Reflections on international cooperation
This unit was published in "International Cooperation of Competition Authorities in Europe: from Bilateral Agreements to Transgovernmental Networks" Błachucki, M., ed., (2020).
This unit was published in "International Cooperation of Competition Authorities in Europe: from Bilateral Agreements to Transgovernmental Networks" Błachucki, M., ed., (2020).
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This unit was published in "International Cooperation of Competition Authorities in Europe: from Bilateral Agreements to Transgovernmental Networks" Błachucki, M., ed., (2020).
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The more that states depend on oil exports, the less cooperative they become: they grow less likely to join intergovernmental organizations, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and to agree to binding arbitration for investment disputes. This pattern is robust to the use of country and year fixed effects, to alternative measures of the key variables, and to the exclusion of all countries in the Middle East. To explain this pattern, we consider the economic incentives that foster participation in international institutions: the desire to attract foreign investment and to gain access to foreign markets. Oil-exporting states, we argue, find it relatively easy to achieve these aims without making costly commitments to international institutions. In other words, natural resource wealth liberates states from the economic pressures that would otherwise drive them toward cooperation.
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International cooperation to tackle complex common resource problems like climate change is extremely difficult. Although there is broad agreement on the nature of the problem and what is required to solve it, many nations continue to block any meaningful action for solution. This global cooperation crisis is baffling in the light of recent evidence about the surprisingly cooperative disposition of human beings. Research from social and natural sciences points to an unmistakable conclusion: people cooperate all the time, and they enjoy doing so. This picture of human behaviour is at odds with common assumptions about people being narrowly-and exclusively-self-interested, and prompts the question that we address in this paper: why, if we are so good cooperating at interpersonal levels, is international cooperation so hard? We address this question in three steps. First, we review the recent multidisciplinary evidence demonstrating that people cooperate much more than rational-theory models predict, and that this might stem from a natural, evolved, predisposition to cooperate. Second, we argue that there are seven basic mechanisms that determine whether or not cooperation is successful or sustainable: reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement and we-identity. We group these mechanisms in a 'cooperation hexagon' that summarizes the current consensus about what makes cooperation work. Finally, we discuss what these findings mean for global cooperation. We argue that power games are not enough to explain off current international cooperation blockades. A new, comprehensive theory of international cooperation must be compatible with the recent insights about the fundamentally cooperative nature of human behaviour. We suggest that the search for this theory be made in three directions: a) establish how cooperation scales up from interpersonal to larger scales, and how the basic mechanisms of cooperation behave under conditions of unprecedented complexity and rapid change; b) investigate cooperation at the 'meso-level' of global governance-the relatively small group of people who represent nations in international discussions and institutions-a key interface between interpersonal and inter-institutional motivations for cooperation; and c) examine patterns of international cooperation in the light of the cooperation hexagon, to ascertain whether international cooperation blockades are the result of the underprovisioning of the basic mechanisms of cooperation, and how these mechanisms can be used as criteria for designing better institutions for global governance.
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Probably in few regions of the world are the opportunities for international scientific cooperation greater than in the Far North. From west to east, the United States (Alaska), Canada, Newfoundland (Labrador), Iceland, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Soviet Union are all vitally concerned in Arctic and Subarctic problems. And many other countries have contributed significant chapters in the ever-expanding book of knowledge entitled "The North". Scientific problems are similar regardless of international boundaries, and the number of problems in the Arctic and Subarctic that can be best solved by international cooperation is legion. In fact many of them can be solved only by international cooperation. The desirability of such cooperation and of a circumpolar background is stressed by Professor V. C. Wynne-Edwards: "Parallel investigations along many lines are being made in Alaska, Scandinavia and the U.S.S.R. The importance, from the purely scientific as well as the practical and economic standpoint, of acquainting the investigators of this country at first hand with similar problems and conditions in other northern lands cannot be too strongly stressed. Understanding and insight are born of experience; and the need for a circumpolar background must be evident to many besides myself." .
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The purpose of this document is to provide background information, a framework and recommendations to shape the international dimension of Food 2030. Food 2030 is the EU research and innovation policy response to international policy developments including the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015) and COP21commitmens (United Nations, 2015).
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Abstract This paper aims to reflect about the contradictions of international cooperation for development in Haiti that can be summarized in two perspectives: the North-South cooperation (NSC) and South-South cooperation (SSC). The dynamics of relationships can mix them (N-SSC). We identified governmental and nongovernmental particularly in health, linked to the OECD, the ALBA-TCP and UNASUR as empirical sources for reflection. The OECD privileges the perspective of NSC: commitment of developed nations with undeveloped. It operates mainly through NGOs. The ALBA-TCP and UNASUR have followed the perspective of SSC: commitment and solidarity among nations alike. They emphasize the horizontal partnership based on solidarity, respect for national sovereignty and peculiarities of each country. The resumption of the categories imperialism and internationalism may contribute to the understanding and analysis the contradictions in the international development agenda, illustrated by how these different actor in Haiti organize their actions. While the first one indicates bonding mechanisms geopolitical hierarchy, the latter suggests possibilities for overcoming these mechanisms. Key-words: International cooperation; Haiti; Imperialism; Internationalism; Organizational studies. Resumo Este artigo objetiva refletir sobre contradições da cooperação internacional para o desenvolvimento no Haiti, resumidas em duas perspectivas: cooperação Norte-Sul (CNS) e cooperação Sul-Sul (CSS). A dinâmica das relações pode misturá-las (CN-SS). Identificamos atores governamentais e não governamentais, na área da saúde, vinculados à OCDE, à ALBA-TCP e à UNASUL como fontes empíricas para a reflexão. A OCDE se orienta, predominantemente pela CNS, ou seja, pelo compromisso de assistência que os países desenvolvidos oferecem aos subdesenvolvidos. Opera principalmente através de ONGs. Nas ações da ALBA-TCP e da Unasul predominam a perspectiva da CSS: comprometimento solidário entre nações iguais. Enfatizam a parceria horizontal baseada na solidariedade, no respeito à soberania e peculiaridades de cada país. A retomada das categorias imperialismo e internacionalismo contribui para compreensão e análise das contradições na agenda internacional do desenvolvimento, ilustradas pelas formas mediante as quais esses diferentes atores organizam suas ações no Haiti. Enquanto as dos países da OCDE denotam mecanismos geopolíticos hierárquicos, as ações dos países vinculados à ALBA-TCP e da UNASUR sugerem possibilidades de superação desses mecanismos, buscando a cooperação genuína e autodeterminada. Palavras-chave: Cooperação internacional; Haiti; Imperialismo; Internationalismo; Estudos oganizacionais. Resumen En este artículo se reflexiona sobre las contradicciones de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo en Haití, resumidas en dos puntos de vista: cooperación Norte-Sur (CNS) y cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS). La dinámica de las relaciones pueden mezclarlos (CN-SS). Identificamos los actores gubernamentales y no gubernamentales, en la salud, de la OCDE, del ALBA-TCP y UNASUR como fuentes empíricas para la reflexión. La OCDE se orienta principalmente por la CNS, es decir, ofrecen asistencia a los países sudesarrollados. Opera principalmente a través de ONGs; en las acciones del ALBA-TCP y UNASUR predominan la perspectiva de CSS: el compromiso solidario entre naciones iguales. La énfasis és en la colaboración horizontal basada en la solidaridad, el respeto a la soberanía y las peculiaridades de cada país. La reanudación de las categorías imperialismo y internacionalismo contribuye a la comprensión y el análisis de las contradicciones en la agenda de desarrollo internacional, ilustrada por las formas en que los diferentes actores organizan sus acciones en Haití. Mientras que los países de la OCDE indican mecanismos geopolíticos jerárquicas, las acciones de los países vinculados al ALBA- TCP y UNASUR sugieren posibilidades para la superación de estos mecanismos, buscando la cooperación genuina y autodeterminada. Palabras-clave: Cooperación internacional; Haití, Imperialismo; Internationalismo; Estudios oganizacionales.
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International Cooperation on Search and Rescue in the Arctic SAR in the Arctic is a complex and dynamic cross-disciplinary activity that requires the combined effort of multiple actors with specialized human and technical resources. Due to limited resources and infrastructure in the Arctic, international cooperation is particularly important. This article applies a conceptual framework drawn from regime-theory to study SAR cooperation in the Arctic. More specifically, we apply the three dimensions of regime effectiveness (outputs, outcomes and impacts) to examine the regimes established by the 2011 Arctic SAR Agreement and the 1995 Barents SAR Agreement. The study addresses the rights and duties established by the regimes and their institutional arrangements for cooperation. Further, it investigates the importance of operational cooperation among response agencies in understanding the development and effectiveness of the regimes. The study concludes that the Arctic SAR regime is still under implementation. The agreement has entered into force but a series of steps needs to be taken for the common SAR system to be operative. Consequently, the regime is in the early stages of development and any evaluations of its impact are premature. The parties have implemented the Barents SAR regime both formally and in practice. Though the regime is generally held to have a positive effect on cooperation between the parties, there is a range of challenges that raise questions regarding its capacity to provide for a coordinated and effective joint SAR operation. The study further concludes that treating regime effectiveness in terms of a causal link between output, outcome and impact should be done with caution. It also argues that the focus of regime theory on interest-based decision-making among regime parties should be supplemented by investigating the operative and informal aspects of cooperation.
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Most governments have yet to agree to binding disciplines on government procurement regulation, whether in the WTO or a preferential trade agreement. Empirical research suggests that reciprocally-negotiated market access commitments have not been effective in inducing governments to buy more from foreign suppliers. Foreign sourcing by governments has been rising for most countries, however, independent of whether States have made international commitments to this effect – although there is some evidence that this trend was reversed post-2008 in several countries that had the freedom to do so. The stylized facts suggest a reconsideration of the design of international cooperation on procurement regulation, with less emphasis on specific market access reciprocity and greater focus on good procurement practice and principles, efforts to boost transparency, and pursuit of pro-competitive policies more generally.
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The article analyzes the reforms in the higher education system in recent years, the expansion of international cooperation in training and the process of reforms in this area on the example of the Fergana Valley. It is also scientifically substantiated on the importance of international cooperation in this area in the preparation of highly educated personnel in the higher education system in accordance with the requirements of a market economy. It has been proven that the establishment of bilateral cooperation with universities in economically developed countries makes it possible to train personnel who will make a significant contribution to the development of the country. In this regard, the attention paid in recent years to the establishment and expansion of foreign cooperation in the education system has become the subject of scientific research.
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Any credible claim to implement an agenda for global development – such as currently discussed in the post-2015 process – will require integrating the broader framework of international cooperation into this effort. A wide, but vague consensus that global framework conditions matter for development has already existed in past development debates. However, good resolutions such as MDG 8 for a global partnership have shown insufficient progress in practice. This paper reviews key aspects of the relationship between international cooperation and development at a conceptual level. Drawing on a distinction between domestic and global public goods as enablers and goals of development, the paper first illustrates the role of international cooperation and its interdependence with domestic action. The framework identifies contact points in the relationship between global and domestic action and goals with the categories of provision, support, access and preservation. The second part of the paper reviews key concepts of patterns of international cooperation that represent the elements of the global governance framework to which a broadening development agenda needs to link up more strongly. Overall, the conceptual review underlines that the question of how international cooperation works has moved to the centre of development studies. Yet, an even bigger challenge than achieving cooperation in the first place might be to steer the complex architecture and processes of international cooperation towards contributing to a global agenda for development.
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This article takes a broadly liberal institutionalist approach to explore the substantively important and neglected issue of international cooperation in the global refugee regime. It seeks to explain the nature of the cooperation problem in the global refugee regime and the conditions under which that cooperation has historically been overcome. The article argues that the dominant conception of the refugee regime as characterised by a Prisoner's Dilemma game is misrepresentative because it fails to capture the asymmetric power relations in the regime. Given that the majority of the world's refugee are in the South and the regime sets out few norms obligating Northern states to contribute to the protection of refugees who are not on their territory, the regime is more appropriately characterised by the game theoretical analogy of a Suasion Game. In order to examine the conditions under which the Suasion Game logic has historically been overcome, the article explores the four main examples of ad hoc bargaining processes convened by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) between 1980 and 2005 to facilitate international cooperation to address longstanding refugee situations. It argues that international cooperation has taken place under two conditions. Firstly, Northern states have needed to have linked interests in other issue-areas - such as security, immigration, and trade - that result from interdependence between refugee protection in the South and consequences in other issue-areas in the North. Secondly, though, UNHCR has been an important actor in facilitating issue-linkage within bargaining because, where interdependence has been complex, it has played a role in recognising and effectively communicating these interdependencies to Northern states. The article suggests that the analysis has wider theoretical implications by highlighting the role that the recognition and effective communication of complex interdependencies across issue-areas can play in enabling weaker actors (such as IOs and Southern states) to influence stronger actors' strategies while working within the constraints of their existing preference structures.
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This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers may have incentives to "collude" to get re-elected and term limits may help international cooperation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
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We examine international cooperation on technological development as a supplement to, or an alternative to, international cooperation on emission reductions. R&D should be increased beyond the non-cooperative level if (i) the technology level in one country is positively affected by R&D in other countries, (ii) the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian level, or (iii) the domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international tax agreement. A second-best technology agreement has higher R&D, higher emissions, or both compared with the first-best-outcome. The second-best subsidy always exceeds the subsidy under no international R&D cooperation. Further, when the price of carbon is the same in the second-best technology agreement and in the case without R&D cooperation, welfare is highest, R&D is highest and emissions are lowest in the second-best R&D agreement.
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International cooperation is an integral part of furthering medical and scientific progress. Many specilist societies exist for that purpose and have written into their constitutions that such cooperation and coordination is their aim. They hope to achieve their aims by exchange, in all languages, of information and by so doing strengthen the relations between individual physicians and scentists as well as between corporate professional bodies from different countries. However, at the same time emphasis is laid on the political neutrality of such organsations. Increasingly, this 'neutrality' is being questioned as doctors and scientists become aware of abuse and distortion of their profession taking place in other countries. H Merskey highlights the problems and offers his opinion on the ethics of maintaining these professional relationships with colleagues abroad who are involved in such abuse and distortion.
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