This article present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and rules), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare also. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of Insurgency as well
This article present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and regulations), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of insurgency as well.
This article is the second of three articles which present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and regulations), to describe the different forms of insurgency. One of the assumptions in this work has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional conditions. The author has also said that it should nevertheless be possible to try to find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare. We can also find in this article some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency, guerrilla warfare and methods of insurgency as well.
The Philippines government has been dealing with insurgency for over a decade. The conflict caused by some militant-rebel groups is gaining too much attention from the international communities, particularly the human rights groups and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, so various studies and researches have been conducted and are being conducted by some scholars and peace advocates to assist the government and the rebel arm groups in reaching an agreement that will satisfy the demands and requirements set by both parties.
Security professionals and strategists are discovering the post-cold war world is as rife with persistent, low-level violence as its predecessors. In fact, many regions are experiencing a rise in the amount of conflict in the absence of restraints previously imposed by the superpowers. Since frustration in many parts of the Third World is actually increasing, insurgency--the use of low-level, protracted violence to overthrow a political system or force some sort of fundamental change in the political and economic status quo--will be an enduring security problem. Unfortunately, most existing doctrine and strategy for dealing with insurgency are based on old forms of the phenomenon, especially rural, protracted, "people's war." But as this type of insurgency becomes obsolete, new forms will emerge. It is important to speculate on these future forms in order to assist in the evolution of counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. Dr. Steven Metz uses a psychological method of analysis to argue that two forms of insurgency, which he calls the "spiritual" and the "commercial," will pose the greatest intellectual challenges to security professionals, military leaders, and strategists. The specific nature of such challenges will vary from region to region. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1274/thumbnail.jpg
The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1677/thumbnail.jpg
L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.
L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.
L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.
Touching on a top U.S. foreign policy priority, this Special Report identifies several possible outcomes of the insurgency in Iraq, and recommends to U.S. policymakers the best strategies to deal with the current situation and the unfolding futures. ; "October 2006." ; Caption title. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 10). ; Introduction -- The scenario workshops -- The long slog to overcome ethnic and sectarian politics -- Ethnic-sectarian politics derail the political process -- Descent into hell -- Neighboring helping hands -- "Lebanonization" -- Conclusions and recommendations. ; Touching on a top U.S. foreign policy priority, this Special Report identifies several possible outcomes of the insurgency in Iraq, and recommends to U.S. policymakers the best strategies to deal with the current situation and the unfolding futures. ; Mode of access: Internet.
book chapter, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century. International Perspectives. Vol 2. Combating the Sources and Facilitators. Edited by: James J. Forest. Praeger Security International, 2007. ; Over the last decade, Afghanistan and terrorism have become synonymous in the eyes of many analysts and policy makers. Afghanistan of course, was the first campaign stop- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and has since been viewed as a hotbed for global terrorists and jihadists.
This year marked an important transition for the Berkeley Planning Journal: we are now an electronic, open access publication. Our new publication method of record is eScholarship, a service of the University of California. eScholarship allows us to publish our articles online, in an indexed publication, while granting our readers a wide range of rights to download, print, and share our author's work. We are part of a movement in academia in which many scholars are taking a closer look at the way access to their research is controlled.
The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. The end of European decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union together removed the motivational impulse for much conflict between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. However, new ideological, political, and commercial imperatives are now encouraging intrastate conflict and insurgency amid the breakdown of the international bipolar political system and the emergence of identity politics and of many more nonstate actors. This monograph considers the patterns of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how much the conflict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli experience. ; "January 2005." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 18-21). ; The continuing proliferation of insurgent organizations suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means either of achieving power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. The end of European decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union together removed the motivational impulse for much conflict between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. However, new ideological, political, and commercial imperatives are now encouraging intrastate conflict and insurgency amid the breakdown of the international bipolar political system and the emergence of identity politics and of many more nonstate actors. This monograph considers the patterns of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how much the conflict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli experience. ; Mode of access: Internet.
This monograph creates a proposed insurgency typology divided into legacy, contemporary, and emergent and potential insurgency forms, and provides strategic implications for U.S. defense policy as they relate to each of these forms. The typology clusters, insurgency forms identified, and their starting dates are as follows, Legacy: Anarchist (1880s), Separatist—Internal and External (1920s), Maoist Peoples (1930s), and Urban Left (Late-1960s); Contemporary: Radical Islamist (1979), Liberal Democratic (1989), Criminal (Early 2000s), and Plutocratic (2008); and Emergent and Potential: Blood Cultist (Emergent), Chinese Authoritarianism (Potentials; Near to Midterm), and Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potentials; Long Term/Science Fiction-like). The most significant strategic implications of these forms for U.S. defense policy are derived from the contemporary Radical Islamist form followed by the contemporary Criminal and emergent Blood Cultist forms. If the potential Chinese Authoritarianism form should come to pass it would also result in significant strategic impacts. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1425/thumbnail.jpg
Urban climate insurgency refers to the ensemble of grassroots initiatives aiming to tackle climate change from a radical point of view. Insurgency in this case does not imply violence but rather refers to the radical rejection of the current socioecological system. While explicitly challenging planetary ecocide and climate-change effects, these forms of insurgency target all policies that make the urban condition yet more precarious, demonstrating that climate mobilization is inherently intersectional. The focus here is on the urban dimension of this global climate insurgency that unsettles the dichotomy between rural and urban. It is on the urban terrain, already fissured by racial capitalism but also traversed by antiracist and promigrant movements, that the climate emergency becomes a climate and social justice issue. This introductory essay offers a fresh approach to the new municipalist project and digs into its environmental agenda. From New York to Mälmo, from Rio de Janiero to Istanbul, passing through Jakarta, Bangalore, and Naples, this special issue explores the articulation of radical climate-change politics, the materialization of climate injustices, and grassroots reactions to these injustices in the urban sphere. ; QC 20220328 QC 20220715 ; Occupy Climate Change