Suchergebnisse

Waarom slagen grootmachten er soms in om samen te werken terwijl ze op andere momenten in bloedige conflicten verwikkeld raken, zoals de oorlog die Rusland ontketende in Oekraïne? Welke rol spelen organisaties als de VN-Veiligheidsraad en de NAVO? Welke lessen kunnen we uit de geschiedenis trekken om de actualiteit te beoordelen, ondanks de belangrijke verschillen met het verleden? Conflict en samenwerking buigt zich over deze en andere vragen, die historici en politieke wetenschappers al decennia lang boeien. Het boek beschrijft de internationale betrekkingen vanaf het einde van de napoleontische oorlogen tot aan de meest recente evoluties zoals de opkomst van China en de oorlog in Oekraïne. Het accent ligt op de politiek van de grote mogendheden vanwege hun bepalende rol op het internationale spelbord. De auteurs zoeken een antwoord op de vraag waarom er in bepaalde periodes vrede en stabiliteit was, en beschrijven de opkomst en ondergang van grootmachten

SOCIAL CONFLICTS ARE THE MOTOR OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS & POINT TO A DESIRE OR STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL CHANGES. THESE CHANGES ARE SUBSEQUENTLY REALIZED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, & THE RESULTS LAID DOWN IN THE LAW. DISPROPORTIONAL POSITIONAL CHANGES OF ACTORS WITHIN A SOCIAL SYSTEM BRING ABOUT CONFLICTS. POSITIONS ARE TIED TO VALUE DISTRIBUTIONS, THUS DISPROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF VALUES LEAD TO CONFLICTS. A SECOND APPROACH MAY BE FOLLOWED, VIZ, THE UTILITY-THEORETICAL OR THE SATISFACTION-THEORETICAL APPROACH. THIS APPROACH DEALS WITH AN ANALYSIS OF UTILITY-FUNCTIONS OF ACTORS, CONFLICT BEING DEFINED AS A POSITION ON THE SATISFACTION-SCALE. 2 FIGURES. MODIFIED HA.

This paper challenges the well-established dichotomy to explain international power phenomena either as hard power or soft power. Reflecting the observation of an increasing decoupling between power capacities of the states and their ability to prevail in international conflicts, the author assumes the existence of a third power category whose origins and models of action are not sufficiently recognized and researched. Borrowing the idea of 'structural power' from Susan Strange, he advocates the hypothesis that it is this third power capacity that frequently makes powerful countries powerless and less powerful countries more assertive. Adapted from the source document.

In the present article the author starts off with a discussion of the Barcelona process and the main reason for its failure: namely the fragility of the Oslo peace process. The second topic focuses on the genesis of the Union for the Mediterranean of July 2008 as a follow-up of the Euromediterranean Partnership dated 1995, and its relevance for both its North African and European shores. Included are the institutional and procedural structures, and an analysis of the place conflict resolution holds within the Union for the Mediterranean, the latter illustrated by the recent Gaza War. O. van Zijl

THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL POLITICAL CONFLICT PRESUPPOSES LOCAL ISSUES OR CONTROVERSIES THAT CAN BE SETTLED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE INVOLVED IN VIOLENT CONFLICT BECAUSE RIOTS DO HAPPEN SOMEWHERE, VIZ ON THE TERRITORY OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT LOCAL ISSUES. THE OBJECTIVES OF ACTION HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CONFLICT IS A LOCAL ONE. THE OBJECTIONS OF AN ACTION CAN BE THE CHANGE OF LOCAL POWER HOLDERS OR A CHANGE OF THEIR POLICIES. REPLACEMENT OF LOCAL OFFICIALS BY LOCAL ACTION IN THE DUTCH SITUATION IS NOT SO OBVIOUS. IN MOST CASES A DECISION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED, EG THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW MAYOR. BY-ELECTIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS HAVE NEVER OCCURRED. WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE PUTTING ASIDE OF A LOCAL COUNCIL & APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSIONER BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN MANY CASES LOCAL AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE COOPERATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO REALIZE PLANS OF IMPORTANCE, AT LEAST FINANCIALLY. EVEN WHERE THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST, A LOCAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT DEVIATE TOO MUCH FROM NATIONAL POLICIES. LOCAL REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT IS SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENT. LOCAL CONFLICT CANNOT CHANGE '1ST ORDER POLITICS' (POLICIES) OR '2ND ORDER POLITICS' (POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS) VERY FAR; THE LIMITS ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM. RECENTLY ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO CHANGE THE WAY (PROPORTIONALLY TO THE STRENGTH OF ALL POSSIBLE PARTIES IN THE COUNCILS) THAT PROVINCIAL BOARDS OF ALDERMAN ARE TRADITIONALLY COMPOSED. THOUGH THIS PROCEDURE MIGHT BE REASONED AS A POLITIZATION OF LOCAL & PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, THE MAIN EFFECT WILL BE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN COMPETITION FOR SEATS. HA.

The Iraq War has once again spotlighted the divisions within the European Union that have prevented a unified foreign policy & strategy in its leadership. While the common market & currency, along with the accession of ten new member states have contributed greatly to a sense of European unity, the reliance on majority consensus & "soft security" neither ensures effective supranational policy making, nor does it eliminate the tension caused by the international leadership claims of three European Union members: GB, France, & Germany. The former two are both nuclear powers & permanent members of the Security Council, while the latter is one of the world's leading economies, & the dominant one in Europe; each has its own interests & orientations (eg, the transatlantic reflex of GB, the Continental reflex of France, & the pacifism of Germany). It is proposed that the European Union give more coordinating & directive power to the Union Ministry for Foreign Affairs to ensure a common foreign policy for the continent. A. Siegel