Suchergebnisse

Whether US foreign policy should emphasize democracy or market economics; countering economic espionage against US companies; and US embassy assistance to US companies; 4 articles.

Structures and personnel that made Iran-contra covert actions possible. Partial contents: The administration-Select Committee consensus on the need to continue covert operations; Bush, North, and the bureaucratic consensus on the need to deal with domestic enemies; The failure of Congress.

Political repression in the US is examined historically, & studies of the Reagan administration's (1981-1989) response to what it perceived as a terrorist threat are discussed. Attitudes of the broader US Left toward the ideas & acts of radicals are also considered, & the nature of the organizational structure of the antiterrorist program is explored. The contribution of the Carter administration (1977-1981) to developing what was to become the Reagan administration's counterterrorist program is considered, & the limits to the Carter administration's liberalism are noted. The development of internal security policy by the Reagan administration is recounted, & the targets of the domestic counterterrorism program are described. Antiterrorist activities during the Reagan years are considered, together with congressional oversight of that program, & the treatment in prison of apprehended radicals is described. 100 References. F. S. J. Ledgister

Despite the scope of the threat they pose to Mexico's security, violent drug-trafficking organizations are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. While there is no perfectly analogous case from history, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons and efforts that were correlated with improvement in countries facing similar challenges related to violence and corruption

Internal security; local government; Turkey

"H.A.S.C. no. 112-151." ; Shipping list no.: 2013-0070-P. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

SECURITY ISSUES IN EUROPE ARE IN A PHASE OF TOTAL REDEFINITION, WHILE THE OUTLINES OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE ARE IN GENERAL BLURRED. AT THE PRESENT TIME, EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE DEFINITION OF EUROPE'S SECURITY STRUCTURES IN A POSITIVE FASHION. AT BEST THEY CAN JOIN A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE WITHIN PARAMETERS DEFINED BY THE VICTORS OF THE COLD WARD. AT WORST THEY CAN INFLUENCE THE PROCESS THROUGH THEIR OWN INTERNAL STRIFE THAT SPREADS TO THEIR NEIGHBORS. FRANCE EXPECTS EUROPE'S FUTURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE TO DEVELOP HARMONIOUSLY AROUND "INTERLOCKING INSTITUTIONS." IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW HARMONIOUSLY OLD INSTITUTIONS AND CONCEPTS CAN COEXIST WITH THE NEW.

Examines transition from the Soviet-era secret police and intelligence service to the Russian espionage and security services. Organizational alterations, links between intelligence services, the political/economic elite nomenklatura, and organized crime, domestic and foreign intelligence operations, and the chekist legacy.