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This paper conceptualizes the phenomenon of revenge in international politics and seeks to specify the conditions that increase or diminish the tendency of states to take revenge against enemies. We situate the discussion of revenge within the broader context of emotions in IR. We argue that whether or not a state will take revenge depends on the combinations of three interrelated and mutually constitutive variables: (1) the degree to which a state emotionally experiences harm against it as morally outrageous, (2) the extent of humiliation the harmed state feels, and (3) the degree to which international retaliation is institutionalized by rules and laws that govern the use of cross-border force. We examine the Second Lebanon War (July 2006) as a case of revenge in international politics. Adapted from the source document.

The world is changing fast; it is changing by leaps and bounds which makes it next to impossible to explain what is going on and to foresee possible repercussions. An unsophisticated observer in the West and elsewhere in the world where Western propaganda is heard and believed might imagine that the forces of freedom and democracy are waging an uncompromising struggle against despotism and tyranny. It is implied that the US and the rest of the civilized West are on the side of the forces of good confronted by an obscure conglomerate of the forces of evil, of which Russia is part if according to Pres Barack Obama and certain other Western leaders. Former President of France Valery Giscard d'Estaing has written in his memoirs that according to this interpretation the forces of good insist on democratic elections, human rights, and freedom of trade; America does not hesitate to use its might to defend good and oppose the forces of evil interfering with the fulfillment of these ideals. Here, Prlov examines the morals in international politics. Adapted from the source document.

Representative governments under-invest in public goods that provide insurance against risk, The combination of inequality and risk aversion guarantees that the payoffs to insurance are skewed, so the median voter prefers a sub-optimally low level of investment. The problem is exacerbated by supermajority requirements or the need for international coordination. This accounts for some of the characteristic shortcomings of domestic public policy and represents an important obstacle to international cooperation. The argument is illustrated with reference to the Kyoto Protocol and the International Monetary Fund. The argument implies that delegation to international organizations with risk-averse preferences may be welfare enhancing.

The article is an introduction to this special issue that addresses the complexities of international political bargaining and negotiations. The author outlines the theories and stratagems of the four following articles and their significance in emerging political science literature. Overall, the studies focus on the importance of every aspect of international affairs seen in a bargaining contest. References. G. Luque

AbstractConcerns over disinformation have intensified in recent years. Policymakers, pundits, and observers worry that countries like Russia are spreading false narratives and disseminating rumours in order to shape international opinion and, by extension, government policies to their liking. Despite the importance of this topic, mainstream theories in International Relations offer contradictory guidance on how to think about disinformation. I argue that disinformation is ineffective in terms of changing the policies of a target as regards to its foreign policy alignments and armaments – that is, the balance of power. To be strategically effective, disinformation must somehow overcome three powerful obstacles: first, the fundamental uncertainty that international anarchy generates over any information broadcasted by adversaries; second, the pre-existing prejudices of foreign policy elites and ordinary citizens; and third, the countermeasures that are available even amid political polarisation. I examine the most likely case of there seemingly being a conscious and effective strategy that emphasises disinformation: the Russian campaign that has targeted the Baltic states, especially since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The available evidence strongly suggests that the strategic effects of disinformation are exaggerated.

Every profession is occasionally inflicted with challenges which loom large. The challenge may take the form of a book which purports to produce a fundamental revision—in economics these would include Keynes' General Theory, Hicks's Value and Capital, Samuelson's Foundations; or, in the narrower field of international economics, Meade's Trade and Welfare. Or it may be a methodological revolution. Or both. Older members of the profession may try to ignore the challenge. And some of these challenges, ignored, oblige by disappearing. Others have to be faced, sooner or later.