In: The EU accession of Cyprus - key to the political and legal solution of an "insoluble" ethnic conflict?: proceedings of the International and Interdisciplinary Conference held in Bremen on 14th and 15th May 2004, S. 253-280
Nach einer kurzen historischen Einleitung behandelt der Autor folgende drei Schwerpunkte: 1. Zusammenhang zwischen Expansion der Hochschulbildung und der Entwicklung neuer ökonomischer Formen, insbesondere des neuen Arbeitsmarktes. Wird die Universität in der sogenannten Wissensgesellschaft ihren Platz finden oder wird die Schlüsselrolle an andere Institutionen übertragen, die die notwendige Wissensbasis organisieren? - 2. Zusammenhang zwischen Hochschulbildung und Gesellschaft, Wissenschaft und Kultur. Werden alte soziale Grenzlinien, basierend auf Klasse, Geschlecht, Religion, Volksgruppe, Region einer neuen Schichtung weichen, die auf formellen Bildungsabschlüssen bzw. sozialen Referenzen basieren? Wie kann man die Legitimation einer rationalen Wissenskultur, wie sie in der Universität repräsentiert wird, in Übereinstimmung bringen mit der kurzlebigen, relativistischen postmodernen Kultur? 3. Die Auswirkungen des sozialen Wandels auf die sich wandelnden Strukturen der Hochschulbildung. Sind akademische Freiheit und institutionelle Autonomie unter diesen neuen Konditionen noch das gültige Ideal oder müssen wir uns einem neuen Regime der intellektuellen Reflexivität und sozialen (oder Markt-) Verantwortlichkeit unterwerfen? (HoF/Ko.).
"When originally written six years ago, the opening of this chapter made the point that it is unlikely that many corporate managers would read a chapter titled The Role of Business in Conflict Transformation. Not much has changed since. Most company managers would initially regard this topic as irrelevant to their operations, imposed by the outside world, and likely to distract them from their core business. Of course, managers think about the impact of conflict on their business. Some possibly even consider the secondary impacts their activities have on conflict, for example through the provision of revenues to authorities that are part of it. However, most companies do not see a role for themselves in conflict transformation. As a result, even though discussions about conflict transformation frequently focus on companies, they generally occur without the participation of those companies. A close look at how companies operate within countries that are in, or just coming out of, conflict reveals that many international companies are, in reality, already involved in conflict transformation practices. However, companies do not view their actions in terms of 'peace and conflict'. Rather, they consider their actions in terms of business sense as they serve to reduce risk exposure to the company and provide a more constructive working environment. Companies are unresponsive when approached with a conflict transformation agenda because conflict transformation is not linked to the business case. This divide between the conflict transformation community and the corporate community is remarkable, in spite of the significant overlap between a company's interest in establishing a stable and peaceful working environment and the conflict transformation agenda. So why is it that, generally speaking, companies and conflict transformation advocates have difficulties engaging with each other within this debate? Exploring the answers to this question is the starting point of this chapter. In order to address this query, it is necessary to gain an understanding of how companies view conflict transformation and what leverage companies have in relation to their project cycle. It is then possible to discuss some options that are available to both companies and conflict transformation advocates to increase their engagement and become more strategic in working together in areas of mutual interest and joint concern." (excerpt)
"This article analyzes different perspectives dealing with organizational change and the dissemination of ideas and practices between different contexts. Through an investigation into projects featuring cooperation between Swedish and Estonian civil society organizations, the chapter demonstrates how different concepts brought together can further our understanding of such processes." (author's abstract)
"Section 2 presents theoretical considerations about the definition and measurement of de shadow economy and discusses also the main factors determining its size. In Section 3, empirical results of the size and development of the shadow economy and shadow labor force are discussed. Also the interaction between the shadow economy and unemployment is analyzed. Finally section 4 concludes." (Text excerpt, IAB-Doku) ((en))
"After briefly reviewing the literature on global income inequality, the authors turn to examine how within-nation income inequality has changed in recent decades. Using the available "high-quality" data from the Luxemburg Income Study and methods based on the relative distribution, they look 'behind' standard summary inequality measures to describe patterns of distributional change from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s in seven transitional and middle-income societies (i.e., Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Mexico, Taiwan, Russia, and Hungary). The authors compare countries in terms of the locations on the distribution that have shaped their recent inequality experience, focusing on how inequality has grown in these societies (i.e., upgrading, downgrading, or polarization)." (author's abstract)
"In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech of late 2009, US President Barack Obama stated that 'the resurgence of ethnic or sectarian conflicts; the growth of secessionist movements, insurgencies, and failed states; have increasingly trapped civilians in unending chaos' (Obama 2009). Claims that the world is becoming an ever more violent place have widespread currency in the media and in policy communities, but there is little evidence to support them. On the contrary, cutting-edge data show that most forms of organized violence around the world have been declining, not increasing. The importance of quantitative data in monitoring trends in armed conflict and organized violence has grown, as pressures for evidence-based policy intensify among donor governments, international agencies and non-governmental organizations. The study of global and regional security trends can enhance our understanding of why and where conflicts occur, and, in turn, how they may be resolved. This is essential in formulating effective conflict prevention and resolution policies. In addition, conflict data can also help to evaluate the impact of such policies. Patterns in the frequency and location of conflicts can indicate which conflict mitigation and prevention strategies are succeeding and which are not. This chapter presents and analyses the most systematically compiled and updated set of quantitative data on global organized violence. The discernable trends challenge some popular beliefs about war and peace in the contemporary world and can inform evidence-based conflict prevention and resolution policy. In section 2, the authors will introduce the different methods of collecting and coding conflict data. In section 3, the authors will highlight some of the most salient results of the authors' descriptive data analysis. The number of conflicts has been declining since the end of the Cold War, and there has been a downward trend in battle-related deaths since 1950. However, the data also reveal that there are several challenges ahead. Conflict numbers have begun to increase again in recent years and there are a significant number of conflicts that seem to defy attempts at long-term resolution, recurring regularly. Finally, section 4 will conclude with proposed explanations of the trends presented and policy recommendations to meet some of the challenges uncovered by the data." (excerpt)
"Only some 15 years ago it was unusual for policy makers to talk of development and security policies in the same breath. Today the reverse is true: national policy makers talk of the 3-Ds (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense), the 4-Ds (including Democratization), and 'joined-up government approaches' as if they are inseparable. Similarly, the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union, among others, all profess the necessity for integrated security and development policies. Yet, behind the current security-development nexus proposition, there are multiple layers of confusion, contradictions and policy dilemmas. Based on ongoing research undertaken by the Security-Development Nexus Program at the International Peace Academy (IPA), this paper seeks to bring greater clarity to current debates on the linkages between security and development policies in an increasingly interdependent but fractured global system. The paper starts by identifying the multiple levels at which the policy debate takes place: local, national, regional and global. It argues that moving indiscriminately between these levels has created tremendous conceptual as well as policy confusion. Similarly, because both development and security are extremely broad and elusive concepts, the call for integrating them often leads to a policy enigma: What should be integrated with what? Furthermore, it is readily assumed that the security-development linkage applies equally to various conflict contexts and to different conflict phases - albeit in somewhat different configurations. Finally, there is a tendency to make policy recommendations as if the policy community were an apolitical monolith - rather than the diverse mix of national, regional, governmental and non-governmental actors with their own interests and agenda. Recent research examining the linkages between distinct issue areas such as poverty, demography, globalization, human rights and environment has begun to provide important clues about how these factors combine to exacerbate or reduce risks of violent conflicts as well as political and criminal violence. Similarly, comparative country-level research demonstrates the specificity of each conflict context while assessing the appropriateness of current approaches to linking security and development in essentially distinct policy and political environments. It is anticipated that these research results will contribute to a new generation of policies and programs that go beyond the rhetorical call for integrating security and development policies." (author's abstract)
"This chapter was borne out of a need to bring together two contending constituencies and their arguments about why and how to identify impact in peacebuilding initiatives in practice. The two constituencies, which the authoress calls 'frameworkers' and 'circlers', involve sets of people who blend across the lines of development and conflict transformation work and possess very different arguments about how to conceptualize and operationalize issues of impact and change in program design, monitoring and evaluation. The differences matter in a practical sense for workers in international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because their views often clash during program design, monitoring and evaluation processes, and leave both sides dissatisfied. The groups also matter for conceptual reasons because they capture unspoken differences that hinder people's ability to talk clearly about impact and change, what matters, how people 'know what they know' about impact and change and, therefore, how they do their peacebuilding work. Unmasking the conceptual debates can improve our ability to speak about and achieve effectiveness and impact. The authoress receives diverse reactions to the arguments contained here. People who self-identify as circlers are often delighted to find an argument that recognizes them. For example, when one raises the topic in a course one co-teaches an peacebuilding monitoring, evaluation and learning there is a palpable sense of relief amongst some in the room who question linear causal logic and objective measures. Others, who are frameworker-orientated and work extensively in the field, tend to be open to the arguments below; they want frameworkers to be depicted positively but appreciate that different worldviews operate in the field and believe people need to be aware of differences and able to translate between them where possible. On infrequent occasions, academics steeped in positivist research have read the chapter and been appalled by the discussion regarding alternative worldviews, perceptions of reality and the questioning of causality; they find the suggestions disturbing and counter to their commitment to discover objective truths. Overall, these reactions reinforce for the authoress the importance of identifying and discussing assumptions at work in peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation; they also suggest that there are further issues to be addressed and that the authoress only begins to scratch the surface of the issues presented here. In this chapter, she begins by outlining the two basic constituencies: frameworkers and circlers. She briefly reviews the current status of peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation, which continues to grow and evolve. This is followed by an analysis of a series of topics that are debated between frameworkers and circlers; some of these topics are debated openly and addressed by other works that examine peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation, and some lie below the surface or are not articulated as debates. The tensions provide insights into the underlying issues that need to be identified in order to be fruitfully addressed. Finally, the authoress presents some concrete examples of ways that peacebuilding or other social change orientated programs have adopted to Bridge the positions in practice and identify practices that can strengthen particular areas that are currently under-developed and can benefit programs." (excerpt)
"The relationship between development policy and security policy has undergone rapid changes over a period of only a few years. In Germany, as well as other donor countries, there was in the past a clearly recognizable distance between development actors and military actors and between their respective tasks. This distance is shrinking. The new debate is important for many developing countries and regions (e.g. Afghanistan), but is especially relevant to sub-Saharan Africa. Peace and security are at the top of the agenda for Africa. While they have been recognized in the past as among the most urgent challenges facing the continent, they have not previously gained the marked profile they are now assuming as a political priority for practical policy approaches and efforts both in and outside Africa. The basic parameters involved have shifted in the direction of greater visibility and a heightened political will to act. The African Union (AU), created in 2002, is most important for this new situation. However, the new peace and security architecture faces a number of challenges. Although the AU's ownership approach to peace and security is fundamentally correct, it contrasts sharply with African funding and implementation capacities. Ultimately, the AU will prove to be effective only if the relevant donors are prepared to support, and above all to fund, its policies. Interfaces between development policy and security policy are not a phenomenon confined to Germany. The UN, for example, is increasingly interested in conducting comprehensive peace missions in Africa. Integrated missions with civil and military components were first undertaken in Sierra Leone. Another important example is Britain, which established an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool in 2001. The British development, foreign and defence policies are contributing to this fund. Germany's cross-policy approaches in Africa's case cover different categories, such as strategic planning, funding and operational activities. It is important to stress that many of these efforts are made within a broader context of international approaches of the G8 and the European Union. An important effort as regards a German 'whole-of-government' approach began with an action plan for 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building'. The action plan is an interministerial exercise and was approved by the Cabinet in May 2004. Its objective is to develop the Federal Government's capabilities and to make greater use of the foreign, security and development policies in civil crisis prevention. One of its main aims is therefore coherent and coordinated action on the part of all state and non-state actors. Several parts of the plan are devoted to Africa. The new tendencies in Germany have led not to a merging of development and security concepts, but to a new relationship between the actors concerned. This closer relationship also entails differences of view on a number of issues." (author's abstract)