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Security professionals and strategists are discovering the post-cold war world is as rife with persistent, low-level violence as its predecessors. In fact, many regions are experiencing a rise in the amount of conflict in the absence of restraints previously imposed by the superpowers. Since frustration in many parts of the Third World is actually increasing, insurgency--the use of low-level, protracted violence to overthrow a political system or force some sort of fundamental change in the political and economic status quo--will be an enduring security problem. Unfortunately, most existing doctrine and strategy for dealing with insurgency are based on old forms of the phenomenon, especially rural, protracted, "people's war." But as this type of insurgency becomes obsolete, new forms will emerge. It is important to speculate on these future forms in order to assist in the evolution of counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. Dr. Steven Metz uses a psychological method of analysis to argue that two forms of insurgency, which he calls the "spiritual" and the "commercial," will pose the greatest intellectual challenges to security professionals, military leaders, and strategists. The specific nature of such challenges will vary from region to region. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1274/thumbnail.jpg

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- The Contributors -- 1. Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis -- 2. The Irish Republican Army and Northern Ireland -- 3. People's War in Thailand -- 4. The Guatemalan Insurrection -- 5. Urban Terrorism in Uruguay: The Tupamaros -- 6. Iraq: The Kurdish Rebellion -- 7. Revolutionary War in Oman -- 8. Armed Struggle in Angola -- 9. Summary and Conclusions -- Selected Bibliography -- Index.

Maldistribution of land in agrarian societies is commonly thought to be an important precondition of mass political violence and revolution. Others argue that because of the difficulty of mobilizing rural populations for political protest, land maldistribution is irrelevant except as part of an inegalitarian distribution of income nationwide. These rival inequality hypotheses have significant implications with respect to the kinds of reforms likely to reduce the potential for insurgency in a society. They are tested using the most comprehensive cross-national compilation of data currently available on land inequality, landlessness, and income inequality. Support is found for the argument that attributes the greater causal import to income inequality. Moreover, the effect of income inequality on political violence is found to hold in the context of a causal model that takes into account the repressiveness of the regime, governmental acts of coercion, intensity of separatism, and level of economic development.

IN AN ATTEMPT TO POSTULATE A TYPE OF EFFORT THAT WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF CONTROLLING INSURGENCIES, THIS ARTICLE IDENTIFIES AND DISCUSSES WHAT APPEAR TO BE THE MOST SALIENT FACTORS DERIVED FROM 43 POST-WORLD WAR II CASES IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES OR ANOTHER WESTERN COUNTRY WAS INVOLVED. THE LIST ACKNOWLEDGES THE FACT THAT THIS TYPE OF CONFLICT OPERATES ON TWO LEVELS WHICH RESULTS IN THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF ANY COUTERINSURGENCY IS NOT DETERMINED PRIMARILY BY THE SKILLFUL MANIPULATION OF VIOLENCE IN THE MANY MILITARY BATTLES THAT TAKE PLACE ONCE A WAR OF THIS KIND IS RECOGNIZED TO HAVE BEGUN. RATHER, THE ARTICLE SUGGESTS, THE CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IS DETERMINED BY THE LEVEL OF PREPARATION UNDERTAKEN BEFORE CONFLICT, AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE REMAINS THE FOCUS OF THE EFFORT DURING THE CONFLICT.

"Religion, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency" published on by Oxford University Press.