Suchergebnisse

In this volume Mitrokhin presents two dictionaries produced by the KGB itself to define their activities in both offensive and defensive intelligence work. The translated documents tell the story of the KGB's methods and targets and should interest the general public as well as the specialist

When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state.

Appendix D. Directors of U.S. Naval Communications 1912-1942Appendix E.U.S. Naval Attachés in Tokyo, 1914-1941; Appendix F.U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Section "OP-20-G" and Its Antecedents; Appendix G. Officers in Charge, Office of Naval Communications, Code and Signal Section, "Research Desk" (OP-20-GX); Appendix H. Officers in Charge, Office of Naval Communications, Code and Signal Section, Translation Section (OP-20-GZ); Appendix I. Growth of U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence; Appendix J.U.S. Naval Radio Intelligence, Primarily Focused upon Japan, as of December 1941.

Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have reawakened interest as well as controversies over how Western militaries tried to engage, with varying degrees of success, with the 'Human Terrain'. These debates are far from new. This article explores the role played by a handful of Royal Air Force Intelligence Officers across the Aden Protectorates in the 1950s. Undoubtedly, they enjoyed notable success, not least in countering the immediate territorial avarice of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. But they remained agents of an empire in retreat, their effectiveness in harnessing a granular knowledge of the tribal landscape to the delivery of aerial violence being buffeted by an environment that they could not shape and over which, despite their best endeavours, Aden could exercise little control.

AbstractThis article explores Allied intelligence officers' encounters with and interrogations of German civilians from autumn 1944 onwards, psychological warfare operations directed at civilians, and their wider ramifications. Focusing especially on the officers serving with the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), I will demonstrate that field intelligence officers' stance towards German civilians was fluid and often ambiguous, with the encounter causing considerable distress to some of them. Their reports and correspondence further suggest that in this period, Germans readily professed knowledge of atrocities. But contrary to intelligence officers' expectations, they failed to accept any guilt or responsibility. Finally, I will argue that the very foundations and techniques of Western Allied psychological warfare may have reinforced and legitimised justification strategies that separated between "real" Nazis and everyone else. This was at odds with one of the central aims of Military Government, i.e. to inculcate a sense of culpability in Germans.

Spymasters is a collection of interviews revealing enlightening perspectives on the covert operations of this powerful, secretive arm of the U.S. government. Here former top-ranking CIA officials shed light on some of the most sensitive issues and practices in American foreign intelligence to date. These men disclose information about: President Harry S. Truman's demands for a centralized intelligence agency and the stubborn resistance of James F. Byrnes, J. Edgar Hoover, and the military services the tumultuous early stages of the National Security Council the failed Bay of Pigs invasion the

Intelligence officers often interact in culturally diverse settings different from the settings in which they grew up. Yet, there is a lack of academic research about the integration of culture and the study of intelligence. Researchers have made Cultural Intelligence (CQ) measurable via the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) and successfully applied it in the business world as a predictor of success in multi-cultural environments. This article describes an application of the CQS, using the Observer Report questionnaire to assess the memoirs of three successful intelligence officers to ascertain the degree that CQ applies to the success of officers in United States Intelligence Community (USIC) in multicultural environments. The study results indicated each intelligence officer possessed a high degree of cultural intelligence that assisted in the course of their duties and the CQS is a good assessment tool to measure cultural intelligence.
Keywords: Cultural intelligence, Cultural Intelligence Scale, CQS, Cultural Intelligence Quotient