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This dissertation contributes to several fields of international macroeconomics. Chapter 2 presents a new dataset and new evidence on the invoicing pattern in international trade for a large panel of countries. It goes into detail explaining the motivation to set prices in different currencies, with a special focus on the role of the euro as invoicing currency. Chapters 3 and 4 of this study focus on the impact of oil prices on oil-exporting countries, a topic which has received far less attention than the impact on industrial countries. Chapter 3 analyses the import behaviour of oil exporting countries and its potential role in the resolution of global current account imbalances. Chapter 4 analyses the effect of oil price changes on the economy of the world’s largest oil exporting country, Russia. Chapter 5 looks at the international transmission of monetary policy shocks, paying particular attention to the implications of different exchange rate regimes.
Changes in the role of collective action at the international level, in the international economic environment, and, most importantly, our better understanding of economics in general require that we rethink the role of international financial institutions (IFIs). For multilateral development banks like the World Bank, their central mission, the promotion of growth and the reduction of poverty, is clear. The steps toward fulfilling this mission in a changing world are also relatively clear, and many of these institutions have already begun processes of renewal. But all of the IFIs have, in one way or another, also been involved in crisis management, especially in recent years. Here, future roles are less clear because they depend on the redefinition of the international financial architecture - a redefinition that has been hotly debated, but has not yet crystallised into a shared vision. The theoretical underpinnings - as well as the practical implementation - of alternative visions will require far more development before clarity on a future role will be attained. In this essay, I will address these questions from the perspective of the theory of international public goods, which is a powerful way to organise our thinking both on why we have IFIs in the first place, and the role that they should play in a changing world.
This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models.
Abstract. This paper analyzes the extent to which international public goods and agency problems are present in international organizations. A noncooperative model of the funding choices of donor countries and the subsequent policy choices of an international agency is used to develop h y-potheses about the behavior of ideal and problematic international agen-cies. The analysis suggests that international agencies are likely to be under-funded and undermonitored relative to that which maximizes the joint in-terest of signatory countries. The funding and policy implications of the model are tested using data from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The statistical results suggest that (i) treaty obligations affect behavior of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries, (ii) GEF’s allocation of grants gener-ally a dvances the international environmental agenda, and (iii) significant free-riding and agency problems exist in GEF as it is presently organized. Overall, the empirical results suggest that treaty organizations may be rela-tively effective, if not perfect, instruments of international public policy.
One of the most outstanding features of making politics in a shrinking world and interdependent economies is the creation of "International Policy Regimes" (IPR) for the governance of "micro" arenas of international politics. This is a stimulating development for comparative public policy analysts as it enables (and requires) us to extend our traditional cross-national, cross-sectorial and cross-issue analyses so as to include also a cross-international analysis. This paper compares two international policy regimes for the regulation of international competition in the sector of telecommunications. The first regime deals with the regulation of terminal equipment (type-approval processes) and the second with network interconnection (the integration of different and competing networks into one system). While the terminal type-approval regime involves deregulation, and was found to be narrow in scope and fairly effective, the network interconnection regime involves reregulation and was fo.
International political economy is concerned with the ways in which political forces (states institutions individual actors etc.) shape the systems through which economic interactions are expressed and conversely the effects that economic interactions (including the power of collective markets and individuals acting both within and outside them) have upon political structures and outcomes. The major theoretical perspectives in international political economy are Mercantilsm liberalism Marxism and constructivism. Mercantilsm is similar to International relations realism.
Abstract: The importance of international migration for the demographic situation in most countries, particularly developed ones, has increased in recent years. Attention must, there-fore, be given to the statistics describing this phenomenon. However, statistics produced in individual countries do not appear to be mutually comparable. The author takes the example of migration flows between individual countries, from the point of view of the country of origin and the destination country, and describes the differences in observation, summarises the main reasons for these differences, and outlines possible ways of reducing the differences.