Interpretation and Construction
In: Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Band 34
In: Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Band 34
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Working paper
In: THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2011
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In: Singapore Management University School of Law Research Paper No. 2/2013
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Working paper
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This Note surveys evidence concerning how early American Supreme Court Justices approached interpretation and construction based on an analysis of Supreme Court opinions from 1795 to 1805. An evaluation of this evidence indicates two main trends. First, the Justices engaged in interpretation and construction as a single process, alternating between textual and normative reasoning to determine the intent of the Framers or of Congress. In some cases, textual reasoning seemed determinative; in others, normative reasoning was decisive. This finding illustrates some tension between the idea of limiting judicial discretion in construction and applying methods of interpretation and construction that would have been used in the Founding Era. This may highlight important questions for some original methods originalists. Second, the Justices utilized a variety of tools and canons in the construction zone. Acquiescing to historical practice, deferring to national interest concerns, and using legislative evidence were all fair game. To the extent that modern-day theorists or jurists find Founding-era evidence of judicial practice relevant to contemporary debates about interpretation and construction, this Note offers evidence of how early American Justices went about determining the meaning of legal texts, and offers tentative conclusions about the implications for contemporary debates.
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In: Wake Forest Law Review, Band 57
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This article analyzes the constitutional provisions and practices of the Kosovar process of forming a government in two scenarios: after a parliamentary election, and after a motion of no confidence. The factors that most prominently complicate this process are the proportional electoral system, extreme party pluralism, and ambiguous constitutional provisions. Leaving aside the first two factors, which have thus far resisted efforts to change them, the authors claim that the constitutional law dealing with the government-formation process has undergone both procedural and substantive changes as a result of interpretations and decisions by the Constitutional Court. The authors further note that these changes are constitutional constructions, rather than constitutional interpretations, and describe the novel, resultant practice as legitimized without amendment. These constitutional interpretations and constructions, their possible alternatives, and the relevant constitutional provisions are analyzed through doctrinal legal research. That constitutional judgments can be reinterpreted and abused by interim, and office-seeking (rather than policy-seeking) political coalitions seems a condition poised to engender future instability; therefore, the authors hold that the amendment of the constitution is the best insurance against political and constitutional crises when it comes to forming a government, either after elections or with the same legislature. The authors hope that this paper will contribute to the enrichment of the constitutional practice of forming parliamentary governments and the development of the doctrine of constitutional interpretation. ; U ovome članku analiziraju se ustavne odredbe i praksa kosovskog formiranja vlade u dva scenarija: nakon parlamentarnih izbora i nakon izglasavanja nepovjerenja. Čimbenici koji izrazito kompliciraju taj proces su proporcionalni izborni sustav, ekstremni stranački pluralizam i dvosmislene ustavne odredbe. Ostavljajući po strani prva dva čimbenika, koji su do sada odolijevali nastojanjima da ih se promijeni, autori tvrde da je ustavno pravo koje se bavi procesom formiranja vlasti doživjelo i proceduralne i materijalne promjene kao rezultat tumačenja i odluka Ustavnog suda. Autori nadalje primjećuju da su te promjene ustavne konstrukcije, a ne klasična ustavna tumačenja, te opisuju novu, rezultirajuću praksu kao legitimiranu bez ustavne promjene. Ova ustavna tumačenja i konstrukcije, njihove moguće alternative te relevantne ustavne odredbe analiziraju se doktrinarnim pravnim istraživanjem. Uzimajući u obzir činjenicu da se ustavne presude mogu reinterpretirati i biti zloupotrijebljene privremenim ad hoc koalicijama, koje se temelje na trenutačnim uskim stranačkim interesima, može se pretpostaviti da će to stvarati dodatne nestabilnosti u budućnosti. Stoga autori smatraju da je izmjena ustava najbolje osiguranje od političke i ustavne krize kada je u pitanju formiranje vlasti, bilo nakon izbora, bilo s istim zakonodavnim tijelom. Autori se nadaju da će ovaj rad pridonijeti obogaćivanju ustavne prakse formiranja parlamentarnih vlada i razvoju doktrine tumačenja ustava.
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Front Matter; Law as Fact, Law as Fiction; Lexical Indeterminacy; Topical Jurisprudence; Legal Speech Acts as Intersubjective Communicative Action; Who needs Fact when you've got Narrative? The Case of P, C & S vs. United Kingdom; Taking Facts Seriously; Transforming Ambiguity into Vagueness in Legal Interpretation; The Inclusive/Exclusive Nation; Global Values and Floating Borders in the Brazilian Amazon; Landmarks for Aboriginal Law in Australia; Back Matter.
In: Constitutional Commentary, Band 27, S. 95-118
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In: The Oxford international law library
In: Oxford monographs in international law
Nowadays the development of AI technology is not yet mature, let alone the legal definition and regulation of its type, even the type of technology itself is full of uncertain factors. Because of the rapid development of technology and the openness of theories, scientists have not yet formed a unified consensus and system on cutting-edge technical issues. Therefore, at present, governments all over the world are actively formulating the development plans of AI, but the supervision and regulation of AI are scattered and lagging behind. There is nothing wrong with encouraging the development of new technologies, but the application of technologies requires a responsible response to various ethical demands from human society. No matter what form of AI technology and its application are inseparable from the algorithm and the issue of "algorithm accountability" may probably be a focus of legal regulations on AI and the path of accountability is algorithm interpretation. It is desirable but regrettable that the EU's GDPR stipulates the non-binding "right to explanation". But the stop of GDPR is exactly the starting point of constructing the algorithm interpretation mechanism in law.
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In: Cambridge studies in international and comparative law 124
How should international treaties be interpreted over time? This book offers fresh insights on this age-old question. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) sets out the rules for interpretation, stipulating that treaties should be interpreted inter alia according to the 'ordinary meaning' of the text. Evolutive interpretation has been considered since the times of Gentili and Grotius, but this is the first book to systematically address what evolutive interpretation looks like in reality. It sets out to address how and under what circumstances it can be said that the interpretation of a treaty evolves, and under what circumstances it remains static. With the VCLT as its point of departure, this study develops a functional reconstruction of the rules of treaty interpretation, and explores and analyses how the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have approached the issue