Suchergebnisse

Addresses seven statements on international courts, pointing to their ineffectiveness: (1) International courts do not lead to peace. (2) Contemporary courts are not really the legacy of Nuremburg. (3) War crimes tribunals and truth commissions do not always advance human rights. (4) Only sometimes do war crimes victims demand prosecution. (5) There is no proof that giving amnesty to war criminals encourages impunity. (6) Evidence is weak that war crimes prosecutions deter future abuses. (7) There is no need for the International Criminal Court.

An innovative, interdisciplinary and far-reaching examination of the actual reality of international courts, International Court Authority challenges fundamental preconceptions about when, why, and how international courts become important and authoritative actors in national, regional, and international politics. A stellar group of scholars investigate the challenges that international courts face in transforming the formal legal authority conferred by states into an actual authority in fact that is respected by potential litigants, national actors, legal communities, and publics. Alter, Helfer, and Madsen provide a novel framework for conceptualizing international court authority that focuses on the reactions and practices of these key audiences. Eighteen scholars from the disciplines of law, political science and sociology apply this framework to study thirteen international courts operating in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, as well as on a global level. Together the contributors document and explore important and interesting variations in whether the audiences that interact with international courts around the world embrace or reject the rulings of these judicial institutions. Alter, Helfer, and Madsen's authority framework recognizes that international judges can and often do everything they 'should' do to ensure that their rulings possess the gravitas and stature that national courts enjoy. Yet even when imbued with these characteristics, the parties to the dispute, potential future litigants, and the broader set of actors that monitor and respond to the court's activities may fail to acknowledge the rulings as binding or take meaningful steps to modify their behaviour in response to them. For both specific judicial institutions, and more generally, the book documents and explains why most international courts possess de facto authority that is partial, variable, and highly dependent on a range of different audiences and contexts - and thus is highly fragile.

One of the most noted developments in international law over the past twenty years is the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. They decide who has the right to exploit natural resources, define the scope of human rights, delimit international boundaries and determine when the use of force is prohibited. As the number and influence of international courts grow, so too do challenges to their legitimacy. This volume provides new interdisciplinary insights into international courts' legitimacy: what drives and undermines the legitimacy of these bodies? How do drivers change depending on the court concerned? What is the link between legitimacy, democracy, effectiveness and justice? Top international experts analyse legitimacy for specific international courts, as well as the links between legitimacy and cross-cutting themes. Failure to understand and respond to legitimacy concerns can endanger both the courts and the law they interpret and apply.

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Åke Hammarskjöld (1935), 'The Permanent Court of International Justice and the Development of International Law', International Affairs, 14 (6), November-December, 797-817 -- Georg Schwarzenberger (1947), 'The Judgment of Nuremberg', Tulane Law Review, XXI (3), March, 329-61 -- Manfred Lachs (1983), 'Some Reflections on the Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of International Law', Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 10, 239-78 -- Tjaco T. Van Den Hout (2008), 'Resolution of International Disputes: The Role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration - Reflections on the Centenary of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes', Leiden Journal of International Law, 21 (3), September, 643-61 -- Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2005), 'Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo', California Law Review, 93 (3), May, 899-956 -- Gilbert Guillaume (1995), 'The Future of International Judicial Institutions', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 44 (4), October, 848-62 -- Yuval Shany (2009), 'No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary', European Journal of International Law, 20 (1), February, 73-91 -- Cesare P.R. Romano (2007), 'The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 39, 791-872 -- Gerhard Hafner (2004), 'Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law', Michigan Journal of International Law, 25, Summer, 849-63 -- Pierre-Marie Dupuy (1999), 'The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 31, 791-807 -- Ruti Teitel and Robert Howse (2009), 'Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 41, 959-90 -- Emmanuel Decaux (2011), 'The Place of Human Rights Courts and International Criminal Courts in the International System', Journal of International Criminal Justice, 9 (3), July, 597-608 -- Chester Brown (2002), 'The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Finding Your Way through the Maze' [review essay], Melbourne Journal of International Law, 3 (2), October, 453-75 -- Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadakis (2011), 'The Convergence of the European Legal System in the Treatment of Third Country Nationals in Europe: The ECJ and ECtHR Jurisprudence', European Journal of International Law, 22 (4), November, 1071-88 -- Dinah Shelton (2009), 'Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts', Chicago Journal of International Law, 9 (2), Winter, 537-71 -- Antonio Cassese (2007), 'The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia', European Journal of International Law, 18 (4), September, 649-68 -- J.G. Merrills (2007), 'The Mosaic of International Dispute Settlement Procedures: Complementary or Contradictory?', Netherlands International Law Review, LIV (2), August, 361-93 -- Rosalyn Higgins (2003), 'The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52 (1), January, 1-20 -- David D. Caron (1990), 'The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution', American Journal of International Law, 84 (1), January, 104-56

The issue of the defining elements of a truly fair justice system has become a constant and consistent concern of international and/or regional political and legal organisations. Given the scale of the phenomenon of establishing and resorting to international courts and tribunals, reflecting, among others, the preference and availability of international actors for settling their disputes by independent and impartial decision-makers, the principles and values of the international judiciary have been subjected to discussions in an increasingly elaborate manner. Among these, judicial independence occupies a special position, being tightly connected to the issue of the legitimacy of such institutions, as an essential factor in ensuring voluntary compliance to the internationally adopted decisions. In this context, the present paper addresses the independence of the judiciary in international courts, both in terms of the fundamental theoretical contributions and from a practical perspective, by following the institutional provisions and guarantees for ensuring an independent and impartial judiciary in the statutes of two of the most relevant international courts, namely the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.

The question of adjudication in international financial law has rarely been analysedcomprehensively in the legal literature. This can probably be explained with the factthat, unlike in other areas of international economic law, there is no internationalfinancial court specifically designed to adjudicate international disputes between financial regulators, or between governments and financial institutions or investors.Moreover, the informality of regulatory cooperation through Transnational RegulatoryNetworks (TRNs), the use of soft laws to regulate international financial relations, andthe presence of prudential carve-outs in international treaties was supposed to keepfinancial supervisory and regulatory authorities free from international scrutiny and tolimit the judicial review of regulatory measures to a purely domestic exercise. Yet, financial measures are increasingly challenged in international investment tribunals, human rights courts, and regional courts. From 1995 to 2016, there have been more than 100 known international disputes on financial services, of which roughly two thirds involved a supervisory measure such as the resolution or bankruptcy of an insolvent bank or the imposition of supervisory fines. The remaining claims mostly included violation of sovereign debt contracts, or emergency legislation affecting financial services. Investment arbitrations, in particular, are considerably on the rise. The increased number of regulatory disputes represents fundamental implications for the financial regulatory community in terms of domestic governance, regulatory cooperation, and global financial stability.This essay empirically investigates and maps for the first time the patterns of international adjudication in financial law, and comments on what the rise of international litigation means for the global financial architecture.

South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa): By an order of February 5, 1963, the President of the International Court of Justice fixed September 30, 1963, as the time limit for the filing of the South African countermemorial in the South West Africa cases. At the request of the government of South Africa, the Court in its order of September 18, 1963, extended this time limit to January 10, 1964. By its order of January 20, 1964, the International Court noted that the South African countermemorial had been filed, and it fixed as time limits June 20, 1964, for the filing of the replies of Ethiopia and Liberia; and November 20, 1964, for the filing of the rejoinder by South Africa

Corfu Channel Case: Public sittings of the International Court of Justice on the preliminary objection filed by Albania on the Corfu Channe Case1 were held on February 26, 27, 28 and March 1, 2 and 5, 1948. The decision of the Court was given on March 25,1948.

The article presents a transcript of a roundtable discussion of a number of Russian legal scholars, which was organized by the Center of International Law and International Security at the Institute for Contemporary International Studies (ICIS), Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. They debate Russia's position with regard to international justice in general and international courts in particular. It is essential to understand the prospects of just decisions being made by international courts on cases to which Russia is a party or in which it has a special interest. K. Cargill

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa and Liberia v. South Africa): On October 2, 1962, the International Court of Justice held the first of the public hearings on the preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, raised by the government of the Republic of South Africa in these cases. After opening the sitting and briefly recalling the stages in the written proceedings covered since the institution of the cases on November 4, 1960, the President of the Court proceeded to the installation of the two judges ad hoc designated by the parties in accordance with Article 31, paragraphs 3 and 5, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The two judges ad hoc were Sir Louis Mbanefo, Chief Justice of the High Court, Eastern Region of Nigeria, designated by Ethiopia and Liberia acting in concert, and the Honorable Jacques Theodore van Wyk, Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, designated by the government of the Republic of South Africa. The President announced that Judge Córdova was prevented by his health from sitting in the present proceedings.

In a cable dated July 9, 1951, from Foreign Minister Bagher Kazemi to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Iran withdrew its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice. Referring specifically to the Court's order on interim measures (issued on July 5), the cable stated that the Court "had shaken the confidence" which the Iranian government and people had always had in international justice. The Iranian note made four specific points: first, the Iranian declaration (ratified on September 19, 1932) accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, and extended to the International Court of Justice under the latter's Statute, extended such jurisdiction only to disputes relating to the application of treaties and conventions. The Declaration excluded questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of Iran. Agreements or contracts under private and domestic law (such as concessions to work certain sources of natural wealth, commercial matters, and matters relating to Iran's sovereign rights) "were and still are excluded" from compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Second, the note pointed out that the concession granted the "former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company" in 1933 did not mention the United Kingdom in any capacity and reserved no rights or powers to that government.