Suchergebnisse

This text seeks to rethink the relationship between literature and the gendered construction of national boundaries. It does so by proposing a reconsideration of the terms singularity, difference and literariness while analysing two talked-about and best-selling postcolonial novels, Disgrace (1999) by J.M. Coetzee and Agaat (2004) by Marlene van Niekerk.

The aim of this paper is the study of the enhanced cooperation mechanism in the framework of the Lisbon Treaty as it applies to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. The concept of enhanced cooperation was introduced into the EU Treaty structure by the Treaty of Amsterdam, although initially the CFSP was excluded. The Treaty of Nice extended a limited possibility of enhanced cooperation to the CFSP, while still excluding from its scope all 'matters having military or defence implications'. The Treaty of Lisbon, at the same time as emphasising solidarity and the building of a common policy, accepts the extension of enhanced cooperation and flexibility into the defence sphere. The object of this paper, as well as outlining the ways in which enhanced cooperation has applied to the CFSP and the ways in which this will be affected by the Treaty of Lisbon, is to examine the extent to which foreign policy, security and defence lend themselves to enhanced cooperation and other forms of flexibility. The conclusion is that there is a need to distinguish between foreign policy and defence; the development of an active and credible EU foreign policy cannot readily accommodate differentiated integration as it depends for its force not primarily on either legally binding instruments or coercion but on political weight. On the other hand, military and defence capacities and initiatives are perhaps inherently differentiated.

This article reexamines how concerns about China contributed to the escalation of the Vietnam War during the first years of Lyndon Johnson's administration. Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam to protect America's global credibility as the leader and defender of the non-Communist world in the face of the threat posed by China's "wars of national liberation" strategy in Vietnam. U.S. officials evaluated this threat in the context of the broadening Sino-Soviet split. The concern in Washington was that if Hanoi, a regime openly supported by Beijing as a star in the "wars of national liberation," were to take over South Vietnam, the Soviet Union might then be forced to discard the "peaceful coexistence" principle and the incipient detente with the West. The escalation in Vietnam was spurred largely by apprehension that a failure to contain China in Vietnam might prompt the Soviet Union to shift back to a hard line toward the West. Adapted from the source document.

This article offers an integrated theoretical and policy-oriented framework for cross-cultural conflict resolution by exploring relationships among conflict resolution styles and crisis communicative strategies with emphasis on both conflict structure and cross-cultural factors. Using the Hainan negotiation between China and the United States as a case study, the factors inherent in conflict are investigated with respect to Chinese cultural characteristics. The congruence of the Chinese context with integrative conflict management is explored. The analysis indicated that the use of mediators and consideration of renqing (favor) and mianzi (face), which are central resources in Chinese interpersonal interactions, are likely to contribute to an integrative conflict solution.

The questions of how and when the Cold War manifested itself in Southeast Asia are here examined through the perceptions of Britain and Australia to regional and global events from 1945 to 1950. Both had major stakes in the eventual results of the local contentions in Southeast Asia, as well as in the global effects of great power rivalry. Yet even for these powers, determining when they believed the Cold War came to Southeast Asia is dependent on the definition adopted. By 1946, there was already recognition of entrenched ideological conflict in Southeast Asia, and that this threatened Western interests. In 1947, there was recognition of connections between the local communist parties and the 'global designs' of the Soviet Union. In 1948, there was the outbreak of armed violence in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, though there was no evidence of direct Soviet involvement in these. Ultimately, however, it was the establishment of the PRC in 1949 (as a major regional communist power), in tandem with plans by non-communist states to coordinate policy against communism, which was seen as marking the arrival of fully-fledged Cold War in Southeast Asia.

This article takes the November 1965 letter of Poland's Roman Catholic bishops to their German counterparts as a starting point for historical inquiry into the nature and consequences of Catholic engagement in Polish-German reconciliation. The article begins with a close reading of the letter's text and its philosophical-theological underpinnings; then, it discusses the letter's reception history and its political consequences. The letter and its reception have a double significance: first, as an event in post-World War II European political, intellectual, and ecclesiastical history; second, as an ethical commentary on the spirit of dialogue promulgated in the constitutions of the Second Vatican Council. Although the letter helped to facilitate a process of Polish-German reconciliation that remains ongoing, this process has failed to assimilate the letter's ethics of forgiveness. That failure has reinforced the roadblocks that hamper Polish-German reconciliation almost two decades after the fall of communism in Europe.

A provision obliging states parties not to assist with prohibited acts is an accepted and essential part of a modern weapons treaty. The draft cluster munitions convention includes such a provision in Article 1(c). Article 1(c) is based on extensive precedent from past weapons treaties and is indispensable to the humanitarian goal of the convention. Because it prevents states parties from contributing even indirectly to the use of cluster munitions, it promotes the object and purpose of the treaty, which is to minimize civilian harm from the weapons. It also stigmatizes cluster munitions by declaring that states parties will not tolerate their use by anyone and contributes to deterring use by non-states parties.