"Vor dem Hintergrund der kooperationstheoretischen fundierten Diskussion um internationale Regime entwickelt der Artikel ein Konzept von 'Regieren' im internationalen System. Innerhalb bestimmter Grenzen vermögen Normen das Verhalten rationaler Nutzenmaximierer zu beeinflussen und können deshalb für die gezielte Verhaltensbeeinflussung zur Realisierung bestehender Kooperationsmöglichkeiten eingesetzt werden. Sie stellen aber erst dann geeignete Lenkungsinstrumente dar, wenn sie unabhängig von dem zu beeinflussenden Verhalten gebildet werden können. Dazu bedarf eine an Kooperation interessierte Gruppe von Akteuren der kollektiven Entscheidungsfähigkeit. Die Interaktion muß auf eine neue Ebene verlagert werden, auf der kommuniziert und nicht gehandelt wird. Die Bildung gemeinsamer normativer Erwartungen im Rahmen von Verhandlungen, einer besonders geeigneten Form der Kommunikation, wird damit zum Kern des Regierens." (Autorenreferat)
Is there an intersection between the application of Public International Law with the political conduction of international relations? Should International Law, International Order and International Rules be redefined? How can such an intersection be found? The investigation seeks to extrapolate new definitions and an International Law axiom by utilizing sundry approaches to the state of the question which is properly laid out as well as some terms defined previous to the discussion by utilizing "approaches." The investigation is carried out by using the Cartesian method or that of Descartes and followers and the formal and material logical structures. Eventually new definitions and an axiom by extrapolating analyses categories are laid out. Hence, approaches such as the "legalistic" one, the "natural law" one, the "religious," the "extra-legal" one, the "eclectic" one, the "effective" one and the "UN proposed" one are analyzed in-depth upon observing the experience and current factual situation even though noting that those approaches are neither mutually exclusive nor "pure," but representative as the examples supporting them show. The paper's bottom line is no other than zeroing in on one of the oldest of International Law's wounds: That of its effectiveness. But by pointing out various moot points and by reflecting on the different reality stages, one can conclude that the material mission of the law as well as the aims of international order are eventually attained. Nonetheless in concluding and setting out the axioms and new definitions, the existing political power within a democratic framework should not be overlooked as the praxis of International Law meets that of international power to form then a juxtaposition. So, regardless of some international instruments being deemed as substantial law, one has to ask whether what the international community calls "breaking of law," is rather a breaking of procedures or adjective mandates. ; ¿Existe un punto de equilibrio o balance entre lo que es la aplicación del derecho internacional público y el manejo político de las relaciones internacionales? ¿Deben los conceptos de Derecho Internacional, Orden Internacional y Reglas Internacionales ser redefinidos? ¿Cómo se puede encontrar un punto de equilibrio? Esta investigación busca la extrapolación de nuevas definiciones y de un axioma de Derecho Internacional utilizando para ello varias aproximaciones al estado de la cuestión que es presentada así como términos previamente definidos en forma anterior al inicio de la discusión que utiliza las denominadas "aproximaciones." La investigación se lleva a cabo usando el método cartesiano y las estructuras de la lógica formal y material. Al final, nuevas definiciones y un axioma son presentadas usando para ello distintas categorías de análisis. Así, "aproximaciones" como la "religiosa o teocrática," o la "extra-legal," o la "legalista," o la "efectiva," o la del "derecho natural," la "ecléctica," la del "deber ser" y finalmente la "efectiva" son analizadas en profundidad a través de la observación de la experiencia y la situación actual, aun cuando haciendo notar que dichas aproximaciones no son mutuamente excluyentes, no tampoco "puras," pero sí representativas como los ejemplos que las soportan muestran. La idea subyacente de la investigación no es otra que centrarse en uno de los temas más importantes del derecho internacional: su efectividad. Pero al señalar varios puntos de discusión y a través de la reflexión de los diferentes escenarios reales, se puede concluir que la misión material del derecho internacional al final se cumple. No obstante, al concluir y al trazar el axioma y nuevas definiciones, no puede olvidarse el poder político existente dentro de un marco democrático por cuanto la praxis del derecho internacional se encuentra con la del poder internacional para formar una intersección. De tal manera, que independientemente de que algunos instrumentos internacionales se tengan como norma sustantiva, debe preguntarse uno si lo que la comunidad internacional llama "violación del derecho" no es una pero de meras reglas adjetivas.
In this paper I am going to argue a familiar but still controversial thesis about the relation between international ethics and international law, which I would sum up in the following list of propositions:First, international law is a source as well as an object of ethical judgements. The idea of legality or the rule of law is an ethical one, and international law has ethical significance because it gives institutional expression to the rule of law in international relations.Secondly, international law—or, more precisely, the idea of the rule of law in international relations—reflects a rule-oriented rather than outcome-oriented ethic of international affairs. By insisting on the priority of rules over outcomes, this ethic rejects consequentialism in all its forms.
"Eine Ausdehnung des Selbstverteidigungsrechts auf 'vorbeugende Verteidigung' ist unnötig. Das bestehende Völkerrecht bietet einen hinreichenden Rahmen, um dem internationalen Terrorismus zu begegnen. Unilaterale Antworten sind kontraproduktiv, denn sie spielen dem terroristischen Angriff auf die internationale Ordnung in die Hände." (Autorenreferat)
The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, it proposes to undertake, in introductory form, one of the many tasks a historical sociology of international relations could perform: the comparative study of one of those relations which appear in almost any international system, i.e., international law. Secondly, this essay will try to present the rudimentary outlines of a theory of international law which might be called sociological or functional.International law is one of the aspects of international politics which reflect most sharply the essential differences between domestic and world affairs. Many traditional distinctions tend to disappear, owing to an "international civil war" which projects what are primarily domestic institutions (such as parliaments and pressure groups) into world politics, and injects world-wide ideological clashes into domestic affairs. International law, like its Siamese twin and enemy, war, remains a crystallization of all that keeps world politics sui generis. If theory is to be primarily concerned with the distinctive features of systems rather than wim the search for regularities, international law becomes a most useful approach to international politics.
Much of the contemporary literature on the utility of international sanctions approaches the apparent riddle of why sanctions are embraced so eagerly when they are supposedly such an "ineffective" tool of statecraft by focusing on the instrumental and rational purposes of sanctions. As a result, one purpose that does not always lend itself to a rational means-end calculus—the purpose of punishment—tends to be overlooked or, more commonly, dismissed outright. This article explores punishment as both a useful and an effective purpose of international sanctions. It argues not only that sanctions should be distinguished from other forms of hurtful statecraft but also that they are a form of "international punishment" for wrongdoing, despite the difficulties of applying the term "punishment" in the context of international relations. The article then examines the purposes of punishment and reveals that only some are understandable when a model of means-end rationality is used, suggesting that the element of the nonrational also plays an important role in international sanctions. The argument is then applied to the case of U.S. sanctions imposed after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan to demonstrate the different purposes of punishment at work in this case. The article concludes that just as we cannot understand punishment as a purposive human activity solely by reference to a rational model of a means to a clearly delineated end, so too we cannot entirely understand sanctions as a form of international punishment by an attachment to a rational model of policy behavior. However, some forms of punishment are exceedingly effective, and this may explain why sanctions continue to be a popular instrument of statecraft.
In a reeent work entitled The Psychology of Nations we are told that "International Law must be made intelligible to very young minds, and now that we are to have an international seat of congresses and courts, the interest must be made in its existence to give reality to the idea of internationalism." This admonition by a psychologist is illustrative of a widespread attitude toward international law; that it is a matter readily understood, for which there need be no specialized training, everyone being competent to pass judgment upon any subject about which international law is supposed to be concerned.
