Suchergebnisse

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians and political commentators. One point was common – the issue was very delicate and needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation and take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivistic approach (Ole Węver's theory of securitization) and from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration – is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue and the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) and even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly.

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians and political commentators. One point was common – the issue was very delicate and needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation and take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivistic approach (Ole Węver's theory of securitization) and from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration – is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue and the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) and even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly.

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians and political commentators. One point was common – the issue was very delicate and needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation and take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivistic approach (Ole Węver's theory of securitization) and from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration – is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue and the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) and even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly.

The May 9th issue was the main question on the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda in the first half-year 2005. The question was a trivial one: should the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus attend the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in Moscow. However the question became a source of public discussions among politicians, businessmen, historians and political commentators. One point was common – the issue was very delicate and needed unusual measures to find the right solution. The President agreed that he should be aware of the painful historic experience of Lithuanian nation and take the issue to the public discussions before the final decision is made. Therefore the task of this research is to look at the May 9th issue from different theoretical perspectives: from constructivistic approach (Ole Węver's theory of securitization) and from positivistic approach to security issues. The first question of exploration – is the May 9th issue a security issue? From securitization perspective the question should be formulated like this: was the May 9th issue a securitizated threat? From positivistic perspective the question sounds so: could the discussions around the May 9th issue and the decision of the Lithuanian President cause damage to Lithuanian national security? The research has concluded that the May 9th issue was successfully securitizated, because three criteria of securitization were fulfilled: a) usual political procedures were changed with reference to the possible threat rising from the President's decision; b) objects to be secured were indicated; c) securitizing actors were identified. From positivistic perspectives the real threat of the May 9th problem could be estimated as minimal (or hypothetical) and even communication processes (proposing the hypothesis that communication security sector has an effect on threats dynamics) did not changed threats characteristics significantly.

A systematic solution to this issue would allow both the Ministry of the Interior and subordinate institutions, including the Police department, to apply the uniform EU's financial support distribution mechanism, based on rationality, transparency and objectivity principles, systematic and measured behavior. It is also suggested when evaluating the EU and other funding sources to create a financial source correlation system: to create the map of funded areas, which would allow to see whether there is a duplication of the same areas financed by different sources. In order to achieve more effective systemic distribution of EU's financial support mechanism, the EU financial support distribution model should be introduced in accordance with a number of components: - to make the legal regulation of EU's financial support distribution more exact in the level of Ministry of Interior (to specify the provisions according to: responsible subjects, the EU's support distribution criteria, EU's support distribution procedures and importance of priorities by distributing the support; support distribution mechanism). - to define the criteria of EU's financial support distribution, according to which the EU's financial support is distributed. Criteria (leverages) would allow a more rational and objective distribution of EU's financial support. - to determine (specify) the EU's financial support distribution procedures and importance of priorities when distributing the support logically ranking the priorities according to their importance and providing a very clear position as to why a particular priority has specific need for funds. - to specify the EU's financial support distribution mechanism while providing in advance the target expenditure need inside the area, and only then generalizing a need for specific area.

A systematic solution to this issue would allow both the Ministry of the Interior and subordinate institutions, including the Police department, to apply the uniform EU's financial support distribution mechanism, based on rationality, transparency and objectivity principles, systematic and measured behavior. It is also suggested when evaluating the EU and other funding sources to create a financial source correlation system: to create the map of funded areas, which would allow to see whether there is a duplication of the same areas financed by different sources. In order to achieve more effective systemic distribution of EU's financial support mechanism, the EU financial support distribution model should be introduced in accordance with a number of components: - to make the legal regulation of EU's financial support distribution more exact in the level of Ministry of Interior (to specify the provisions according to: responsible subjects, the EU's support distribution criteria, EU's support distribution procedures and importance of priorities by distributing the support; support distribution mechanism). - to define the criteria of EU's financial support distribution, according to which the EU's financial support is distributed. Criteria (leverages) would allow a more rational and objective distribution of EU's financial support. - to determine (specify) the EU's financial support distribution procedures and importance of priorities when distributing the support logically ranking the priorities according to their importance and providing a very clear position as to why a particular priority has specific need for funds. - to specify the EU's financial support distribution mechanism while providing in advance the target expenditure need inside the area, and only then generalizing a need for specific area.

Seeking to ensure full national security it is not enough just to guarantee alone State's national security – and security should be guaranteed for whole society's layers and their welfare. In order to guarantee full national security, should be ensured gender equality in the first instance, in all areas: social, military, economic and political. The ideology of feminism precisely declares the ideas of human rights, gender equality and gives more universal conception of security. It is not ensure just State's national security, but it implements economic State's growth, progress, implements the image of welfare State and develops the ideas of democratic culture and tolerance. It is important to guarantee external State's security, but also it is worth to regard to ensuring of State's internal security. Internal security – satisfaction the needs and welfare of sections of society determines existing of the united, stable society, which, if it necessary, might withstand, be resistant against the treats for national security. The master's thesis consists of an introduction, three teaching sections, conclusions and a list of references. The aim of the research – Articulation and conceptualization of the links and influences of national security with gender – feminist theory and highlighting, concretization and implementation of the positive and functional purpose of gender equality positive values in Lithuanian public security policy. The methodology of the research. In the first chapter is analyzing dispersion of feminism ideas and their problems, based on analytical, descriptive, historical and systemic methods. In the second chapter is highlighted interactions of national security and feminism, based on structural, functional, hermeneutic security as one of the goals of gender equality and interpretive, critical, and design methods. The third chapter concretizes gender equality issues in the context of Lithuania's national security, based on comparative, modeling and political forecasting methods. Conclusion. Full national security is not possible if is not ensured gender equality. Ensuring gender equality enables society's harmony, its stability, security, development of democratic culture, social modernization also existence of welfare State and its economic progress.

In the broader sense the general object of observation considered in this paper is the influence of transboundary cyber-security issues on government behaviour. The main academic problem this paper deals with is how the relationship between internal external security concerns could be fully conceptualized to assess and explain the latter. The subject of this paper is not being analyzed through single theory or paradigm but from the perspective of middle-ranged approaches. This pragmatic approach helps better to unpack the complexity of cyber-security issues.As substitent theories cannot adequately assess the outcome of the expected changes this paper invokes an analytical framework built by Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard which encourages a strong focus on the nature of transboundary problems and their implications for changes in four dimensions: perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Analysing what implications new cyber-security issues have in each of these dimensions and explaining how aggregate effect of their interconnections determines Lithuania's response to transboundary cyber-security challenges are the main tasks of this paper. These interim objectives are as follows: 1) evaluating the changes in Lithuania's threat perceptions causes by the vulnerabilities of the emerging cyberspace; 2) examining the internal-external security nexus entrenched in Lithuania's cyber-security policies; 3) looking at how the internal-external security nexus is being used in political interests and conflict domain 4) inquiring into the institutional context of cyber-security regulation and the changes it has or will yet have to face. While some of the causal mechanisms and processes at play may be quite clear or drawn from the authors' insights, exploring the variety of dynamics unfolding in four dimensions is the empirical question. Answering this question helps to define one of the 'four ideal' types that state behaviour may take. These forms of behaviour are 1) inertia; 2) ignorance; 3) exaggeration; 4) coherence. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate which of the 'ideal types' best defines Lithuania's behaviour towards relatively new empirical phenomenon – cyber-security problem. The general hypothesis of this paper states that how government respond to cyber-security problem depends on whether and how the nexus of internal – external security concerns becomes manifestant across the other four dimensions. The empirical observations provided in this paper support considerable proof to the relevance of the main hypothesis. The results suggest that only at the policy dimension can the manifest convergence of national and international cyber-security plans of action be visible, thus suggesting the strong relation between internal-external security domins. While there is still a huge legal and regulational breach. Cyber-security issues have clearly impacted upon Lithuania's polity too, however, ministres and newly established institutional structures face grave misscoordination problems, although they tend to collaborate domesticaly and internationally. Finally, there is only scarce tendency towards more observant cyber-security issues perception among Lithuania's society and elite. This draws a conclusion that while the cyber-security problem in Lithuania is starting to be percieved and even the addressing policies are starting to be developped, yet they are failed to be turned into effective action. Therefore, Lithuania's response can be described as the form of 'inertia'

In the broader sense the general object of observation considered in this paper is the influence of transboundary cyber-security issues on government behaviour. The main academic problem this paper deals with is how the relationship between internal external security concerns could be fully conceptualized to assess and explain the latter. The subject of this paper is not being analyzed through single theory or paradigm but from the perspective of middle-ranged approaches. This pragmatic approach helps better to unpack the complexity of cyber-security issues.As substitent theories cannot adequately assess the outcome of the expected changes this paper invokes an analytical framework built by Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard which encourages a strong focus on the nature of transboundary problems and their implications for changes in four dimensions: perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Analysing what implications new cyber-security issues have in each of these dimensions and explaining how aggregate effect of their interconnections determines Lithuania's response to transboundary cyber-security challenges are the main tasks of this paper. These interim objectives are as follows: 1) evaluating the changes in Lithuania's threat perceptions causes by the vulnerabilities of the emerging cyberspace; 2) examining the internal-external security nexus entrenched in Lithuania's cyber-security policies; 3) looking at how the internal-external security nexus is being used in political interests and conflict domain 4) inquiring into the institutional context of cyber-security regulation and the changes it has or will yet have to face. While some of the causal mechanisms and processes at play may be quite clear or drawn from the authors' insights, exploring the variety of dynamics unfolding in four dimensions is the empirical question. Answering this question helps to define one of the 'four ideal' types that state behaviour may take. These forms of behaviour are 1) inertia; 2) ignorance; 3) exaggeration; 4) coherence. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate which of the 'ideal types' best defines Lithuania's behaviour towards relatively new empirical phenomenon – cyber-security problem. The general hypothesis of this paper states that how government respond to cyber-security problem depends on whether and how the nexus of internal – external security concerns becomes manifestant across the other four dimensions. The empirical observations provided in this paper support considerable proof to the relevance of the main hypothesis. The results suggest that only at the policy dimension can the manifest convergence of national and international cyber-security plans of action be visible, thus suggesting the strong relation between internal-external security domins. While there is still a huge legal and regulational breach. Cyber-security issues have clearly impacted upon Lithuania's polity too, however, ministres and newly established institutional structures face grave misscoordination problems, although they tend to collaborate domesticaly and internationally. Finally, there is only scarce tendency towards more observant cyber-security issues perception among Lithuania's society and elite. This draws a conclusion that while the cyber-security problem in Lithuania is starting to be percieved and even the addressing policies are starting to be developped, yet they are failed to be turned into effective action. Therefore, Lithuania's response can be described as the form of 'inertia'

In the broader sense the general object of observation considered in this paper is the influence of transboundary cyber-security issues on government behaviour. The main academic problem this paper deals with is how the relationship between internal external security concerns could be fully conceptualized to assess and explain the latter. The subject of this paper is not being analyzed through single theory or paradigm but from the perspective of middle-ranged approaches. This pragmatic approach helps better to unpack the complexity of cyber-security issues.As substitent theories cannot adequately assess the outcome of the expected changes this paper invokes an analytical framework built by Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard which encourages a strong focus on the nature of transboundary problems and their implications for changes in four dimensions: perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Analysing what implications new cyber-security issues have in each of these dimensions and explaining how aggregate effect of their interconnections determines Lithuania's response to transboundary cyber-security challenges are the main tasks of this paper. These interim objectives are as follows: 1) evaluating the changes in Lithuania's threat perceptions causes by the vulnerabilities of the emerging cyberspace; 2) examining the internal-external security nexus entrenched in Lithuania's cyber-security policies; 3) looking at how the internal-external security nexus is being used in political interests and conflict domain 4) inquiring into the institutional context of cyber-security regulation and the changes it has or will yet have to face. While some of the causal mechanisms and processes at play may be quite clear or drawn from the authors' insights, exploring the variety of dynamics unfolding in four dimensions is the empirical question. Answering this question helps to define one of the 'four ideal' types that state behaviour may take. These forms of behaviour are 1) inertia; 2) ignorance; 3) exaggeration; 4) coherence. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate which of the 'ideal types' best defines Lithuania's behaviour towards relatively new empirical phenomenon – cyber-security problem. The general hypothesis of this paper states that how government respond to cyber-security problem depends on whether and how the nexus of internal – external security concerns becomes manifestant across the other four dimensions. The empirical observations provided in this paper support considerable proof to the relevance of the main hypothesis. The results suggest that only at the policy dimension can the manifest convergence of national and international cyber-security plans of action be visible, thus suggesting the strong relation between internal-external security domins. While there is still a huge legal and regulational breach. Cyber-security issues have clearly impacted upon Lithuania's polity too, however, ministres and newly established institutional structures face grave misscoordination problems, although they tend to collaborate domesticaly and internationally. Finally, there is only scarce tendency towards more observant cyber-security issues perception among Lithuania's society and elite. This draws a conclusion that while the cyber-security problem in Lithuania is starting to be percieved and even the addressing policies are starting to be developped, yet they are failed to be turned into effective action. Therefore, Lithuania's response can be described as the form of 'inertia'

In the broader sense the general object of observation considered in this paper is the influence of transboundary cyber-security issues on government behaviour. The main academic problem this paper deals with is how the relationship between internal external security concerns could be fully conceptualized to assess and explain the latter. The subject of this paper is not being analyzed through single theory or paradigm but from the perspective of middle-ranged approaches. This pragmatic approach helps better to unpack the complexity of cyber-security issues.As substitent theories cannot adequately assess the outcome of the expected changes this paper invokes an analytical framework built by Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard which encourages a strong focus on the nature of transboundary problems and their implications for changes in four dimensions: perceptions, policies, politics and polity. Analysing what implications new cyber-security issues have in each of these dimensions and explaining how aggregate effect of their interconnections determines Lithuania's response to transboundary cyber-security challenges are the main tasks of this paper. These interim objectives are as follows: 1) evaluating the changes in Lithuania's threat perceptions causes by the vulnerabilities of the emerging cyberspace; 2) examining the internal-external security nexus entrenched in Lithuania's cyber-security policies; 3) looking at how the internal-external security nexus is being used in political interests and conflict domain 4) inquiring into the institutional context of cyber-security regulation and the changes it has or will yet have to face. While some of the causal mechanisms and processes at play may be quite clear or drawn from the authors' insights, exploring the variety of dynamics unfolding in four dimensions is the empirical question. Answering this question helps to define one of the 'four ideal' types that state behaviour may take. These forms of behaviour are 1) inertia; 2) ignorance; 3) exaggeration; 4) coherence. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to evaluate which of the 'ideal types' best defines Lithuania's behaviour towards relatively new empirical phenomenon – cyber-security problem. The general hypothesis of this paper states that how government respond to cyber-security problem depends on whether and how the nexus of internal – external security concerns becomes manifestant across the other four dimensions. The empirical observations provided in this paper support considerable proof to the relevance of the main hypothesis. The results suggest that only at the policy dimension can the manifest convergence of national and international cyber-security plans of action be visible, thus suggesting the strong relation between internal-external security domins. While there is still a huge legal and regulational breach. Cyber-security issues have clearly impacted upon Lithuania's polity too, however, ministres and newly established institutional structures face grave misscoordination problems, although they tend to collaborate domesticaly and internationally. Finally, there is only scarce tendency towards more observant cyber-security issues perception among Lithuania's society and elite. This draws a conclusion that while the cyber-security problem in Lithuania is starting to be percieved and even the addressing policies are starting to be developped, yet they are failed to be turned into effective action. Therefore, Lithuania's response can be described as the form of 'inertia'

The main concepts used to explain the theme: The Shengen area – the territory of countries which have signed the Shengen Agreement. This area is special that its outer borders are preserved very carefully and control of inner borders of this area is abolished. The Shengen Agreement – agreement of some European Union countries about progressively declining of borders control because of realization people free moving. This Agreement was signed on 14 June in 1985 under initiative of Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl and the President of France Francois Mitterand by Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherland, France and Federal Republic Germany in Shengen. Border guard, control and surveillance are a relevant topic in every country. It should be mentioned, that when the country has borders with other countries, it has created the policy, legal and institutional basis for the control and surveillance of its border that secures social, political, legal, economical, cultural and scientific interests of the citizens of that country. There are two border concepts in the European Union – internal and external borders. The co-operation of the member states, based on the integrated border management concept, is oriented to the common attempt to control and secure the external border carrying out various joint operations and projects. The analysis of the guidelines of cooperation of the EU member states in the field of external border surveillance and evaluation of the effectiveness of this cooperation is being carried out using the researches, Shengen acquis, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty of Lisbon, etc. ; Šengeno erdvėje nėra pasienio kontrolės prie vidaus sienų, todėl išorės sienos kontrolė yra ypač svarbi. Europos Sąjungos (toliau ES), Šengeno valstybėse narėse yra sukurtas ir naudojamas integruotas sienų saugumo modelis, apimantis tam tikras veiklos sritis (dimensijas), pavadintas keturiais filtrais. Panaikinus vidaus sienų kontrolę, laisvo asmenų judėjimo principas įgyvendinamas valstybių narių teritorijoje, tarp jų ir Lietuvos. Tai reiškia, kad Lietuvos sienų kontrolės lygis turi įtakos visos Šengeno erdvės saugumo užtikrinimui, todėl būtina nuolat taikyti įvairias priemones, tarp jų ir teisines, skirtas tobulinti integruotą sienų valdymą tiek Lietuvos, tiek ES mastu. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad skirtingos valstybės narės turi garantuoti išorės sienų saugumą, galimi nacionalinių įstatymų ir administracinės praktikos skirtumai. Todėl aktualu išnagrinėti, kaip Lietuvoje praktiškai taikomas ES integruotas sienų saugumo modelis, koks yra jo teisinis reguliavimas, išskirti su sienų kontrole susijusių teisės aktų problemas ir pateikti siūlymus bei rekomendacijas joms spręsti.

Conflicts, internal or international, are generated by many various causes and factors. When regionalization processes start (neighbor states are involved into a conflict), the conflict becomes a problem of the whole region. In this article it was tried to show and explain the main aspects of regional conflicts formation, causes of conflicts, and the process of regionalization. These issues are analyzed from the standpoint of security complex; this composes theoretical background of the study. The article asserts that the concept of security complex enables us to envisage the causes of conflicts formation and escalation, as well as also explain their regionalization and the impact on neighboring states. This article presents a theoretical model of regional conflict formation. It argues that research of relations within security complex helps actors to identify security threats more clearly, and this influences the formation of disputes. The sum of causal factors constitutes the core of the conflict, thus it is very important to notice and understand these factors while analyzing regional conflicts. Meanwhile, security complex influences the process of conflict regionalization. Consequences, the presented theoretical model of conflict formation can be useful a better understanding of the processes of conflict formation, and for identification and research of such phenomenon. Otherwise, it is a rather new look at conflicts from regional level, trying evaluate their significance in the context of regional relations.

Conflicts, internal or international, are generated by many various causes and factors. When regionalization processes start (neighbor states are involved into a conflict), the conflict becomes a problem of the whole region. In this article it was tried to show and explain the main aspects of regional conflicts formation, causes of conflicts, and the process of regionalization. These issues are analyzed from the standpoint of security complex; this composes theoretical background of the study. The article asserts that the concept of security complex enables us to envisage the causes of conflicts formation and escalation, as well as also explain their regionalization and the impact on neighboring states. This article presents a theoretical model of regional conflict formation. It argues that research of relations within security complex helps actors to identify security threats more clearly, and this influences the formation of disputes. The sum of causal factors constitutes the core of the conflict, thus it is very important to notice and understand these factors while analyzing regional conflicts. Meanwhile, security complex influences the process of conflict regionalization. Consequences, the presented theoretical model of conflict formation can be useful a better understanding of the processes of conflict formation, and for identification and research of such phenomenon. Otherwise, it is a rather new look at conflicts from regional level, trying evaluate their significance in the context of regional relations.

The main goal of Lithuanian internal and foreign policy is to consolidate Lithuanian national security. The basic parts of national security are: human rights; safety of individual liberty; national values; state independence; Constitution (the highest law of the state); conditions of free development of the state; territorial unity; environmental and cultural heritage based on laws or other acts that our Republic has ratified or acceded. Lithuania pursues the policy of national security based on the 3rd constitutional art. which states that no one can limit national sovereignty or assume rights. The stated policy is regulated by some more constitutional articles of the Republic (1st art., 8th art., 94th art., 139th art., etc) as well as by regulations of the constitutional act (June 8, 1992). National security should be treated in different aspects such as social, economical, ecological not only military. The security of our Republic is inseparable part of the security of all Europe and the whole world in general. Integration into European economical or security structures is possible only through active participation in international organizations. Membership in North Atlantic treaty organization (NATO) and European organization (EU) is treated as strategic goal of Lithuanian Republic. It means that doing one's ordinary duties concerning public order and security of the society an official must take into consideration interests of other member states, should know national juridical basis of neighbor states for an activity in the territory of some state will be performed according to the laws and acts of that state.