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After the collapse of the USSR, a huge superpower that occupied one sixth of the land, the question of succession arose before the states that were part of it. The USSR occupied a vast territory, participated in international obligations, had debts, was a member of international organizations. It was obvious that the relationship between the newly formed states depended on how it was possible to divide the "legacy" of the USSR. The USSR took an active position at the international level, was engaged in the development of weapons. The issue of dividing all assets and liabilities worried the entire international community. His decision was difficult, and the legal basis for making decisions on succession did not seem to everyone to be indisputable. At present, it is obvious to everyone that the Russian Federation became the main heir of the USSR, it was the Russian Federation that continued the policy of the USSR, continued to participate in international relations and in the fulfillment of obligations, despite the equality of all states that were part of the USSR. The issues of the succession of the USSR and Russia are the subject of study of modern international law. Within the framework of this article, some aspects of the indicated topic will be highlighted.

The European Union does not have an autonomous and self-standing public policy concerning the protection of landscape. Instead, it adopts fragmentary and incidental measures meant to protect landscape. These measures are adopted within the frameworks of other EU policies, most importantly the EU environmental policy as well as other policies which are integrated with it (such as agricultural policy or policy concerned with special planning). In all these realms, the EU shares its powers with its member states. In some important areas, such as e.g. the property regime, the member states retained their exclusive competences. This particular distribution of powers makes the implementation of the extra-EU international law instruments rather difficult and not sufficiently effective to produce a worthwhile impact. These obligations have a limited influence because most of them are obligations of "a diligent pursue" rather than "firm result". As such, they are unlikely to give rise to direct application of respective conventional provisions. Notwithstanding, their importance is much more pronounced in the area of legal reasoning, where even the EU or domestic measures have to be interpreted in the light of the EU and/or its member states' obligations arising from international conventions on landscape protection.

The aim of this study was to present private and official codifications concerning the topic of responsibility of international organizations. Moreover, it highlighted some controversial issues which occurred during the work of International Law Commission (ILC). The topic of responsibility of international organizations was analyzed both by private bodies such as Institute de Droit International and International Law Association and – as mentioned above – ILC. The efforts of Institute de Droit International resulted in a resolution on The Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-fulfilment by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties. While in 1996 International Law Association studied these topics, a Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations was established. These private drafts paid attention of ILC to some legal issues which helped ILC to identify problems which require further discussion. After completion of its work on State responsibility in 2001, ILC decided to include the topic Responsibility of International Organizations in its work program. Mr G. Gaja was appointed the Special Rapporteur and in years 2003-2011 he presented eight reports which took into account the comments and observations received from governments and international organizations. In his reports he largely followed the model of Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. In 2011 the Commission adopted the draft of 67 articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, divided into six parts. The Draft Articles aimed at codification of a set of secondary rules applicable to a wide range of international organizations. The codifications of rules on the responsibility of international organizations was a very difficult task due to diversity of international organizations, which differ in size, functions and competence. Furthermore, there is a lack of relevant practice that would allow to elaborate the principles relating to responsibility of international organizations. Nonetheless, the responsibility for international wrongful acts is the most important institution of international law irrespective of the subject which committed a wrongful act. ; Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim

26 września 2017 r. formalnie zakończył się okres obowiązywania decyzji o relokacji osób będących w oczywistej potrzebie ochrony międzynarodowej. Z przewidzianych 160 tysięcy, relokacji poddano do tego czasu nieco ponad 29 tysięcy osób. Przy zastosowaniu metody analizy prawnej oraz analizy decyzyjnej, w artykule podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na następujące pytania badawcze: (1) co było przyczyną odmowy dokonania relokacji przez niektóre państwa członkowskie?; (2) jakie działania podejmowała Komisja Europejska chcąc nakłonić państwa do wypełnienia zobowiązań prawnych?; (3) jakie konsekwencje pociąga za sobą odmowa dokonania relokacji osób, będących w potrzebie ochrony międzynarodowej?. W artykule analizie poddano cykliczne sprawozdania Komisji Europejskiej z funkcjonowania nadzwyczajnego, czasowego mechanizmu relokacji. W toku poprowadzonych rozważań wskazano przyczyny niewywiązywania się przez państwa członkowskie z prawnych zobowiązań oraz przyczyny braku woli dokonania rzeczywistej reformy polityki azylowej i imigracyjnej. Udowodniono, że wyrażone w traktatach zobowiązanie do wspólnych, solidarnych działań w obliczu kryzysów ustąpiło miejsca partykularnym dążeniom do wzmocnienia ochrony terytoriów państwowych. ; On September 26, 2017, the decisions concerning the relocation of persons in clear need of international protection formally ceased to bind. Until that time, out of 160,000 persons, only 29,000 have been relocated. With the application of two academic methods (that of legal analysis and analysis of political decisions), the following research questions are addressed in this paper: (1) what were the reasons of some member states to refuse relocation?; (2) what actions have been taken by the European Commission to persuade member states to fulfill their legal obligations?; (3) what are the consequences of non-compliance with legal obligations to relocate persons in need of international protection? The paper presents an analysis of the European Commission's monthly reports on relocation. The reasons for member states' non-compliance with their legal obligations and for their reluctance to reform the EU asylum and immigration policy have been pointed out. The analysis demonstrates that EU member states have given priority to state security, setting aside the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in migration and asylum policies, stipulated in EU treaties.

On September 26, 2017, the decisions concerning the relocation of persons in clear need of international protection formally ceased to bind. Until that time, out of 160,000 persons, only 29,000 have been relocated. With the application of two academic methods (that of legal analysis and analysis of political decisions), the following research questions are addressed in this paper: (1) what were the reasons of some member states to refuse relocation?; (2) what actions have been taken by the European Commission to persuade member states to fulfill their legal obligations?; (3) what are the consequences of non-compliance with legal obligations to relocate persons in need of international protection? The paper presents an analysis of the European Commission's monthly reports on relocation. The reasons for member states' non-compliance with their legal obligations and for their reluctance to reform the EU asylum and immigration policy have been pointed out. The analysis demonstrates that EU member states have given priority to state security, setting aside the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in migration and asylum policies, stipulated in EU treaties. ; 26 września 2017 r. formalnie zakończył się okres obowiązywania decyzji o relokacji osób będących w oczywistej potrzebie ochrony międzynarodowej. Z przewidzianych 160 tysięcy, relokacji poddano do tego czasu nieco ponad 29 tysięcy osób. Przy zastosowaniu metody analizy prawnej oraz analizy decyzyjnej, w artykule podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na następujące pytania badawcze: (1) co było przyczyną odmowy dokonania relokacji przez niektóre państwa członkowskie?; (2) jakie działania podejmowała Komisja Europejska chcąc nakłonić państwa do wypełnienia zobowiązań prawnych?; (3) jakie konsekwencje pociąga za sobą odmowa dokonania relokacji osób, będących w potrzebie ochrony międzynarodowej?. W artykule analizie poddano cykliczne sprawozdania Komisji Europejskiej z funkcjonowania nadzwyczajnego, czasowego mechanizmu relokacji. W toku poprowadzonych rozważań wskazano przyczyny niewywiązywania się przez państwa członkowskie z prawnych zobowiązań oraz przyczyny braku woli dokonania rzeczywistej reformy polityki azylowej i imigracyjnej. Udowodniono, że wyrażone w traktatach zobowiązanie do wspólnych, solidarnych działań w obliczu kryzysów ustąpiło miejsca partykularnym dążeniom do wzmocnienia ochrony terytoriów państwowych.

The subject of the study is to outline the boundaries within the legislator may sanction the obligations to provide information to tax authorities using tax sanctions. The author analyzes tax sanctions as instruments guaranteeing the effectiveness of legal norms related to information obligations in the light of the protection of the taxpayer's rights. In the author's opinion, there is a clear outline of the possible shape of the sanction, which limits the legislator in excessive interference with the rights of taxpayers. These limits, both in national and international law, are determined primarily by the principle of proportionality, which is decisive for the degree of discomfort associated with the application of sanctions. It should be indicated that the shape limits of these sanctions, characterized in this study, guarantee, in turn, the protection of the rights of these entities. At the same time, it should be emphasized that tax sanctions are, in principle, a complementary element of the system of the guarantees of the law effectiveness and the legislator deciding on their wider use should properly balance the degree of "saturation" of tax law with sanctions taking into account its nature. ; Przedmiotem opracowania jest nakreślenie granic, w ramach których ustawodawca może sankcjonować obowiązek informowania organów podatkowych za pomocą sankcji podatkowych. Autor analizuje sankcje podatkowe jako instrumenty gwarantujące skuteczność norm prawnych związanych z obowiązkami informacyjnymi w świetle ochrony praw podatnika. Zdaniem autora granice możliwego kształtu sankcji podatkowych mają istotne znaczenie z uwagi na konieczność ochrony podatników przed nadmierną ingerencją w ich prawa. Ograniczenia te, zarówno w prawie krajowym, jak i międzynarodowym, wyznacza przede wszystkim zasada proporcjonalności, która decyduje o stopniu dolegliwości związanej z zastosowaniem sankcji. Należy wskazać, że scharakteryzowane w niniejszym opracowaniu granice kształtu tych sankcji gwarantują z kolei ochronę praw tych podmiotów. Jednocześnie należy podkreślić, że sankcje podatkowe są co do zasady elementem uzupełniającym systemu gwarancji skuteczności prawa, a ustawodawca – decydując się na ich szersze zastosowanie – powinien odpowiednio zrównoważyć stopień "nasycenia" prawa podatkowego sankcjami, uwzględniając jego charakter.

The article analyses the current, post-crisis case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in cases concerning the so-called Dublin Regulation, i.e. Regulation 604/2013, which establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. The aim of the article is to analyze the standard of migration security in the area of Dublin cases. The key problem for the discussed issue was the judgment in the Jawo case, in which the Court of Justice examined the admissibility of Dublin transfers to the Italian Republic on the grounds that there was a risk of extreme material deprivation of the migrant. The Jawo case is a continuation of high-profile international court rulings in cases such as M.S.S., Tarakhel (ECtHR) and N.S. (CJEU), which decided to suspend transfers to Italy and Greece. Apart from the issues of protection against inhuman treatment, the jurisprudence of the CJEU also draws attention to the issues of legal security, effectiveness and accessibility of administrative procedures for third-country nationals seeking international protection in the EU. Finally, the standard of migration security in the Dublin area also includes the obligation to act in solidarity and mutual trust between the Member States, as set out in the judgments of the CJEU.

Peacekeeping operations are nowadays an important phenomenon in international relations and especially in conflict-ridden regions. The concept and framework of such operations has been constantly evolving in the past and one of the milestones of this evolution was the fall of the communist system and the end of the cold war. In Europe, this historic moment coincided with establishment by the Maastricht Treaty of the new organism within the process of western Europe's integration: the European Union. Both these facts triggered a reaction of the somewhat passive and hardly visible European defence organisation of the Western European Union. Its Petersberg Declaration of 1992 redefined security and sought to change peace obligations of the member states of WEU, as they accepted a broader responsibility and a broader concept of security in the European region. This was an important first step in making defence integration a part of the mainstream integration process. On the legal basis of the Petersberg Declaration, six operations were carried out. The paper discusses them, showing striking similarities, which actually comprise a special philosophy of intervention by WEU. This philosophy reflects both strengths and weaknesses of WEU's role in the European integration.

Peacekeeping operations are nowadays an important phenomenon in international relations and especially in conflict-ridden regions. The concept and framework of such operations has been constantly evolving in the past and one of the milestones of this evolution was the fall of the communist system and the end of the cold war. In Europe, this historic moment coincided with establishment by the Maastricht Treaty of the new organism within the process of western Europe's integration: the European Union. Both these facts triggered a reaction of the somewhat passive and hardly visible European defence organisation of the Western European Union. Its Petersberg Declaration of 1992 redefined security and sought to change peace obligations of the member states of WEU, as they accepted a broader responsibility and a broader concept of security in the European region. This was an important first step in making defence integration a part of the mainstream integration process. On the legal basis of the Petersberg Declaration, six operations were carried out. The paper discusses them, showing striking similarities, which actually comprise a special philosophy of intervention by WEU. This philosophy reflects both strengths and weaknesses of WEU's role in the European integration.

Poland under the Pressure of the Western Powers (January–July 1938)The year 1938 was a forecast of events leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War. From the Polish point of view it was essential that Poland had found herself facing developments decisive for a certain configuration of forces on the international arena. The prime ally – France – wished at all cost to force Poland to consent to a written commitment, namely, that the Polish side would not attack Czechoslovakia once the German threat became a fact. The French and the British were dissatisfied with suitable verbal assurances. Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski, the Polish Ambassador in Italy, aptly expressed the very heart of the matter: "We do not wish to incur harm upon the Czechs, but in the face of their notorious ill will towards us we have neither the duty nor the willingness to help them". The pressure exerted by the Western powers, which did not hasten to assume the sort of obligations that they wished to impose upon Poland, lasted uninterruptedly until July 1938. French diplomacy applied a double standard regarding France and the Polish ally. This did not bid well for future cooperation in the case of an outbreak of a world war.

Poland under the Pressure of the Western Powers (January–July 1938)The year 1938 was a forecast of events leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War. From the Polish point of view it was essential that Poland had found herself facing developments decisive for a certain configuration of forces on the international arena. The prime ally – France – wished at all cost to force Poland to consent to a written commitment, namely, that the Polish side would not attack Czechoslovakia once the German threat became a fact. The French and the British were dissatisfied with suitable verbal assurances. Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski, the Polish Ambassador in Italy, aptly expressed the very heart of the matter: "We do not wish to incur harm upon the Czechs, but in the face of their notorious ill will towards us we have neither the duty nor the willingness to help them". The pressure exerted by the Western powers, which did not hasten to assume the sort of obligations that they wished to impose upon Poland, lasted uninterruptedly until July 1938. French diplomacy applied a double standard regarding France and the Polish ally. This did not bid well for future cooperation in the case of an outbreak of a world war.

Official Development Aid as an idea is an implement of assistance, a kind of redistribution of the global income on the governmental level. Nevertheless, it is also a source of influence and as a result peculiarly understood imperialism. The opposition between political vision and reality is the factor which backs up this thesis. Political plans and prospects of the EU aid policy, such as "The European Consensus of Development" or "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership", are concerned about supporting good governance and providing fair conditions of international trade. On the other hand, introducing this policy often, more or less, increases dependency of poor economies on the rich. It is also not eradicated from the European Union policy, for example in the case of the European Development Bank. However, EU development aid, coming to 49 billions euro, could be named munificent when compared to the United States. U.S. Official Development Aid amounts to only 0,19% of GDP, when the obligations confirmed by the government in a few declarations, among which is the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, are about 0,7% of GDP. Secondly it is commonly shaped as an interrelated aid, which augment dependency of the recipient country. International institutions established in Bretton Woods, like International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, have also a huge impact on the way of development of poor countries. There are a lot of groups of interest whose opinions are clear – above-mentioned institutions are the U.S. instruments of imperialism. It is caused by American predominance in these institutions and the line of policy which it supports. In the XXI century imperial aspirations are also present in recently developing countries – like China or Brazil. Changing roles in the system of international relations are now coming, creating a diffusion between clubs of rich North and poor, developing South. Leaders of development from developing countries are trying to build a strong position in relations with recipients of ODA. It is easier for them than for the West, mostly because of the lack of bad, colonial past relations. Their imperialism is not linked with history whatsoever, making their role of foreign relations easier to build up. Despite these cases of using development assistance in order to build up an imperium, there are a lot of non-governmental institutions whose perception of aid is beyond politics and burdens of imperialism. Best example of that is Grameen Bank – an institution founded by M. yunus, a Noble Prize winner. Its way of helping people is mainly intended to being unprofitable. There are a lot of ideas about how to describe development aid – more like a charity or kind of imperialism. Some aspects of business are desirable in ODA, partly because of increasing efficiency. It is economically proved that the return of capital in any way of benefit will strengthen willingness to providing aid. On the other hand, people are naturally liable to help and perform activities which do not give them any interest or gain. What is most interesting – nowadays developing countries are strengthening and they are evaluating theirs powers as equal partners of the rich, developed world. It comprises change in the system of international relations. Moreover United Nations should find a way of enforcing obligations of donors – like 0,7 percent of GDP for ODA to 2015. If the line of politics is steady, similar to current line, this goal will not be reached, so ODA will be more seen as a way of imperialism than help. In general, there are a lot of aspects of development which indicate that ODA is an implement of imperialism. On the other hand – some kind of interest improves the willingness of donors to provide aid. Besides that question – imperial or not – development aid is still increasing the number of people whose conditions of living are better because of ODA.

Official Development Aid as an idea is an implement of assistance, a kind of redistribution of the global income on the governmental level. Nevertheless, it is also a source of influence and as a result peculiarly understood imperialism. The opposition between political vision and reality is the factor which backs up this thesis. Political plans and prospects of the EU aid policy, such as "The European Consensus of Development" or "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership", are concerned about supporting good governance and providing fair conditions of international trade. On the other hand, introducing this policy often, more or less, increases dependency of poor economies on the rich. It is also not eradicated from the European Union policy, for example in the case of the European Development Bank. However, EU development aid, coming to 49 billions euro, could be named munificent when compared to the United States. U.S. Official Development Aid amounts to only 0,19% of GDP, when the obligations confirmed by the government in a few declarations, among which is the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, are about 0,7% of GDP. Secondly it is commonly shaped as an interrelated aid, which augment dependency of the recipient country. International institutions established in Bretton Woods, like International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, have also a huge impact on the way of development of poor countries. There are a lot of groups of interest whose opinions are clear – above-mentioned institutions are the U.S. instruments of imperialism. It is caused by American predominance in these institutions and the line of policy which it supports. In the XXI century imperial aspirations are also present in recently developing countries – like China or Brazil. Changing roles in the system of international relations are now coming, creating a diffusion between clubs of rich North and poor, developing South. Leaders of development from developing countries are trying to build a strong position in relations with recipients of ODA. It is easier for them than for the West, mostly because of the lack of bad, colonial past relations. Their imperialism is not linked with history whatsoever, making their role of foreign relations easier to build up. Despite these cases of using development assistance in order to build up an imperium, there are a lot of non-governmental institutions whose perception of aid is beyond politics and burdens of imperialism. Best example of that is Grameen Bank – an institution founded by M. yunus, a Noble Prize winner. Its way of helping people is mainly intended to being unprofitable. There are a lot of ideas about how to describe development aid – more like a charity or kind of imperialism. Some aspects of business are desirable in ODA, partly because of increasing efficiency. It is economically proved that the return of capital in any way of benefit will strengthen willingness to providing aid. On the other hand, people are naturally liable to help and perform activities which do not give them any interest or gain. What is most interesting – nowadays developing countries are strengthening and they are evaluating theirs powers as equal partners of the rich, developed world. It comprises change in the system of international relations. Moreover United Nations should find a way of enforcing obligations of donors – like 0,7 percent of GDP for ODA to 2015. If the line of politics is steady, similar to current line, this goal will not be reached, so ODA will be more seen as a way of imperialism than help. In general, there are a lot of aspects of development which indicate that ODA is an implement of imperialism. On the other hand – some kind of interest improves the willingness of donors to provide aid. Besides that question – imperial or not – development aid is still increasing the number of people whose conditions of living are better because of ODA.

Changeability is an immanent feature of tax systems. Over the last years, it has been even more noticeable. The domestic systems of the member states strive for the widest possible scope of cooperation in order to fulfill all the demands of the fast developing society. In this article, the authors describe the development of the international cooperation with regard to countering the double taxation problem as well as tax avoidance in general. Against this background, the publications of the OECD from 2016 are most certainly worth mentioning, seeing that due to them the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) was published. Regulations set forth therein are aimed mostly at the interactions of different tax provisions that lead to non-taxation of the profit parts of international enterprises. One of the key objectives of the Project is referred to as Action 13, which introduces an obligation of three-tier transfer pricing documentation. Representing a standpoint that – from the legislative point of view – creating efficient and clear legal provisions is of paramount importance, the authors have attempted to examine the problems encountered by the legislator while the implementation process of the transfer pricing directives. ; Zmienność jest cechą immanentną systemów prawnych, na przestrzeni ostatnich lat jest ona jeszcze bardziej zauważalna. Systemy krajowe państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej zmierzają do jak najszerszej współpracy, a wszystko po to, by jak najpełniej spełniać wymagania szybko rozwijającego się społeczeństwa. W niniejszym artykule autorzy zajęli się opisaniem rozwoju międzynarodowej współpracy w zakresie zwalczania problemu podwójnego opodatkowania oraz unikania opodatkowania. Na tym tle dużą rolę odgrywają prace OECD z 2016 r., dzięki którym powstał projekt zatytułowany Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). Regulacje w nim zawarte dotyczą głównie przypadków, gdzie interakcje odmiennych przepisów podatkowych prowadzą w efekcie do nieopodatkowania części zysków międzynarodowych przedsiębiorstw. Jedno z kluczowych zadań projektu zostało określone jako działanie nr 13, a wprowadza ono obowiązek trójstopniowej dokumentacji w odniesieniu do cen transferowych. Jako że autorzy uważają, iż najistotniejsze z punktu widzenia ustawodawstwa jest stworzenie efektywnych, a zarazem jasnych przepisów prawa, w niniejszej publikacji podjęto rozważania na temat problemów, jakie stoją na drodze ustawodawcy krajowego podczas procesu implementacji dyrektyw dotyczących cen transferowych.