The World Health Organisation (WHO) was founded in 1948 with a remit to promote public health around the world. The WHO's constitution sets out its objective as 'the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health' (WHO, 1948). The paper raises broad questions over the aspirations and practice of international health policy in its international political and development context. The paper explores how international health policy has been informed by evolving international development strategies, from the earlier modernisation approaches to the sustainable development approaches of recent decades. The final part considers international health policy today in a world of continuing international inequalities.
In this paper, the implicit and explicit conceptualizations of international organizations found in the three major theories of international relations are outlined and compared. It turns out that in a neorealist framework, international organizations can be explained; however, they exhibit no autonomy and cannot therefore be conceptualized as a corporate actor. Principally, the same applies to rational choice institutionalism, although limited autonomy is conceivable. Both theories are reductionist in the sense that they do not allow a corporate actor beyond the nation-state. International organizations are at best instruments of state interests. Solely social constructivist theories allow a conceptualization of international organizations as partly autonomous corporate actors. The reason for this conceptual openness lies in its ontology that includes ideational factors such as knowledge and ideas. The concept of emergence gives the core explanation for international organization autonomy: identities and interests of states and international organizations constitute each other mutually. This is specified by referring to the generation of new knowledge within international organizations as the key feature which accounts for feedbacks to the member-states of international organizations. This power of international organizations to alter perceptions and identities of their own 'founding fathers' makes them more than state instruments. International organizations thereby gain autonomy, which justifies conceiving of them as high-order corporate actors in international relations.
This article documents the rise of nonconsensual international lawmaking and analyzes its consequences for the treaty design, treaty participation, and treaty adherence decisions of nation states. Grounding treaties upon the formal consent of states has numerous advantages for a decentralized and largely anarchic international legal system that suffers from a pervasive "compliance deficit." But consent also has real costs, including the inability to ensure that all nations affected by transborder problems join treaties that seek to resolve those problems. This "participation deficit" helps explain why some international rules bind countries without their acceptance or approval. Such rules have wide applicability. But they can also increase sovereignty costs, exacerbating the compliance deficit. Nonconsensual international lawmaking thus appears to create an insoluble tradeoff between increasing participation and decreasing compliance. This article explains that such a tradeoff is not inevitable. Drawing on recent examples from multilateral efforts to prevent transnational terrorism, preserve the global environment, and protect human rights, the article demonstrates that the game-theoretic structure of certain cooperation problems, together with their institutional and political context, create self-enforcing equilibria in which compliance is a dominant strategy. In these situations, nonconsensual lawmaking reduces both the participation and the compliance deficits. In other issue areas, by contrast, problem structure and context do not affect the tradeoff between the two deficits, and the incentive to defect remains unaltered. Analyzing the differences among these issue areas helps to identify the conditions under which nonconsensual lawmaking increases the welfare of all states.
The aim of this thesis is to analyse international financial integration. Chapter 2 investigates the determinants of international financial integration. Variables including the capital control policy dummy variable, openness to international trade, domestic credit and economic growth are candidates for explaining variation in the degree of international financial integration. Chapter 3 analyses cointegration between the US and several European Union equity markets. Between 1993 and 1998, there is mixed evidence of cointegration ties with the US equity market. Over the period covering the introduction of the euro, most of the European markets did not show any evidence of cointegration with the US market. Granger causality tests reveal significant causality running from the US to the European markets. Chapter 4 estimates time series of market and idiosyncratic volatilities for the firms composing the index DJ Eurostoxx 50 following the volatility decomposition method of Campbell et al. (2001). There was a positive trend in both market and firm-level volatility and average correlation among firms has increased. This contrasts with the US evidence in Campbell et al. (2001) of a strong positive trend in firm-level volatility, no trend in market volatility and a decrease in the average correlation. Results confirm a statistically significant market risk-return trade-off and that firm-level volatility has no predictive power for subsequent market returns. Chapter 5 analyses the link between FDI and economic growth using panel data. FDI has a stronger positive impact on economic growth in countries with higher levels of education attainment, those that are more open to international trade, have better stock market development and lower rates of population growth and levels of risk. Chapter 6 investigates the determinants of the home bias. Results indicate that capital controls and transaction costs are factors driving the home bias of Australian equity portfolio investment. The home bias lessens if the bilateral trade ...
Der Einfluss Internationaler Organisationen reicht angesichts der Herausforderung, für globale Probleme Lösungen zu finden, mittlerweile so weit, dass sich die Frage nach den in ihnen vorhandenen Machtbegrenzungsmechanismen stellt. Doch wie kann die Macht Internationaler Organisationen kontrolliert werden, wenn das aus dem nationalen Verfassungsrecht bekannte Gewaltenteilungsprinzip nicht auf die internationale Ebene übertragen werden kann? Die Arbeit analysiert die dazu innerhalb der Vereinten Nationen (UNO) und der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) existierenden formalisierten Mechanismen anhand ihrer Gründungsverträge. Dabei werden drei Kategorien von Machtbegrenzungsmechanismen identifiziert: Kompetenzzuweisungen und -abgrenzungen, organinterne Mechanismen und schließlich Interaktion zwischen den Organen. Die in der Praxis bedeutsamsten Mechanismen stellen zum einen das Vetorecht im UN-Sicherheitsrat sowie der negative Konsens im Streitbeilegungsgremium der WTO dar, die zur Gruppe der organinternen Mechanismen gehören. Zum anderen besteht in der Kontrolle der Streitbeilegungs-Panel der WTO durch den Appellate Body eine wichtige Machtbegrenzung durch Interaktion. Die Untersuchung dokumentiert das paradoxe Phänomen, dass die Mechanismen zur Begrenzung der Macht in vielen Fällen auch eine machtsteigernde Wirkung haben, indem sie die Effizienz, Akzeptanz und Legitimation der Organisation erhöhen. Die Verfasserin erklärt dies damit, dass das Augenmerk der Gründungsstaaten in der Entstehungsphase auf dem Funktionieren der Organisation als Gegengewicht zu ihren jeweiligen Mitgliedsstaaten lag. Dass Internationale Organisationen in der Zwischenzeit so stark an Einfluss gewonnen haben, dass ihre Macht nunmehr begrenzt werden sollte, ist eine neue Entwicklung, die jedoch in Zukunft deutlich an Bedeutung gewinnen wird. ; In light of the challenge to find answers to global problems, the influence of international organizations nowadays goes so far that the question of existing checks and balances within these organizations arises. But how can power be controlled when the principle of separation of powers originating from national constitutional law cannot be transferred to the international stage? The purpose of this thesis is to analyze existing formalized internal mechanisms within the United Nations and the World Trade Organization on the basis of their founding treaties. The author identifies three categories of checks and balances: allowing and limiting competencies, mechanisms within the organs and finally interactions between the organs. In practice, the most important mechanisms of these organizations are on the one hand the power of veto within the UN Security Council and the negative consensus within the WTO dispute settlement body, which belong to the category of mechanisms within the organs. In addition, the control of the WTO dispute settlement panels by the Appellate Body is an important form of checks and balances through interaction. The analysis shows the paradoxical phenomenon, that checks and balances in many cases have the effect of increasing power by augmenting the efficiency, acceptance and legitimacy of the organization. The author explains this by reference to the intentions of the founding states during the developing phase to strengthen these organizations as a counterbalance to their respective member states. It is a new development that international organizations have now increased their influence so much that their power should be limited, but this will become significantly more important in the future.
A decade ago, trade and investment liberalization dominated the global economic policy agenda. The World Trade Organization (WTO) had recently been created, the United States, Mexico and Canada were implementing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and much of Southeast Asia and South America were near the peak of an economic boom that was driven in part by greater openness to inflows of foreign capital. In bilateral and multilateral discussions of economic integration, global migration was often missing from the docket entirely. The growth in labor flows from low-income to high-income countries has not been greeted with universal enthusiasm, either by policy makers or academics. In theory, international migration increases economic efficiency by shifting labor from low-productivity to high-productivity environments. As workers move from Central America to the United States, North Africa to Europe, or Southeast Asia to Australia, the global labor supply shifts from labor abundant to labor-scarce economies, compressing international differences in factor prices and raising global gross domestic product (GDP). Migrants enjoy large income gains family members at home share in these gains through remittances, and non-migrating workers in the sending country enjoy higher wages thanks to a drop in local labor supply (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007).
There is a growing and misinformed sense in some quarters that the United States and other countries have engaged (and continue to engage) in delegations to international institution that involve a significant threat to domestic sovereignty. Concerns about such delegations come from academics (John Yoo: "Novel forms of international cooperation increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to international organizations"), prominent politicians (Bob Barr: "Nary a thought is given when international organizations, like the UN, attempt to enforce their myopic vision of a one-world government upon America, while trumping our Constitution in the process. Moreover, many in our own government willfully or ignorantly cede constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms to the international community;" Jesse Helms: "The American people see the UN aspiring to establish itself as the central authority of a new international order of global laws and global government."); and senior government officials (John Bolton: "For virtually every area of public policy, there is a Globalist proposal, consistent with the overall objective of reducing individual nation-state autonomy, particularly that of the United States"). In our view the perspective evidenced by the above quotes is almost wholly a myth. But it is a myth that persists and continues to attract attention. This Essay seeks to bring forward a more realistic and accurate view of international institutions and engagement. We demonstrate that meaningful delegations of sovereignty are extremely rare and even when they do exist they are carefully cabined. Decision-making authority in all areas remains firmly in the hands of national governments.
The exhibition, curated by Melvin and held at Tate Britain, presented all the range of art practice shown in Studio International magazine during Peter Townsend's editorial reign. By showing all the covers as a wall installation, viewers could explore specific issues in depth by viewing archive material, the articles, drafts, correspondence, photographs, original design and layout sheets and different controversial discussions, such as Roger Hilton's letter to Townsend, which was part artist statement, part stream of consciousness and art political discussion. The display drew attention to projects of several artists, such as Marcel Broodthaers, and to the curatorial-editorial projects initiated by Seth Siegelaub. Other artists on show included Bridget Riley, Jan Dibbets, Phillip King, John Plumb, Joseph Beuys and Dieter Rot.
This Essay explains how the political theorists Hobbes, Kant, and Locke interpret the decision to go to war (us ad bellum) and the manner in which the war is conducted (just in bello). It also considers the implications of the three theories for compliance with international law more generally. It concludes that although all three can lay claim to certain key features of modern international law, it is Locke who provides the most complete support for both the laws of war, in particular, and with international law, in general.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 303-320) and index. ; Conflict and crisis: concepts and overview findings on earthquakes I -- Protracted conflict-crisis model and findings on earthquakes II -- Crisis escalation to war: concepts, model, and findings on earthquakes III -- Crisis severity and impact: concepts and model -- Crisis intensity and fallout: findings on earthquakes IV -- Structure and stability: concepts and model -- Findings on the polarity-stability nexus -- Ethiopian (Abyssinian) War 1934-36, multipolarity, Africa -- Berlin Blockade 1948-49, bipolarity, Europe -- Bangladesh 1971, bipolycentrism, Asia -- Gulf War I 1990-91, unipolycentrism, Middle East -- Coping/crisis management: findings on earthquakes V -- What have we learned? ; Mode of access: Internet.
An overview of the objectives of Bahamian foreign policy, the history of foreign relations in post-independence Bahamas, the Bahamian official stance on human rights issues, South Africa, Israel, Palestine, disarmament, drug trafficking, the Organization of American States and the non-aligned movement, Law of the Sea, and the issue of Bahamian boundaries.
We develop a generalized approach to the treatment of household inequality aspects of social welfare in general equilibrium models of trade. We follow a dual approach, highlighting how general equilibrium distributional aspects of social welfare related to import protection may be examined alongside corresponding efficiency aspects. We work with a social welfare function that is explicitly separable between mean income and income dispersion. Our results compliment the set of standard inequality results in trade theory that are focused strictly on functional rather than household inequality. As an application of the theoretical framework, we then examine the direct impact of inequality on a government's objective function. We nd that equity consider- ations may serve to counter lobbying interests in both capital-rich and capital-poor countries, though with an opposite marginal impact on the nal policy outcome. We also identify a new theoretical basis for potential protectionist bias on the part of welfare maximizing governments in capital-rich countries in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Our dual framework also offers a possible empirical framework for decomposition of policy-induced price changes into household inequality for a broad class of models.
For Member States of the European Union, participation in this supranational organization has increased the number of diffi culties in the international arena. Occasionally, the expanding legislative activity of the European institutions reaches out beyond the borders of the European legal system and incidentally affects the EU Member States ' autonomous relations with third parties. Consequently the EU and its members, often with success, seek third parties ' consent to exceptional treatment. Because of their number and significance, such derogations have inspired this article to inquire into their expansion and legal status under international law. Even though the EU-related exceptions have not created an international customary rule, the article observes that European integration shapes international rules in diverse fi elds and adjusts them to its needs. Since European integration is designed to administerand regulate an increasing number of issues, the autonomous international obligations of the EU Member States may become an obstacle. Because the European Union is likely to continue using special treatment in the future, it is important to assess how far the supranational exception can go in order to accommodate all interests at stake.
A growing international consensus has emerged in the last few decades on the need to prosecute egregious violations of international law. In this regard, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is seen as a landmark development in the global protection of international human rights and humanitarian law standards. Since its independence in 1991, Eritrea has experienced heinous violations of international law. The violations amount to international core crimes, as defined by the ICC Statute and customary international law. These include crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. There are consistent reports, as well as documentary and testimonial evidence from reliable sources on this. Accordingly, a number of high-ranking government officials may be reasonably suspected of involvement in the perpetration of international crimes in Eritrea. However, Eritrea is not a state party to the ICC Statute and this means that many of the international crimes perpetrated in the country may not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. On the other hand, violations are continuing with impunity, as there are no effective domestic remedies to rectify the problem, giving rise to the need for immediate intervention by the international community. The article discusses the legal implications of the ICC Statute with regard to international crimes committed in Eritrea before and after the coming into effect of the Statute. Drawing on the latest developments of international criminal law, it explores possible options for the prosecution of the main perpetrators of international crimes pursuant to Security Council referral as stipulated under article 13(b) of the ICC Statute.
Many writers believe that international law is precatory but not "binding" in the way domestic law is binding. Since international law derives from the practice of states, how is it that what states do becomes what they must do? How do we get bindingness or normativity out of empirical fact? We have to avoid the Humean fallacy of attempting to derive an ought from an is. Yet we can find in nature at least one norm that is compelling: the norm of survival. This norm is hardwired into our brains through evolution. It is also hardwired into the international legal system that has survived for four thousand years. In every dispute or controversy, the international legal system weighs in on the side of peaceful and stable resolution--simply because that is in the system's interest of self-perpetuation. In sum, it is internaitonal law itself that selects from state actions those actions most conducive to the peaceful resolution of disputes and formulates them as rules and precedents of the system.