This Note surveys evidence concerning how early American Supreme Court Justices approached interpretation and construction based on an analysis of Supreme Court opinions from 1795 to 1805. An evaluation of this evidence indicates two main trends. First, the Justices engaged in interpretation and construction as a single process, alternating between textual and normative reasoning to determine the intent of the Framers or of Congress. In some cases, textual reasoning seemed determinative; in others, normative reasoning was decisive. This finding illustrates some tension between the idea of limiting judicial discretion in construction and applying methods of interpretation and construction that would have been used in the Founding Era. This may highlight important questions for some original methods originalists. Second, the Justices utilized a variety of tools and canons in the construction zone. Acquiescing to historical practice, deferring to national interest concerns, and using legislative evidence were all fair game. To the extent that modern-day theorists or jurists find Founding-era evidence of judicial practice relevant to contemporary debates about interpretation and construction, this Note offers evidence of how early American Justices went about determining the meaning of legal texts, and offers tentative conclusions about the implications for contemporary debates.
Nowadays the development of AI technology is not yet mature, let alone the legal definition and regulation of its type, even the type of technology itself is full of uncertain factors. Because of the rapid development of technology and the openness of theories, scientists have not yet formed a unified consensus and system on cutting-edge technical issues. Therefore, at present, governments all over the world are actively formulating the development plans of AI, but the supervision and regulation of AI are scattered and lagging behind. There is nothing wrong with encouraging the development of new technologies, but the application of technologies requires a responsible response to various ethical demands from human society. No matter what form of AI technology and its application are inseparable from the algorithm and the issue of "algorithm accountability" may probably be a focus of legal regulations on AI and the path of accountability is algorithm interpretation. It is desirable but regrettable that the EU's GDPR stipulates the non-binding "right to explanation". But the stop of GDPR is exactly the starting point of constructing the algorithm interpretation mechanism in law.
Es zählt zu den Gemeinplätzen der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, dass politische Wirklichkeit sozial konstruiert ist. Wenig wissen wir hingegen darüber, wie politische Wirklichkeit entsteht, insbesondere wie Sprache bewirkt, dass etwas zu einer allgemein akzeptierten politischen Wirklichkeit wird. In Anknüpfung an die bisherige konstruktivistische Forschung rekonstruiert der Band auf methodisch innovative Weise den Gebrauch von Sprachbildern und Metaphern im deutschen Diskurs über den EU-Verfassungsvertrag. Durch die quantitative und qualitative Extrapolation des metaphorischen Sprechens in der Europadebatte lassen sich nicht nur signifikante Veränderungen in den Diskursen der bundesdeutschen Parteien offenlegen, sondern die Einzelmetaphern lassen sich auch zu machtvollen handlungsleitenden Narrativen verdichten. Dass die europäische Verfassungsfrage vor allem eine Frage der demokratischen Legitimation und europäischen Identität, des politischen Gestaltungswillens und der Finalität Europas ist, scheint dabei wenig überraschend. Dass die Frage der Konstitutionalisierung Europas aber auch und gerade ein Diskurs über neue Grenzziehungen und die partielle Schließung "offener Staatlichkeit" ist, kann hingegen als das eigentlich "Neue" in der deutschen Europapolitik angesehen werden. ; It is a truism in social scientific research to say that political reality is socially constructed. Despite this we know very little about how political reality comes into being, and especially how language can cause something to become a generally accepted part of political reality. Building on the constructivist research already undertaken this volume applies an innovative methodology to reconstruct the use of imagery and metaphors which have been part of the German discourse surrounding the EU\'s constitution. By quantitatively and qualitatively extrapolating metaphoric speech in the debate on Europe, it is not only possible to reveal significant changes in the discourse of German political parties, but also to see how the individual metaphors condense to become powerful guiding narratives. Seen in this light it is then not particularly surprising that the question of the European constitution is " more than anything " a question of democratic legitimacy, European identity, the will to shape the political, and of European finality. At the same time the question of Europe\'s constitutionalisation is particularly a discourse of redrawing borders, and the partial closure of "open stateness". It is this then that can be seen as "the new part" of German European policy.
Under our constitutional settlement, the judges interpret and apply statutes such as to articulate the will of the democratically legitimated Parliament. The article discusses the views of the academic, the judge and the practitioner on how the judges seek to discern the will of Parliament reconciling that with their judicial obligation to serve justice and the principles of legality - the law making dynamic.
The dissertation is an analytical study on international and Ukrainian perspective of the ship arrest, examining the rights and interests of claimants such as mortgagees and holders of maritime liens, but also those of shipowners and ship operators. The purpose of this research is to compare two Arrest Conventions of 1952 and 1999, taking into consideration their historical and theoretical development, problems of implementation and interpretation, differences in the list of individual maritime claims, procedures and rules regarding arrest, rearrest, release and counter security. The associated object is to carry out an assessment of the law of Ukraine on ship arrest. The new Arrest Convention of 1999 has clarified many provisions of the older Convention and expanded the list of maritime claims. However, it has still left room for discussion and freedom for national legislation to fill the gaps. Both Conventions allow ship arrest for security and in some jurisdictions the concept is used for the founding of jurisdiction. However, no convention has ever addressed the questions of arrest of cargo/bunkers and caveat against arrest and/or release. The author is of the opinion that the 1999 Arrest Convention is more favourable to developing countries whereas the 1952 Convention meets the needs of the traditional maritime states in a manner more acceptable to them. In a somewhat similar vein, the writer is of the opinion that the 1952 Arrest Convention is more "pro-shipping", while the 1999 Convention brings more benefits to port countries. Ukraine has already shown an intention to comply with provisions of the 1999 Convention in articulating the list of maritime claims in the Merchant Shipping Code. However, it ratified the 1952 Arrest Convention, with a view to restrict the numbers of arrests of Ukrainian vessels in other jurisdictions, allowing arrest only for maritime claims.
The way the Colombian Constitutional Court has interpreted the text of legislation that recognizes the right to life and how rules on the general problem of abortion have been developed are analyzed in this article. According to this assessment, the rights associated with the problem of abortion in Colombia have been created and developed as constructions of the Constitutional Court and, in doing so, the extent of the obligations pertaining to these construed rights have been confused. The first part of the article offers an explanation of the distinction between interpretation and construction, and outlines the interpretative theses on the right to life upheld by the Constitutional Court when deciding the constitutionality of criminalizing abortion. The rules that have been constructed are identified as well. In the last part, the rules of the Court are reconstructed on the basis of Hohfeld operators. ; En el artículo se analiza la forma como la Corte Constitucional colombiana interpretó los textos normativos que reconocen el derecho a la vida y cómo desarrolló reglas en torno al problema general del aborto. De acuerdo con este análisis, se afirma que los derechos asociados al problema del aborto en Colombia han sido creados y desarrollados como construcciones de la Corte Constitucional, y que en esta tarea se han confundido los niveles de los deberes correlativos de los derechos construidos. Para ello, en la primera parte del trabajo se explica la distinción entre interpretación y construcción. luego se presentan las tesis interpretativas del derecho a la vida sostenidas por la Corte Constitucional al momento de decidir la constitucionalidad de la penalización del aborto y se identifican las reglas construidas. En la última parte, se reconstruyen las reglas de la Corte en función de los operadores de Hohfeld. DOI:10.5294/dika.2014.23.2.4 ; Neste artigo, analisa-se a forma como a Corte Constitucional colombiana interpretou os textos normativos que reconhecem o direito à vida e como desenvolveu regras sobre o problema geral do aborto. De acordo com essa análise, afirma-se que os direitos associados ao problema do aborto na Colômbia foram criados e desenvolvidos como construções da Corte Constitucional, e que, nessa tarefa, se confundiram os níveis dos deveres correlativos dos direitos construídos. Para isso, na primeira parte do trabalho, explica-se a diferença entre interpretação e construção. Em seguida, apresentam-se as teses interpretativas do direito à vida sustentadas pela Corte Constitucional no momento de decidir a constitucionalidade da penalização do abordo e identificam-se as regras construídas. na última parte, reconstroem-se as regras da Corte em função dos operadores de Hohfeld.
En el artículo se analiza la forma como la Corte Constitucional colombiana interpretó los textos normativos que reconocen el derecho a la vida y cómo desarrolló reglas en torno al problema general del aborto. De acuerdo con este análisis, se afirma que los derechos asociados al problema del aborto en Colombia han sido creados y desarrollados como construcciones de la Corte Constitucional, y que en esta tarea se han confundido los niveles de los deberes correlativos de los derechos construidos. Para ello, en la primera parte del trabajo se explica la distinción entre interpretación y construcción, luego se presentan las tesis interpretativas del derecho a la vida sostenidas por la Corte Constitucional al momento de decidir la constitucionalidad de la penalización del aborto y se identifican las reglas construidas. En la última parte, se reconstruyen las reglas de la Corte en función de los operadores de Hohfeld. ; The way the Colombian Constitutional Court has interpreted the text of legislation that recognizes the right to life and how rules on the general problem of abortion have been developed are analyzed in this article. According to this assessment, the rights associated with the problem of abortion in Colombia have been created and developed as constructions of the Constitutional Court and, in doing so, the extent of the obligations pertaining to these construed rights have been confused. The first part of the article offers an explanation of the distinction between interpretation and construction, and outlines the interpretative theses on the right to life upheld by the Constitutional Court when deciding the constitutionality of criminalizing abortion. The rules that have been constructed are identified as well. In the last part, the rules of the Court are reconstructed on the basis of Hohfeld operators. ; Neste artigo, analisa-se a forma como a Corte Constitucional colombiana interpretou os textos normativos que reconhecem o direito à vida e como desenvolveu regras sobre o problema geral do aborto. De acordo com essa análise, afirma-se que os direitos associados ao problema do aborto na Colômbia foram criados e desenvolvidos como construções da Corte Constitucional, e que, nessa tarefa, se confundiram os níveis dos deveres correlativos dos direitos construídos. Para isso, na primeira parte do trabalho, explica-se a diferença entre interpretação e construção. Em seguida, apresentam-se as teses interpretativas do direito à vida sustentadas pela Corte Constitucional no momento de decidir a constitucionalidade da penalização do abordo e identificam-se as regras construídas. na última parte, reconstroem-se as regras da Corte em função dos operadores de Hohfeld.
This paper examines Dworkin's interpretive theory of law from a feminist perspective, and asks whether his attempts to accommodate competing political opinions within an interpretive community can successfully encompass feminist concerns as well. It is argued that Dworkin repeatedly underestimates the extent of disagreement regarding the practice of law as a whole, while his requirements of fit, coherence and integrity impose a political agenda on the interpreter. As a consequence, Dworkin's theory is ultimately unable to adequately respond to a feminist critique of law, so that feminist jurisprudence must be seen as falling outside the scope of his interpretive community.
The application of the law in terms of meaning is called interpretation. If there is doubt or conflict in determining the meaning of a legal rule or contract, or if there is a gap in the law, interpretation becomes inevitable. There are many methods of interpretation in general law. However, based on the principle of protecting the employee in labour law, the principle of "interpretation in favor of the employee ", which is a special form of interpretation, has emerged. In the study, the place and application of this method in individual labour law are discussed. While examining the principle of "interpretation in favor of the employee" examples from relevant judicial decisions are given. It is understood that the principle of interpretation in favor of the employee has turned into a settled form of interpretation with judicial decisions in labor law. In the study, it was revealed that there are factors and boundaries that should be considered while applying this interpretation method. Conclusions: As a result of the study, it is understood that the principle of interpretation in favor of the employee, which emerged as a result of the obligation to protect the employee who is weak against the employer, is widely applied in the courts. But, making decisions that disrupt the delicate balance between the employee and the employer by completely ignoring the general principles of the law will prevent the realization of the purpose expected from this method of interpretation. In the article, the factors that should be taken into consideration while applying the principle of "interpretation in favor of the employee" are also examined. ; peer-reviewed
"This year (2011) recognises the centenary of the Northern Territory separating from South Australia and becoming the responsibility of the Commonwealth Government. It therefore offers an historical 'marker' on the journey to statehood, and an opportunity to maintain the dialogue within the Territory as undertaken by the Information Roadshow Program delivered by the Northern Territory Statehood Steering Committee during 2010. This Information Roadshow Program travelled to 50 Public Forums and conducted a number of local meetings and information sessions throughout the Northern Territory in 2010." - Executive summary. ; Date:2011 ; Keynote speeches - The Honourable Fred Chaney, Professor George Williams -- The Northern Institute Public Policy Lecture Series - The Honourable Dr. Gary Johns, Professor Elizabeth A. Povinelli -- Further Statehood related presentations - The Honourable Paul Henderson MLA, Chief Justice Robert French -- Historical Society of the Northern Territory Lecture Series 2011 - Michael Tatham, Professor Dean Carson, Ken Parish, Kathy De La Ruse, Judy Boland. ; Made available by the Northern Territory Library via the Publications (Legal Deposit) Act 2004 (NT).
The common law has never developed a cause of action for discrimination. Instead, the legislatures have stepped in. This article explores not whether there should be a cause of action for discrimination at common law, but whether our thinking about discrimination from a legal point of view would benefit from drawing upon common law methodology. We can contrast two methodologies for the design and development over time of legal norms: the top-down model of the comprehensive code designed to bring to life a grand theory about the norms regulating human interaction, and the bottom-up model of case-by-case analysis aiming toward the development of a set of principles explaining and justifying individual decisions. Each has its place, but the latter is perhaps better suited to creating and changing norms in the discrimination law area. However, the abdication of responsibility by the common law has led to the legislatures intervening in their typical top-down style. Lacking a grand theory, the resulting statutory rules have something of the quality of arbitrary pigeonholes into which complainants must fit their fact situation or fail. Three issues are examined, revealing the detrimental impact of the pigeonhole-like quality that current codes have taken on over the course of their development. The first two concern the difficulties encountered in determining which attributes come within the protection of the law through being designated as prohibited grounds of discrimination; the last is a re-examination of whether discrimination is confined to differential treatment motivated by prejudice or encompasses causing adverse effects upon vulnerable groups and individuals. The article makes some first steps towards showing how discrimination law could develop differently if we were to adopt something more like the common law method of norm creation and change.
Roughly ten million Americans owe court-ordered economic sanctions, known as Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs). Oftentimes, payment of these fees is a condition of probation; when an individual is unable to make payments their probation may be revoked, resulting in incarceration. In 1983, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Bearden v. Georgia, explaining that states may only revoke probation for nonpayment of LFOs upon a showing that the nonpayment was "willful," a determination that must be made in court through an ability to pay hearing. Since Bearden, the Supreme Court has not revisited this issue to explain what "willful" means, leading to an outgrowth of divergent interpretations among lower courts. This Note examines the history and context of the Bearden decision in an effort to uncover a clearer understanding of the meaning of the term "willful." In doing so, this Note aims to show how some interpretations of this standard have failed to meet the threshold set by the Supreme Court, resulting in unconstitutional deprivations of liberty. Finally, this Note discusses some of the problems facing advocates in challenging inadequate ability to pay determinations before proposing potential solutions through both strategic litigation and legislative reform, modeled on successful outcomes in Washington, Louisiana, and Massachusetts.
The major conclusions in Georgia Warnke's illuminating Essay, Law, Hermeneutics, and Public Debate are persuasive, but some that appear almost self-evident instead rest on controversial evaluative judgments. Many of my comments deal with these complexities, drawing from her book on interpretation and political theory as well as her Essay. Other remarks develop subjects Warnke barely touches. My thoughts are, thus, some combination of clarification, supplementation, and disagreement. My initial effort is to refine in just what senses interpretations of texts, social practices, and legal rules must speak to our concerns. I next explore how interpretations of legal texts that are applied in the present and are backed by coercive force differ from portrayals of literature; then I inquire how these differences bear on strategies of interpretation. I endorse Warnke's rejection of a jurisprudence that focuses exclusively on original meaning, but I argue that this rejection cannot be grounded in general hermeneutic theory standing alone. Crucial moral and political judgments have to be made about allocating public functions. I then turn to Professor Warnke's analysis of debate over great constitutional issues. I emphasize the multiple levels of legal analysis of a subject like abortion. The terms of public debate usually connect to the terms of legal analysis, but these forms of discourse are not identical. Relatedly, interpretation of relevant legal texts will not always track broader interpretations of social meaning. I next consider Professor Warnke's account of legitimate constitutional interpretation. I question some of her conclusions about illegitimate interpretations, and raise doubts about how far the two criteria she offers for legitimate interpretation apply to legal interpretation. Finally, I address the theme that there may be something like "the nature of the thing," and offer brief suggestions about how a hermeneutic approach to interpretation like Warnke's may fit with belief in natural law.
This article analyzes the constitutional provisions and practices of the Kosovar process of forming a government in two scenarios: after a parliamentary election, and after a motion of no confidence. The factors that most prominently complicate this process are the proportional electoral system, extreme party pluralism, and ambiguous constitutional provisions. Leaving aside the first two factors, which have thus far resisted efforts to change them, the authors claim that the constitutional law dealing with the government-formation process has undergone both procedural and substantive changes as a result of interpretations and decisions by the Constitutional Court. The authors further note that these changes are constitutional constructions, rather than constitutional interpretations, and describe the novel, resultant practice as legitimized without amendment. These constitutional interpretations and constructions, their possible alternatives, and the relevant constitutional provisions are analyzed through doctrinal legal research. That constitutional judgments can be reinterpreted and abused by interim, and office-seeking (rather than policy-seeking) political coalitions seems a condition poised to engender future instability; therefore, the authors hold that the amendment of the constitution is the best insurance against political and constitutional crises when it comes to forming a government, either after elections or with the same legislature. The authors hope that this paper will contribute to the enrichment of the constitutional practice of forming parliamentary governments and the development of the doctrine of constitutional interpretation. ; U ovome članku analiziraju se ustavne odredbe i praksa kosovskog formiranja vlade u dva scenarija: nakon parlamentarnih izbora i nakon izglasavanja nepovjerenja. Čimbenici koji izrazito kompliciraju taj proces su proporcionalni izborni sustav, ekstremni stranački pluralizam i dvosmislene ustavne odredbe. Ostavljajući po strani prva dva čimbenika, koji su do sada odolijevali nastojanjima da ih se promijeni, autori tvrde da je ustavno pravo koje se bavi procesom formiranja vlasti doživjelo i proceduralne i materijalne promjene kao rezultat tumačenja i odluka Ustavnog suda. Autori nadalje primjećuju da su te promjene ustavne konstrukcije, a ne klasična ustavna tumačenja, te opisuju novu, rezultirajuću praksu kao legitimiranu bez ustavne promjene. Ova ustavna tumačenja i konstrukcije, njihove moguće alternative te relevantne ustavne odredbe analiziraju se doktrinarnim pravnim istraživanjem. Uzimajući u obzir činjenicu da se ustavne presude mogu reinterpretirati i biti zloupotrijebljene privremenim ad hoc koalicijama, koje se temelje na trenutačnim uskim stranačkim interesima, može se pretpostaviti da će to stvarati dodatne nestabilnosti u budućnosti. Stoga autori smatraju da je izmjena ustava najbolje osiguranje od političke i ustavne krize kada je u pitanju formiranje vlasti, bilo nakon izbora, bilo s istim zakonodavnim tijelom. Autori se nadaju da će ovaj rad pridonijeti obogaćivanju ustavne prakse formiranja parlamentarnih vlada i razvoju doktrine tumačenja ustava.
This paper provides a study of the new law on divorce from a public law perspective; it identifies a number of issues which are worth analysing from the point of view of Constitutional Law and Administrative Law. These comprise the obligatory referendum mechanism, the relevance of the Interpretation Act1 to the making of regulations under the divorce law, the formulation of a Henry VIII clause empowering the Prime Minister to amend primary legislation through subsidiary law, the administrative law issue of continuing to task mediators with non-mediation functions, that is, to act as conciliators, the lack of a definition of key terms such as 'domicile' and 'ordinary residence' and, generally, the drafting style of the divorce law, dedicating particular attention to its very first provision. The author will argue that the divorce law could have been a better product from a legislative point of view if certain improvements suggested in this paper were incorporated therein. ; peer-reviewed
