Suchergebnisse

The effectiveness of intelligence operations is directly related to the conduct of intelligence officers and depends on their moral attitudes and system of values. The specifics of intelligence operations may lead to moral dilemmas in the behaviour of the officers. The operating methods of intelligence institutions include both ethical tactical elements and those that run counter to the generally accepted ethical principles that could discredit democracy and the fundamental values that the state advocates. This article analyses the ethical problems that are encountered in the process of using HUMINT, an intelligence method. The authors employ theoretical analysis to construct an initial integral behaviour model of the intelligence officer based on the context of choices and operational implications that could encourage further scientific discussion of the subject.

The effectiveness of intelligence operations is directly related to the conduct of intelligence officers and depends on their moral attitudes and system of values. The specifics of intelligence operations may lead to moral dilemmas in the behaviour of the officers. The operating methods of intelligence institutions include both ethical tactical elements and those that run counter to the generally accepted ethical principles that could discredit democracy and the fundamental values that the state advocates. This article analyses the ethical problems that are encountered in the process of using HUMINT, an intelligence method. The authors employ theoretical analysis to construct an initial integral behaviour model of the intelligence officer based on the context of choices and operational implications that could encourage further scientific discussion of the subject.

"In September 1918, World War I was nearing its end when Marguerite E. Harrison, a thirty-nine-year-old Baltimore socialite, wrote to the head of the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence Division asking for a job. The director asked for clarification. Did she mean a clerical position? No, she told him. She wanted to be a spy. Harrison, a member of a prominent Baltimore family, usually got her way. She had founded a school for sick children and wangled her way onto the staff of the Baltimore Sun. Fluent in four languages and knowledgeable of Europe, she was confident she could gather information for the U.S. government. The MID director agreed to hire her, and Marguerite Harrison became America's first female foreign intelligence officer."--

United States (U.S.) civilian and military intelligence services increasingly have engaged with local intelligence services, either in an advisory role or direct coordination or liaison. In many cases, the intelligence officers have tended to try to remake the local intelligence services in the image of U.S. intelligence structures and procedures, with these efforts rather futile in most cases. One factor that has led to considerable frustration and potential failure has been a lack of understanding of the culture of local intelligence systems. Understanding both the subtleties of an area's social norms and mores, and the bureaucratic and historical cultures of other intelligence services remain critical factors in long-term success. Using case studies of environments in which established intelligence services have worked with emergent intelligence agencies, this paper examines the requirements for incorporating both larger cultural approaches and detailed knowledge of other intelligence bureaucracies.

Intelligence officers discern the truth. They gather information - often contradictory or incomplete - and, with it, they build the most accurate possible image of the world. With the stakes at their absolute highest, they must then decide what to do. In everyday life, you are faced with contradictory, incomplete information, too. Reading the news on social media, figuring out the next step in your career, or trying to discover if gossip about a friend is legitimate, you are building an image of the world and making decisions about it. Looking through the eyes of one of Britain's most senior ex-intelligence officers, Professor Sir David Omand, How Spies Think shows how the big decisions in your life will be easier to make when you apply the same frameworks used by British intelligence. Full of revealing examples from his storied career, including key briefings with Prime Ministers from Thatcher to Blair, and conflicts from the Falklands to Afghanistan, Professor Omand arms us with the tools to sort fact from fiction, and shows us how to use real intelligence every day.

Cover -- Prologue -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6 -- 7 -- 8 -- 9 -- 10 -- 11 -- 12 -- 13 -- 14 -- 15 -- 16 -- 17 -- 18 -- 19 -- 20 -- 21 -- 22 -- 23 -- 24 -- 25 -- 26 -- 27 -- 28 -- 29 -- 30 -- 31 -- 32 -- 33 -- 34 -- 35 -- 36 -- 37 -- 38 -- 39 -- 40 -- 41 -- 42 -- A Note on the Author -- A Note on the Type.

From references to secret agents in The Art of War in 400 B.C.E. to the Bush administration's ongoing War on Terrorism, espionage has always been an essential part of state security policies. This illustrated encyclopedia traces the fascinating stories of spies, intelligence, and counterintelligence throughout history, both internationally and in the United States. Written specifically for students and general readers by scholars, former intelligence officers, and other experts, Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence provides a unique background perspective for viewing history an

Intro -- Insights from Chapter 1 -- Insights from Chapter 2 -- Insights from Chapter 3 -- Insights from Chapter 4 -- Insights from Chapter 5 -- Insights from Chapter 6 -- Insights from Chapter 7 -- Insights from Chapter 8 -- Insights from Chapter 9 -- Insights from Chapter 10 -- Insights from Chapter 11 -- Insights from Chapter 12 -- Insights from Chapter 13 -- Insights from Chapter 14 -- Insights from Chapter 15 -- Insights from Chapter 16 -- Insights from Chapter 17 -- Insights from Chapter 18 -- Insights from Chapter 19 -- Insights from Chapter 20 -- Insights from Chapter 21.

Wie der Autor darlegt, verfolgte Frankreich im Vergleich zu Großbritannien eine Mandatspolitik im Nahen Osten, die sich weniger auf die lokale Elite als auf direkte Kontrolle stützte. Dementsprechend waren die französischen Geheimdienste im Nahen Osten gut organisiert. Anhand von erst seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre zugänglichem Archivmaterial geht der Autor den Aktivitäten der französischen Geheimdienste - Service de Renseignements, Section de Centralisation des Renseignements und Sûreté Générale - in der Zeit zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen in Syrien nach. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Geheimdienste ein integraler Bestandteil der französischen Mandatsmacht waren, die in kritischen Momenten, wie der syrischen Revolte von 1925, arabische Nationalbestrebungen zu kontrollieren wussten. (DÜI-Mjr)