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Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have reawakened interest as well as controversies over how Western militaries tried to engage, with varying degrees of success, with the 'Human Terrain'. These debates are far from new. This article explores the role played by a handful of Royal Air Force Intelligence Officers across the Aden Protectorates in the 1950s. Undoubtedly, they enjoyed notable success, not least in countering the immediate territorial avarice of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. But they remained agents of an empire in retreat, their effectiveness in harnessing a granular knowledge of the tribal landscape to the delivery of aerial violence being buffeted by an environment that they could not shape and over which, despite their best endeavours, Aden could exercise little control.

"A collection of writings by present or former faculty and students at the Joint Military Intelligence College. The purpose of the book is to provide an academic resource for students, teachers, and practitioners of intelligence. The growth of the literature, and some of the most significant writings have come from a center of excellence in the field, the Joint Military Intelligence College. Those presented here represent a cross section of subdisciplines, some with a very timely element, some timeless." ; "PCN 56166"--P. [4] of cover. ; "July 2005." ; Shipping list no.: 2006-0023-P. ; "A collection of previously published works by students and members of the faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Introduction -- Pt.1. The work of intelligence -- Ch. 1 Meeting the Intelligence Community's continuing need for an intelligence literature -- Ch. 2. Writing with Intelligence, Chapter 2, "The basic tools of writing with intelligence" -- Ch. 3. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone, Prologue, Part 1, Part 2 -- Ch. 4. On becoming an intelligence analyst -- Ch. 5. Getting Intelligence Right: the Power of Logical Procedure (excerpt) -- Ch. 6. Opening windows of opportunity: the need for opportunities-based warning -- Ch. 7. Teaching vision -- Ch. 8. Spy fiction, spy reality -- Ch. 9. Evidence Marshaling and Argument Construction (excerpt) -- Ch. 10. Failures of imagination: thoughts on the 9/11 Commission Report -- Ch. 11. Homeland security and intelligence: can oil mix with water in an open society? -- Pt. 2. The history of intelligence -- Ch. 12. The San Cristobal trapezoid -- Ch. 13. Israel's quest for satellite intelligence -- Ch. 14. Experiences to Go: Teaching with Intelligence Case Studies (excerpt) -- Ch. 15. The creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: Congress's role as overseer -- Pt. 3. The applications of intelligence -- Ch. 16. Health and national security -- Ch. 17. Intelligence support to refugee operations: who's the expert? -- Ch. 18. Religion and war in the 21st century -- Ch. 19. Intelligence support to the life science community: mitigating threats from bioterrorism -- Ch. 20. "SALSA for cyber sonics": education and research at the Joint Military Intelligence College -- Ch. 21 Knowledge-based tools: a Solution for Optimizing Collection Requirements Management (excerpt) -- Ch. 22. Narco-mercantilism and the war on drugs: is victory an option? ; "A collection of writings by present or former faculty and students at the Joint Military Intelligence College. The purpose of the book is to provide an academic resource for students, teachers, and practitioners of intelligence. The growth of the literature, and some of the most significant writings have come from a center of excellence in the field, the Joint Military Intelligence College. Those presented here represent a cross section of subdisciplines, some with a very timely element, some timeless." ; Mode of access: Internet.

The effectiveness of intelligence operations is directly related to the conduct of intelligence officers and depends on their moral attitudes and system of values. The specifics of intelligence operations may lead to moral dilemmas in the behaviour of the officers. The operating methods of intelligence institutions include both ethical tactical elements and those that run counter to the generally accepted ethical principles that could discredit democracy and the fundamental values that the state advocates. This article analyses the ethical problems that are encountered in the process of using HUMINT, an intelligence method. The authors employ theoretical analysis to construct an initial integral behaviour model of the intelligence officer based on the context of choices and operational implications that could encourage further scientific discussion of the subject.

The effectiveness of intelligence operations is directly related to the conduct of intelligence officers and depends on their moral attitudes and system of values. The specifics of intelligence operations may lead to moral dilemmas in the behaviour of the officers. The operating methods of intelligence institutions include both ethical tactical elements and those that run counter to the generally accepted ethical principles that could discredit democracy and the fundamental values that the state advocates. This article analyses the ethical problems that are encountered in the process of using HUMINT, an intelligence method. The authors employ theoretical analysis to construct an initial integral behaviour model of the intelligence officer based on the context of choices and operational implications that could encourage further scientific discussion of the subject.

The effectiveness of intelligence operations is directly related to the conduct of intelligence officers and depends on their moral attitudes and system of values. The specifics of intelligence operations may lead to moral dilemmas in the behaviour of the officers. The operating methods of intelligence institutions include both ethical tactical elements and those that run counter to the generally accepted ethical principles that could discredit democracy and the fundamental values that the state advocates. This article analyses the ethical problems that are encountered in the process of using HUMINT, an intelligence method. The authors employ theoretical analysis to construct an initial integral behaviour model of the intelligence officer based on the context of choices and operational implications that could encourage further scientific discussion of the subject.

The effectiveness of intelligence operations is directly related to the conduct of intelligence officers and depends on their moral attitudes and system of values. The specifics of intelligence operations may lead to moral dilemmas in the behaviour of the officers. The operating methods of intelligence institutions include both ethical tactical elements and those that run counter to the generally accepted ethical principles that could discredit democracy and the fundamental values that the state advocates. This article analyses the ethical problems that are encountered in the process of using HUMINT, an intelligence method. The authors employ theoretical analysis to construct an initial integral behaviour model of the intelligence officer based on the context of choices and operational implications that could encourage further scientific discussion of the subject.

United States (U.S.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with local intelligence services, either in an advisory role or direct coordination or liaison. In many cases, the intelligence officers have tended to try to remake the local intelligence services in the image of U.S. intelligence structures and procedures, with these efforts rather futile in most cases. One factor that has led to considerable frustration and potential failure has been a lack of understanding of the culture of local intelligence systems. Understanding both the subtleties of an area's social norms and mores, and the bureaucratic and historical cultures of other intelligence services remain critical factors in long-term success. Using case studies of environments in which established intelligence services have worked with emergent intelligence agencies, this paper examines the requirements for incorporating both larger cultural approaches and detailed knowledge of other intelligence bureaucracies.

Increasing modernization in military technology and methodology occurred during the beginning of the twentieth century. These changes had a direct effect on how U.S. Marines practiced military intelligence during the occupation of Haiti from 1915- 1934. The use of military intelligence had an impact on the outcome on the occupation but was not the only factor that contributed to U.S. military victories. My thesis explains that the improvement of intelligence methods used by Marines in Haiti occurred as a result of outside influence, changing circumstance in Haiti, and individual agency. Major failures had occurred that allowed resistance to grow unchecked in the Haitian countryside. With the introduction of full-time military intelligence officers and improved data documentation, the intelligence collected became more useful to Marine Corps leadership. The staff officers that assumed the roles of intelligence personnel created new forms for recording intelligence reports and made past intelligence more accessible to military command. Individual ingenuity led to the assassination of Charlemagne Peralte, the central leader of the caco revolt. This thesis discusses the intelligence innovation that occurred during the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1935.

Jervis reviews Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds. The Missing Dimension: Govern- ments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century and Ernest R. May, ed. Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars. He introduces his review with the following definitions and clarifications. General Eisenhower pointed out that the U.S. Army treated intelligence as a "stepchild."1 This characterization applied to most countries, at least until the development of surveillance satellites and other technological marvels. Within the military, intelligence has been the "slow track"; aside from a few mavericks, officers were generally shunted into the area when they were deemed unfit for more important tasks. This is not surprising: the job of the military is to fight, and so positions that directly represent this function will have the greatest pres- tige. Foreign ministries, of course, carry out diplomacy, and so one might think that they would value intelligence more highly because of its closer links to this mission. But most diplomats have prided themselves on being generalists and have tended to believe, often correctly, that they can under- stand other countries better than can specialized intelligence officers

Internationally, the border has been presented as a site of unique opportunity for the identification and protection of victims of human trafficking. In the UK, the establishment of specialist safeguarding and anti-trafficking (SAT) units within the border force has raised questions about the challenges for border force officers (BFOs) of balancing the enforcement of strict immigration rules with the protection of victims under anti-trafficking legislation. In this paper we draw on data collected from a study of anti-trafficking initiatives at Heathrow airport to consider a particular area of BFO frustration with SAT work: the collection and use of evidence and intelligence to support investigation and pursuit of potential SAT cases at the border. Our findings focus on the use of intelligence and data to inform initiatives and develop a comprehensive understanding of the trafficking problem; and the scope of BFO powers of evidence-collection on the frontline. The experience of BFOs points to a team often working in isolation as they attempt to traverse gaps in data collection and limits to their powers to gather evidence in pursuit of their duty to identify victims of trafficking at the UK border. We conclude by making proposals for how the border force and central government could improve evidence and intelligence practices in ways that translate into both more coherent anti-trafficking policy and better identification and support for victims.

Internationally, the border has been presented as a site of unique opportunity for the identification and protection of victims of human trafficking. In the UK, the establishment of specialist safeguarding and anti-trafficking (SAT) units within the border force has raised questions about the challenges for border force officers (BFOs) of balancing the enforcement of strict immigration rules with the protection of victims under anti-trafficking legislation. In this paper we draw on data collected from a study of anti-trafficking initiatives at Heathrow airport to consider a particular area of BFO frustration with SAT work: the collection and use of evidence and intelligence to support investigation and pursuit of potential SAT cases at the border. Our findings focus on the use of intelligence and data to inform initiatives and develop a comprehensive understanding of the trafficking problem; and the scope of BFO powers of evidence-collection on the frontline. The experience of BFOs points to a team often working in isolation as they attempt to traverse gaps in data collection and limits to their powers to gather evidence in pursuit of their duty to identify victims of trafficking at the UK border. We conclude by making proposals for how the border force and central government could improve evidence and intelligence practices in ways that translate into both more coherent anti-trafficking policy and better identification and support for victims.

Israel, since its declaration of independence, has taken a realist perspective in its foreign policy. Yet, despite the offensive realist nature of its foreign policy, it suffered a near defeat in the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Research shows despite signals of an impending Arab threat at the time, Israel choose inaction because of a combination of external and internal factors. The internal factors were precipitated primarily as a result of the Israel's landslide victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, whereas the external factors mainly focused on themes of secrecy and deception. Uri Bar-Joseph, however, presents new evidence that negates the importance of secrecy and deception as a reason for Israel's intelligence failure. He provides evidence that Israel's inaction in 1973 resulted because of key intelligence specialists psychological shortcomings; Bar‐Joseph uses Kruglanski's Theory of Lay Epistemics to support this observation. This theory examines the judgement process and links it with the need for closure, and Bar-Joseph cites this theory in explanation of the judgment decisions of key intelligence officers.

The article is devoted to the process of the activity of the Russian naval intelligence in Japan during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. The article deals with the problems that prevented Russian naval intelligence from continuing to work on the Japanese islands during the fighting. Not the least role in the circumstances was played by the Japanese counterintelligence, which was vigilantly watching for possible spies. At the same time, Russian counterintelligence in the Far Eastern region has shown its ineffectiveness. Information about the confrontation between Japanese and Russian naval intelligence is given. The reasons for the lag of the Russian naval intelligence from the Japanese colleagues are investigated. The prerequisites for successful professional results of Japanese scouts in the early twentieth century are analyzed. The author traces the relationship between the state policy of the Russian Empire and the formation of Russian naval intelligence in the Far East. The author studies the history of Russian intelligence and the Russian Imperial Navy in the early twentieth century. In addition, the operations of Japanese military intelligence officers are considered, such as: agitation among the small peoples of Siberia against the Russian government and the organization of an uprising of Macedonian revolutionaries in the Balkans with the aim of subsequently diverting the Russian army to the problems of this region. The most successful operation of the Japanese side was the creation of detachments of Hunghuz or Chinese bandits with enemy officers at the head of the rear of the Russian troops in Manchuria.

At present, a shift in criminal law in both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), but maybe even around the globe, is noticeable. States find ways to make more extensive use in the criminal procedure of intelligence collected by the intelligence services. The Netherlands has recently adopted an 'Act on shielded witnesses' that enables intelligence officers of the two Dutch intelligence services, AIVD and MIVD, to provide evidence in the pre-trial phase to the examining magistrate. The hearing will be predominantly ex parte and in camera. Both the official report of the intelligence services (Ambtsbericht) and the transcript of the witness testimony provided by an intelligence officer may be adduced as evidence. This paper examines the viability of such a regime of shielded intelligence witnesses under the rules in place in England and Wales, and legislative compliance with fair trial rights as laid down in Article 6 ECHR, in particular the right to confrontation (Article 6 (3) (d) ECHR).

At present, a shift in criminal law in both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), but maybe even around the globe, is noticeable. States find ways to make more extensive use in the criminal procedure of intelligence collected by the intelligence services. The Netherlands has recently adopted an 'Act on shielded witnesses' that enables intelligence officers of the two Dutch intelligence services, AIVD and MIVD, to provide evidence in the pre-trial phase to the examining magistrate. The hearing will be predominantly ex parte and in camera. Both the official report of the intelligence services (Ambtsbericht) and the transcript of the witness testimony provided by an intelligence officer may be adduced as evidence. This paper examines the viability of such a regime of shielded intelligence witnesses under the rules in place in England and Wales, and legislative compliance with fair trial rights as laid down in Article 6 ECHR, in particular the right to confrontation (Article 6 (3) (d) ECHR).