Editorial Board
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 161, S. 106144
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 161, S. 106144
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 165, S. 106205
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 316-352
ISSN: 1086-3338
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 390-437
ISSN: 1086-3338
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 280-315
ISSN: 1086-3338
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 75, Heft 3, S. 482-522
ISSN: 1086-3338
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 75, Heft 4, S. 647-691
ISSN: 1086-3338
abstract: When and how do voters punish politicians for subverting democracy? To investigate the role of the public in democratic backsliding, I develop a conceptual framework that differentiates among three mechanisms: vote switching, backlash, and disengagement. The first mechanism entails defection by voters from a candidate who undermines democracy to one who does not; the latter two mechanisms entail transitions between voting and abstention. I estimate the magnitude of each mechanism by combining evidence from a series of original survey experiments, traditional surveys, and a quasi-experiment afforded by the rerun of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election, in which the governing party, akp, attempted to overturn the result of an election that it had lost. I find that although vote switching and backlash contributed to the akp's eventual defeat the most, each of the three mechanisms served as a democratic check in some subset of the Istanbul electorate. Persuasion, mobilization, and even demobilization are all viable tools for curbing the authoritarian tendencies of elected politicians.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 75, Heft 1, S. 99-144
ISSN: 1086-3338
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations
ISSN: 1086-3338
Within sovereign states citizenship is arguably the most important political marker of in- and outsiders. As a result, questions about who gets to reap the benefits of citizenship often result in distributional conflict. This conflict becomes inflamed when a country goes through a period of significant inward migration. Given that citizenship is so important and so contentious, from where do the rules governing its acquisition come? Our starting point is the acknowledgment that migrants are mobile labor. From this perspective, countries in which elites benefit from an increased supply of productive labor—that is, those with high land/labor ratios—will be more likely to adopt policies that attract migrants, such as easier naturalization rules, including birthright citizenship. We illustrate the plausibility of our argument with some statistical evidence and suggest some avenues to further explore this crucial question.
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 170, S. 106322
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 169, S. 106328
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 74, Heft 2, S. 167-204
ISSN: 1086-3338
World Affairs Online
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 74, Heft 1, S. 37–76
ISSN: 1086-3338
World Affairs Online
In: Vienna online journal on international constitutional law: ICL-Journal, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 1-26
ISSN: 1995-5855, 2306-3734
Abstract
The margin of appreciation is an important argumentative framework employed by the ECtHR. Through its application, the Court may establish a balanced relationship with the member states. This is why the margin is one of the main sources for the ECtHR's exercise of deference. Deference happens when low intensity of review is applied – or a wide margin. Therefore, to properly know when to act deferentially demands a clear procedure to determine the intensity of review. However, the application of the margin still presents some weak points and lacks consistency. In this paper, I defend the possibility of applying formal balancing to provide a clearer structure for the exercise of the margin of appreciation and, thus, a way to improve deferential practices by the ECtHR. With the clear structure of balancing, factors are employed in a more organized manner and the relationships behind the idea of determining the intensity of review are explicitly justified. Hence, the notion and structure of balancing competences organize the margin of appreciation in a way to free it from its main criticisms and fulfill the argumentative potential it has.
In: Vienna online journal on international constitutional law: ICL-Journal, Band 16, Heft 1, S. i-iii
ISSN: 1995-5855, 2306-3734