Suchergebnisse

Shipping list no: 2012-0024-P. ; Includes bibliographical references and index. ; Combating terrorists : legal challenges in the Post-9/11 World / Nicholas Rostow -- Mission impossible? international law, and the changing character of war / John F. Murphy -- Cyber attacks as "Force" under UN Charter Article 2(4) / Matthew C. Waxman -- Low-intensity computer network attack and self-defense / Sean Watts -- Cyber operations and the Jus in Bello : key issues / Michael N. Schmitt -- Who may be held? military detention through the Habeas Lens / Robert M. Chesney -- The changing character of the participants in war : civilianization of warfighting and the concept of "direct participation in hostilities" / Charles Garraway -- Direct participation in hostilities and the interoperability of the law of armed conflict and human rights law / Françoise J. Hampson -- Use of unmanned systems to combat terrorism / Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo -- New technology and the law of armed conflict / Darren M. Stewart -- The law of armed conflict in asymmetric urban armed conflict / David E. Graham -- Lawfare today . and tomorrow / Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. -- The age of lawfare / Dale Stephens -- Warning civilians prior to attack under international law : theory and practice / Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Noam Neuman -- The changing character of public legal scrutiny of operations / Rob McLaughlin -- Litigating how we fight / Ashley S. Deeks -- Asymmetric warfare : how to respond? / Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg -- Concluding remarks : LOAC and attempts to abuse or subvert it / Yoram Dinstein. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Shipping list no.: 2004-0041-P. ; Includes bibliographical references and index. ; CNE and CNA in the network-centric battlespace : challenges for operators and lawyers / Arthur K. Cebrowski -- Technology and law : the evolution of digital warfare / David Tubbs, Perry G. Luzwick, Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.-- A different kettle of fish : computer network attack / Roger W. Barnett -- Information operations, information warfare, and computer network attack : their relationship to national security in the information age / Daniel T. Kuehl -- International law, cybernetics, and cyberspace / Anthony D'Amato -- Computer network attack as a use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter / Daniel B. Silver -- Computer network attacks and self-defense / Yoram Dinstein -- Self-defense against computer network attack under international law / Horace B. Robertson, Jr.-- Computer networks, proportionality, and military operations / James H. Doyle, Jr.-- Some thoughts on computer network attack and the international law of armed conflict / Louise Doswald-Beck -- Wired warfare : computer network attack and the jus in bello / Michael N. Schmitt -- Proportionality, cyberwar, and the law of war / Ruth G. Wedgwood -- Neutrality and information warfare / George K. Walker -- Information operations in the space law arena : science fiction becomes reality / Douglas S. Anderson and Christopher R. Dooley -- Fourth dimensional intelligence : thoughts on espionage, law, and cyberspace / David M. Crane -- Computer network attacks by terrorists : some legal dimensions / John F. Murphy -- Meeting the challenge of cyberterrorism : defining the military role in a democracy / Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.-- "Weapons like to lightning" US information operations and US treaty obligations / Jeffrey H. Smith and Gordon N. Lederman -- International law of armed conflict and computer network attack : developing the rules of engagement / Brian T. O'Donnell and James C. Kraska .-- Responding to attacks on critical computer infrastructure : what targets? what rules of engagement? / James P. Terry -- Is it time for a treaty on information warfare? / Phillip A. Johnson. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Defence date: 9 November 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Nehal Bhuta, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor); Professor Jean d'Aspremont, University of Manchester; Professor Marco Roscini, University of Westminster; Professor Joseph H. H. Weiler, European University Institute & New York University ; This doctoral dissertation investigates the wide range of conceptualizations and categorizations that are applicable to state-sponsored cyber operations. State-sponsored cyber operations, namely recourse to cyber means by one State against another, are generally labelled 'cyber warfare'. This is neither a legal nor a prescriptive term; it reflects, however, a disproportionate focus on the realm of warfare. Avoiding hasty or overly simplistic characterizations of situations as cyber warfare is important to avoid further deterioration of their relations leading potentially to military escalation. This dissertation defines state-sponsored cyber operations according to international law and demonstrates that the majority of these incidents fall outside of the realm of (cyber) warfare and, therefore, need to be addressed separately and approached differently. Most state-sponsored cyber operations do not actually violate the prohibition of the use of force or the law of armed conflict, but rather they impinge the territorial sovereignty of the targeted States, the principle of nonintervention, or human rights. Cyber warfare is only the tip of the iceberg. An entire world lies submerged: cyber operations below the threshold of cyber warfare. While the emerged part concerning cyber warfare is well-studied and widely known, this thesis endeavours to shed light on the submerged, and arguably bigger, part that has been understudied and is less known. Parts I and II map the circumstances in which state-sponsored cyber operations violate international law. They demonstrate inter alia that most cyber operations remain under the threshold of cyber warfare, while they may constitute a breach of territorial sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention or even human rights law in most cases. Part I also analyzes the duty of diligence of third States. Part III deals with the attribution of cyber operations, analysing the attribution to the machine, to the human perpetrator, and focusing more specifically on the attribution to the sponsoring State. Part IV focuses on the consequences of an internationally wrongful cyber operation, mainly the obligations deriving from the law of State responsibility, and the remedies to address it, notably the recourse to self-defence, retorsion and countermeasures.

This paper examines the history of the phenom enon of Information Warfare and the increasingly dominant role that deception is taking within its framework. The concept of information warfare began as a technology oriented tactic to gain information dominance by superior command and control. This soon developed into a realization of the power of information as both a 'weapon' as well as a 'target'. The importance of information ra ther than its associated vehicle – information technology − created a situation where influence became a critical factor in conflict. As the nature of conflict changed to being an almost ongoing situation, control over mass communication be- came a high priority task for governments as we ll as the military. As such, the manipulation of information became an essential function. Thus, th e world of deception became an integral part of official communications between governments and their constituency.

The conceptions of warfare and battlefield have astonishingly evolved, going from a traditional view of military ammunition performed in land, sea or air, to the most novel electronic devices which rule today's international conflict strategies in cyberspace. Some examples of the latter weapons operating in the so-called fifth domain, like pen drives, drone strikes, keyboards and malware, are even considered innocuous at the first glimpse, especially when compared to other type of classic artillery. Howbeit, these gadgets were the ones that fostered the current limitless cyber race – which was noticeably triggered by the cyber attack occurred in Estonia (2007) – and has since then proved capable of causing way more alarming consequences, mainly if targeting critical national infrastructures. This present dissertation will dwell on the analysis of the enforcement of international law bodies towards acts of cyber war carried out by state or non-state agents, taking into specific consideration the application of the international criminal law norms. Thereunder, the focus of the study will remain on the characterization of cyber attacks, as either potential crimes of war or aggression.

This paper examines the ethics of the practice of information warfare at both the national and corporate levels. Initially examining the present and past actions of individual hackers, it moves to the more organised, future military and economic warfare scenarios. It examines the lack of legal or policy initiatives in this area.

LLibre de resums i programa del IALL Congress 2013. International Association of Law Libraries, 32nd Annual Course on International Law and Legal Information: Catalan Law and Legal Information in a Global Context. Aula Magna, Faculty of Law, University of Barcelona. Universitat de Barcelona. Barcelona, 15-19 September, 2013.

In this work, the author considers the phenomenon of information warfare in all possible manifestations. The main purpose of the study is to analyze the theoretical foundations of the concept. The relevance of this topic is determined by the fact that in 2017 information warfare has come to the forefront as a means of influence in the international arena, relegating military intervention to the background. This phenomenon is unique, since, in fact, one can observe a fundamental change in the conduct of international relations. In addition, the study presents a number of examples of information warfare in the historical context.Key words: information warfare, politics, international relations, state

Little advancement in science and technology offer as much promise for humanity's future as the collection of computer science-enabled skills referred to as artificial intelligence (AI). AI has the potential to improve the health and well-being of people, communities, and nations, as well as to help in the achievement of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda for 2030. However, like with previous breakthrough breakthroughs, AI applications have the potential to undermine international peace and security, particularly when integrated into the tools and systems of state military. In recognition of this, UN Secretary-General António Guterres' disarmament agenda, Securing Our Common Future, emphasizes the importance for UN member states to gain a better understanding of the nature and implications of emerging technologies with potential military applications, as well as the importance of maintaining human control over weapon systems. He underlines the growing importance of conversation between governments, civic society, and the commercial sector as a supplement to current intergovernmental mechanisms. This is especially true for AI, which, as an enabling technology, is expected to be incorporated into a wide range of military applications yet is now being researched primarily for non-military, predominantly civilian, uses. Nothing has been accomplished from the perspective of a developed country such as Pakistan. If data's use as a foundation for reporting and storytelling grows, it is critical to find responses to concerns about the use or misuse of data, the skills needed to do so, data journalism platforms and instruments, and potential newsroom changes. This research aims to answer the concerns from Pakistan's perspective. Additionally, it addresses the intellectual turns that Big Data and data journalism take in collecting, processing, explaining, interpreting, and representing reality.

Cyber has been around for over a decade and yet we are still faces with a situation of a very weak or rather no regulation. This is being heavily influenced by our weak technological development and due to the nature of cyberspace and the Internet. Cyber warfare poses interesting questions for us. It is one of a kind type of warfare, the one we cannot see or feel, but it's impacts are instantaneous and potentially devastating. States and scholars agree on that. This thesis attempts to explore possibilities of application of existing international laws to amend this situation and answer the questions if it is adequate or at all possible. While scholars are still arguing about the basics of what cyber warfare and cyberspace actually is, it keeps on evolving. States on the other hand have recognized the potential threat of cyber warfare a long time ago and are attempting to mend the existing legal void, however not successfully. The effects of their efforts are limited only to a small number of States. States who are not willing to give up their cyber capability would also stay clear from such international legislation. International treaties and State practice were analyzed in search of a way to accommodate cyber warfare under the current regime. The findings show that application of existing legal basis to cyber warfare is at best difficult and strained. The reality is that cyber warfare does not fit adequately under any of the legal umbrellas at the moment. Application of existing laws generates even more drawbacks than it in the end covers. There is potential for future development however. States are inclined to negotiate and, even as we speak, are attempting at creation of a cyber warfare regulating treaty. The thesis concludes that current international law is not adequate in order to be applicable to cyber warfare and even in areas where it can afford minimal protection, potential for abuse exists. The criteria and standards which were appropriate to conventional warfare and armed conflict are outdated. At least a global understanding on the terms used to define cyber warfare and related terms would be a good starting point. A universally accepted convention would be the perfect solution.

Cyber has been around for over a decade and yet we are still faces with a situation of a very weak or rather no regulation. This is being heavily influenced by our weak technological development and due to the nature of cyberspace and the Internet. Cyber warfare poses interesting questions for us. It is one of a kind type of warfare, the one we cannot see or feel, but it's impacts are instantaneous and potentially devastating. States and scholars agree on that. This thesis attempts to explore possibilities of application of existing international laws to amend this situation and answer the questions if it is adequate or at all possible. While scholars are still arguing about the basics of what cyber warfare and cyberspace actually is, it keeps on evolving. States on the other hand have recognized the potential threat of cyber warfare a long time ago and are attempting to mend the existing legal void, however not successfully. The effects of their efforts are limited only to a small number of States. States who are not willing to give up their cyber capability would also stay clear from such international legislation. International treaties and State practice were analyzed in search of a way to accommodate cyber warfare under the current regime. The findings show that application of existing legal basis to cyber warfare is at best difficult and strained. The reality is that cyber warfare does not fit adequately under any of the legal umbrellas at the moment. Application of existing laws generates even more drawbacks than it in the end covers. There is potential for future development however. States are inclined to negotiate and, even as we speak, are attempting at creation of a cyber warfare regulating treaty. The thesis concludes that current international law is not adequate in order to be applicable to cyber warfare and even in areas where it can afford minimal protection, potential for abuse exists. The criteria and standards which were appropriate to conventional warfare and armed conflict are outdated. At least a global understanding on the terms used to define cyber warfare and related terms would be a good starting point. A universally accepted convention would be the perfect solution.

We attempt to examine the technology of "information warfare" in this paper. The dominant theme of the paper is that the outcome of the information warfare is important not only for the future of a state itself but for the future of the world balance of forces. The main task of geopolitical actors in information warfare is to introduce ideas corresponding to their interests into mass consciousness. All participants of political conflicts have common features in technologies of Information warfare. The information anomie is the indicator of the great geopolitical actors' personified interests on the stage of "information warfare" - the process resulted in destroying the communicative line: report-information understanding and disrupting the social order in society. In this paper authors describe the following Information Warfare technologies: "Political volcano" technology; "SPIN" technology; "Widening media resource" technology; "specific gravity" technology; "Cold War 2.0" technology and Information cleaningup technology. It is assumed that in the future there will be new instructions on applying technologies of information warfare. To impart perspective to the paper we consider examples, opinions and trends.

Drone swarms, which can be used at sea, on land, in the air, and even in space, are fundamentally information-dependent weapons. No study to date has examined drone swarms in the context of information warfare writ large. This article explores the dependence of these swarms on information and the resultant connections with areas of information warfare—electronic, cyber, space, and psychological—drawing on open-source research and qualitative reasoning. Overall, the article offers insights into how this important emerging technology fits into the broader defense ecosystem and outlines practical approaches to strengthening related information warfare capabilities.

There are very few instruments and very few cases, which describe how the law in relation to naval mine warfare applies within non-international armed conflict contexts. Additionally, since 1945, there has been relatively limited State practice. Working out what the law applicable to naval mine warfare in NIAC situations might look like today thus requires some recourse to the pre-World War II scheme designed to accommodate and characterize maritime activity by rebels, insurgents, and belligerents in conflict with their State. This article proposes for discussion a set of "rules" that attempt to incorporate and update elements of this customary scheme within the confines of modern LOAC and law of the sea.

NPS NRP Executive Summary ; The military's identification of an information environment that is somehow separate from the traditional operational environment has created organization, theoretical, and philosophical schisms in how we think about military operations. This divide has resulted in recognized gaps and overlaps in how the military plans and executes operations; basically, although still highly effective, the military is recognizing that they are becoming highly inefficient in blending information (non-kinetic) options with traditional (kinetic) options. This research is designed to help identify the gaps and overlaps in planning and employment of non-kinetic and kinetic approaches to reaching operational objectives. The intent is to independently analyze behavioral objectives based on mission sets and the means by which they may be achieved. The use of kinetic weapons and projectiles is well understood among military planners, therefore this means-analysis will focus on the extensive number of options available that function via the phenomenon of information (i.e., non-kinetic delivery.). The results will be a matrix of options for matching means-to-objectives that will help inform operational planners in developing effective and efficient allocation of resources. ; Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific (NIWC Pacific) ; ASN(RDA) - Research, Development, and Acquisition ; This research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrp ; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ; Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.