mis en relation avec le social, le politique ou le vivant, il intéresse peu les sciences de l'information et de la communication. En ce xxie siècle, au moment où l'humain établit ses relations au monde à partir d'informations personnelles ou publiques, nous soutenons que l'individu communiquant peut se définir à partir de références psychologiques et psychiques, sociologiques, biologiques ancrées dans le xxe siècle, afin d'éviter sa réduction en un fournisseur d'informations pour ferme de données. ; In the 19th century, the individual became the object of a great deal of study in the social sciences, humanities and biological sciences. The individual is often viewed in relation to social or political issues or the living world, but attracts little interest from the information and communication sciences. In our 21st century context, at a time when human beings are establishing their relationships with the world through information, both personal and public, we believe that to preserve the individual from being reduced to the status of a mere purveyor of information for the information farm, the communicating individual can be defined on the basis of psychological, mental, sociological and biological references that are rooted in the 20th century.

The Boltzmann-like approach to traffic flow leads to a singularity in the speed distribution function at a critical concentration. It is then shown that there exist two flow regimes which may be described as an individual flow regime and a collective flow regime. The flow versus concentration relation in the latter regime is independent of the desired speed distribution function. The existence of both metastable flow states and collective flow states for a given concentration is demonstrated for some cases. It is suggested that the stable flow pattern corresponds to the collective flow state because the latter involves the largest fluctuations.

Réactivité individuelle à l'information dans les enquêtes d'évaluation contingente : l'importance de l'engagement Cet article étudie la réactivité d'individus à l'apport d'information au cours d'une enquête d'évaluation contingente. L'impact de l'information est évalué lors d'une procédure séquentielle au cours de laquelle différents types d'information sont successivement fournis aux individus: une information scientifique sur le bien et des informations sur le Consentement à Payer (CAP) des autres répondants. La réactivité à l'information est étudiée lors d'une enquête d'évaluation contingente novatrice au cours de laquelle deux groupes de plus de 120 répondants fournissent simultanément leur CAP (expérience de terrain) et lors d'une enquête téléphonique plus conventionnelle sur plus de 240 répondants. Les résultats traduisent une plus grande réactivité (1) à l'information scientifique qu'à l'information sur le CAP des autres répondants (2) dans l'expérience de terrain plutôt que dans l'enquête téléphonique. Ils sont discutés à la lumière de la théorie de l'engagement empruntée à la psychologie sociale et illustrent l'importance que l'engagement pourrait revêtir dans les applications pratiques de la méthode d'évaluation contingente.

Résumé Le but de cet article est de décrire la notion de "self-interest" et ses relations avec celle d'individu, considéré comme sujet économique, dans la Richesse des Nations . Le concept de "self-interest" est analysé à travers trois différents points de vue qui en illustrent la complexité. En outre, on démontre qu'il faut corriger la vision selon laquelle le "self-interest" est un principe homogène et transparent, qui dirige les actions individuelles et spécifié par un ensemble de caractéristiques partagées par la plupart des individus.

Employment protection refers both to regulations governing hiring and firing rules and finds its sources in legislation, collectively bargained conditions or customary practice. For about fifteen years, a large macroeconomic literature has studied the impact of employment protection on the labor market?s performances, or more precisely the effects of firing rules on the employment rate, the unemployment duration and rate. More recent works begin to emphasize other consequences of employment protection, i.e. its effects in terms of incentives on the behavior of individuals : facing a given legislation in terms of dismissal, economic agents adapt themselves, react and tend to adopt a strategic behavior. This thesis is related to this literature by exploring the individual incentives generated by labor law. Indeed, labor law related to firing and its enforcement by the courts have consequences on the behavior of parties to a labor relationship at several levels. On one hand, dismissal laws have an impact ex ante on the respective investment levels of employers and workers within their relationship : indeed, the way courts adjudicate a dispute due to a dismissal and notably the elements which are taken into account in their decisions have an impact on the incentives of parties to make specific investments. Thus, the theoretical analysis which is displayed shows what economic and social elements judges should take into account if their objective is the maximization of investment levels chosen by both parties. On the other hand, the design of judicial procedures also has an impact of the behavior of agents once the conflict has begun between the parties. By leading comparisons between several disputes? resolution systems thanks to theoretical tools and an experimental analysis, this thesis participates to current legal debates over the ability of procedures to generate as many agreements as possible, allowing for the reduction of judicial costs. ; La protection de l'emploi se définit comme la réglementation encadrant ...

Employment protection refers both to regulations governing hiring and firing rules and finds its sources in legislation, collectively bargained conditions or customary practice. For about fifteen years, a large macroeconomic literature has studied the impact of employment protection on the labor market?s performances, or more precisely the effects of firing rules on the employment rate, the unemployment duration and rate. More recent works begin to emphasize other consequences of employment protection, i.e. its effects in terms of incentives on the behavior of individuals : facing a given legislation in terms of dismissal, economic agents adapt themselves, react and tend to adopt a strategic behavior. This thesis is related to this literature by exploring the individual incentives generated by labor law. Indeed, labor law related to firing and its enforcement by the courts have consequences on the behavior of parties to a labor relationship at several levels. On one hand, dismissal laws have an impact ex ante on the respective investment levels of employers and workers within their relationship : indeed, the way courts adjudicate a dispute due to a dismissal and notably the elements which are taken into account in their decisions have an impact on the incentives of parties to make specific investments. Thus, the theoretical analysis which is displayed shows what economic and social elements judges should take into account if their objective is the maximization of investment levels chosen by both parties. On the other hand, the design of judicial procedures also has an impact of the behavior of agents once the conflict has begun between the parties. By leading comparisons between several disputes? resolution systems thanks to theoretical tools and an experimental analysis, this thesis participates to current legal debates over the ability of procedures to generate as many agreements as possible, allowing for the reduction of judicial costs. ; La protection de l'emploi se définit comme la réglementation encadrant ...