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During the past two centuries, western nations have successively ex-tended the voting franchise to citizens of lower income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to in-crease their countries' power in international relations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a lower tax cost of arming may confer a strategic delegation advantage. We find supporting empirical evidence in case Studies of franchise extensions in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.

During the past two centuries, western nations have successively extended the voting franchise to citizens of lower income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to wage war effectively on other nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a lower tax cost of arming may confer a strategic delegation advantage. We find supporting empirical evidence in case studies of franchise extensions in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.

At head of title: The Dimensionality of Nations Project, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii. ; Thesis--University of Hawaii. ; Bibliography: leaves [127]-134. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This dissertation aims to advance the current understanding of the general conditions affecting the likelihood of military conflicts and wars between states. To that end, the dissertation develops a Darwinian theory of international conflict. This theory is developed by generalizing Darwinian principles as they are used in the study of biological entities, and applying those principles to study states and their behavior. Though states are markedly different from life forms, the same Darwinian principles—at a high level of abstraction—provide a parsimonious explanation of states' conflict behaviors. Based on this Darwinian theory, the key substantive argument of this thesis is that military conflicts between states are more probable when the use of force is likely to enhance the material power of the involved states. The specifics of this argument entail novel predictions about the likelihood of conflict occurrence that differ in important respects from existing claims in the study of international relations. Among other things, and contrary to the prediction of the influential neorealist tradition, this thesis predicts that states are more likely to join the strong side of an ongoing conflict than the weak. This, and other Darwinian-based predictions are statistically evaluated in this thesis using all incidents of conflict initiation, conflict reciprocation, and conflict joining occurring in the international system over the period from 1816 through 2010. The results of these statistical analyses are largely consistent with the Darwinian-based predictions. Moreover, the variables derived from the Darwinian framework are found to have a large substantive effect in predicting whether a state will participate in conflict. Indeed, the substantive effects of the Darwinian variables match (and occasionally exceed) the substantive effects of some of the most important determinants of conflict identified in the literature, such as those related to geographical proximity, the democratic character of states, and the presence of military alliances between states.

Why do escalations in protracted international conflicts sometimes hasten the pace of negotiations ? And why is it sometimes the case that the resulting terms of agreement were deemed unacceptable to one or both sides before the escalation ? We analyze these issues in a game-theoretic setting with asymmetric information, in which the delay a party exercises before it makes an acceptable offer is served to signal credibly its true stand, of which the other side is initially uncertain. Escalation makes both sides more eager to settle than before, as an agreement would end the increased level of hostilities. We analyze how this effect may loosen the incentives to exercise long delays in the course of bargaining, and hence shorten the time to agreement. However, it turns out that the larger is the overall increase in violence implied by escalation, the higher are also the chances that its initiator will eventually regret its own decision to escalate. These insights emerge both with one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information.

"Pre-print of a paper to appear in Elton B. McNeil (ed.) Social science and human conflict . 1964." ; Includes bibliography. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This dissertation addresses the argument that there may not be room for cooperation in relations with (and in between) states with authoritarian systems of rule because international conflicts may strengthen their hold on power. To this end, it asks 1) whether authoritarian regimes benefit in terms of their duration in power from conflict, 2) whether conflicts stabilize domestic politics by moderating the violence involved during regime transitions (in terms of how they fall), and also 3) whether conflicts decrease the human costs involved in the fall of an authoritarian regime. It finds that conflict does not, in general, benefit authoritarian rulers in terms of their duration in power. An adverse security environment actually makes personalist regimes more vulnerable to internal challenges and decreases their time in power. For mililtary regimes, however, conflict stabilizes domestic politics in a way that had not been systematically examined previously. A conflict-prone external environment increases the incentives for the military to act in unison and military leaders are more likely to choose a non-violent and orderly return to the barracks when facing the prospects of mass protests or armed insurgencies. This is because divisions within the military over the response to the unrest become more costly. Similarly, within an adverse security environment, the threat that wielding deadly force in an effort to retain power poses to the unity of the armed forces moderates the actions of the military and lowers the chances of force being used in ways that kill. Thus casualty levels are lower within a conflict-prone security environment for military regimes compared to those that are not.

History and the emotions linked to the past have been a source of conflicts. In particular, the different interpretations of events – or the impossibility to talk about these "white spots" – bring tensions between groups within society, but also among various countries. Indeed, the past leaves traces on politics. It can also be selected as a tool for legitimising action (cf. Lavabre, 1992 and her distinction between the weight and the choice of the past). In International Relations, the past can be used for various goals (cf. Rosoux, 2001). Memory can also be misused (Lavabre, 2000) or abused (Todorov, 1995). How do states address these uses of the past in bilateral relations and how do they try to limit these actions? To tackle this politicisation of the past, historical commissions have been created – already in the interwar period, but mostly as from the 1950's and especially the 1970's – in order to create a dialogue on history and to appease bilateral relations. This contribution is based on two case-studies: the Polish-German Schoolbook Commission, established in 1972 and the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters, created in 2002 and reactivated in 2008. The corpus, collected within the framework of my PhD, is composed of 54 interviews, archives, as well as additional sources such as participant observations, discourses, the press and opinion polls on reconciliation in Poland. Historical commissions are created in the aim of rapprochement, if not reconciliation. In this paper I want to precise the scope and limits of these commissions and insist on the variables explaining their (non-) continuity and (non-) success on overcoming traumatic historical experiences.

History and the emotions linked to the past have been a source of conflicts. In particular, the different interpretations of events – or the impossibility to talk about these "white spots" – bring tensions between groups within society, but also among various countries. Indeed, the past leaves traces on politics. It can also be selected as a tool for legitimising action (cf. Lavabre, 1992 and her distinction between the weight and the choice of the past). In International Relations, the past can be used for various goals (cf. Rosoux, 2001). Memory can also be misused (Lavabre, 2000) or abused (Todorov, 1995). How do states address these uses of the past in bilateral relations and how do they try to limit these actions? To tackle this politicisation of the past, historical commissions have been created – already in the interwar period, but mostly as from the 1950's and especially the 1970's – in order to create a dialogue on history and to appease bilateral relations. This contribution is based on two case-studies: the Polish-German Schoolbook Commission, established in 1972 and the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters, created in 2002 and reactivated in 2008. The corpus, collected within the framework of my PhD, is composed of 54 interviews, archives, as well as additional sources such as participant observations, discourses, the press and opinion polls on reconciliation in Poland. Historical commissions are created in the aim of rapprochement, if not reconciliation. In this paper I want to precise the scope and limits of these commissions and insist on the variables explaining their (non-) continuity and (non-) success on overcoming traumatic historical experiences.

Poster Division: Social & Behavioral Sciences: 1st Place (The Ohio State University Edward F. Hayes Graduate Research Forum) ; A five-year embargo was granted for this item.

Combined critical review of: Arthur H. Westing, ed., Cultural Norms, War and the Environment. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988; Arthur H. Westing, ed., Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal. London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1984; Arthur H. Westing, ed., Herbicides in War: The Long-term Ecological and Human Consequences. London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1984; Arthur H. Westing, ed., Explosive Remnants of War: Mitigating the Environmental Effects. London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Frances, 1985; Arthur H. Westing, ed., Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Here are five remarkable and sobering volumes, with dozens of contributors, that explore in detail whether and how far there can be biological conservation in the face of war and international competition for resources. These studies are the work of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), financed by the Swedish Parliament, with an international staff. This series demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that any one interested in biological conservation who fails also to take serious interest in political and social issues will soon fail in biological conservation.

In the Kyrgyz Region of Ferghana Valley, violent conflict flares repeatedly between the local Kyrgyz majority population and the Tajik ethnic minority. Drawing on a recent qualitative case study conducted in the borderlands of one of the two Tajik enclaves within the Kyrgyz Batken Region, this article seeks to identify the causes of pasture-related inter-ethnic conflict in the agro-pastoral Kyrgyz–Tajik border region. The paper employs an institutional perspective and explores the impact of the given institutional setup. We note that a lack of institutional arrangements for transboundary pasture use hinders Tajik herders' legal access to the region's sole summer pastures. The Kyrgyz "Pasture Committee" has pragmatically designed local rules on transboundary pasture use in the Kyrgyz–Tajik border region, thereby assuring Tajik herders at least semi-official access to the summer pastures. Yet while these rules limit conflict, they fail to limit overstocking. Locally designed rules also open up business opportunities to Tajik herders, which some of the Kyrgyz herders consider unfair and illegal. In order to achieve sustainable and locally accepted regional pasture management, despite the lack of legislative amendments and international agreements, we propose local-level institutional innovations. We also emphasize that pasture use regulation is paramount for maintaining regional stability and peaceful cooperation. ; Peer Reviewed

Does the United States have the right to defend itself by striking first, or must it wait until an attack is in progress? Is the Bush Doctrine of aggressive preventive action a justified and legal recourse against threats posed by terrorists and rogue states? Tackling one of the most controversial policy issues of the post-September 11 world, Michael Doyle argues that neither the Bush Doctrine nor customary international law is capable of adequately responding to the pressing security threats of our times. In Striking First, Doyle shows how the Bush Doctrine has consistently disregarded a vital distinction in international law between acts of preemption in the face of imminent threats and those of prevention in the face of the growing offensive capability of an enemy. Taking a close look at the Iraq war, the 1998 attack against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, among other conflicts, he contends that international law must rely more completely on United Nations Charter procedures and develop clearer standards for dealing with lethal but not immediate threats. After explaining how the UN can again play an important role in enforcing international law and strengthening international guidelines for responding to threats, he describes the rare circumstances when unilateral action is indeed necessary. Based on the 2006 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, Striking First includes responses by distinguished political theorists Richard Tuck and Jeffrey McMahan and international law scholar Harold Koh, yielding a lively debate that will redefine how – and for what reasons – tomorrow's wars are fought. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1245/thumbnail.jpg

This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings.

In earlier efforts to explain international conflict and integration, the central focus was upon national attributes and decisionmaking as crucial to understanding the actions of states in war- and peacemaking. Recently, however, we have begun to critically reconsider these assumptions. In the face of their inability to fully account for the actions of states in international conflict and cooperation, we have sought out a more basic, disaggregated approach to these questions. We believe that the concept of leverage may serve as an important explanatory factor in theories of interstate relations. Here we offer some preliminary arguments concerning leverage and bargaining among domestic and international actors, fleshing out some of the possible relationships between economic and political behaviors and their effects on the war- and peacemaking activities of states in the international system.