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Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran's asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran's claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents' perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence.

Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran's asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran's claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents' perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence.

Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran's asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran's claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents' perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence.

Bazdarandagi: Unconventional Deterrence Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran The subject investigated in this paper is twofold. Despite the fact that Iran is considered to be a significant threat to Western security, Iranian strategy of deterrence draws little attention from Western analysts. Deterrence theory, however, still largely focuses on nuclear weapons or conventional warfare and pays little attention to unconventional warfare, despite it being ever increasingly practiced in recent conflicts. In the rare cases when Iranian deterrence strategy is mentioned, the tactics considered are mostly conventional. This is despite Iran's asymmetric capabilities and experience being well known, as they are not viewed as being part of deterrence. Therefore, Iran's claims of employing deterrence and their asymmetric capabilities are analysed exclusively of each other. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the unconventional deterrence strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main objectives of this paper are to assess: existent literature on deterrence and unconventional deterrence, highlighting the shortcomings of the theory; whether or not Iran is exercising unconventional deterrence; the roles of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force and Basij in Iranian deterrence; the role of proxy groups in deterrence. Case analysis is conducted using criteria found in deterrence theory. Sufficient capabilities to deliver threats, credibility of threats and direct communication of threats were most frequently cited in theory as the vital components of deterrence strategy. These criteria have been broadened to be more suitable for an unconventional deterrence strategy, adding aspects vital to successful unconventional warfare. Deterrence methods of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment have also been taken into consideration. This research shows that Iran most likely has sufficient capabilities to issue threats of unconventional warfare as its forces are well suited to conduct this type of warfare. Yet, it is impossible to determine whether Iranian forces are sufficient in number, as their exact size is purposefully hidden, most likely to create an illusion of sufficient capabilities from their opponents' perspective. Other than military capabilities, Iran has strategic depth and a society prepared for unconventional warfare, increasing the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Regarding credibility, Iran appears to be credible in its threat to conduct asymmetric warfare, as it has multiple historic precedents of employing such methods and has conducted various exercises. Tehran also fulfils the criteria of ideology, required to convince soldiers to sacrifice, as well as strategies for unifying forces, society and ideology in the event of war. In addition, the fact that the aggressor, the US, views Iranian threat of asymmetric warfare as a possibility suggests credibility. Regarding communication, Iran does not appear to be communicating its threats as clearly as deterrence theory requires. Despite Iranian decision makers and military officials being clear in stating what behaviour they would not tolerate, the promised threat of unconventional warfare is rarely stated clearly. This case study demonstrates that what is considered by the West to be aggressive tools (for example, proxy groups or, recently declared a terrorist organisation, the IRGC) could also be interpreted as deterrents. Given the heightened tensions between the US and Iran, it is imperative to pay close attention to the way Iran actually conducts its military strategy. Considering the ever-increasing use of unconventional tactics, it is crucial to improve understanding of the role of unconventional warfare in contemporary deterrence.

Since Islamic Revolution in 1979 relations between Iran and international community are tensed. Though current situation, which could be described as impasse, has emerged just in the 2002, when the scope of Iran's nuclear capabilities was first made public by the Iranian opposition group. Still the 2005 could be considered as a date, when Iran's and international communities relations gained current structure. In the 2005 new president M.Ahmedi-Nejad has been elected and nuclear works were resumed. Whereupon Iran is demonstrating determinacy to continue its nuclear enrichment and officials who are involved in decision making process are using aggressive rhetoric in account to U.S. an Israel. Though mentioned rhetoric is directed towards U.S. and Israel, other interrelated countries have arrogated these signals to themselves. And they were understood completely different: from assessment that their meaning is coincident with Iran's peaceful purpose declaration to judgement that they are direct menace towards Western world. Consequently the assessment of Iran's behaviour and intentions became complicated and that happened for several reasons: first, Iran's rhetoric is controversial – averment that nuclear programme is peaceful logically don't merge with declared willingness to destroy opponents. Second, rhetoric and behaviour don't match - peaceful programme doesn't go with a concealment of nuclear activities. Third, political assessment still rest upon realism postulates that only materialistic factors form foreign politics. In such manner ideological factors are considered not influential. Still in the context of the Islamic Republic their influence could be count not only in cognitive level, but also they could be considered as one of the official formers of the foreign policy. So the main objective of the paper is to find out the type of the strategy Iran is performing. The answer is it offensive or defensive strategy, will also make clear if Iran's strategy causes potential threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East Region and Israel state or not. As the objects of analysis have been chosen Iran's nuclear programme, rhetoric and strategic context. In the process of Iran's strategic context analysis, the main motives there excluded which could form defensive and offensive strategies. And then these motives were checked in the context of Iran's materialistic and ideological capabilities. For the purpose to find out, if Iran has enough material recourses and doesn't have ideological restraints to follow the motives. Obviously, Iran's behaviour and rhetoric is correlated with it's ambitions and inner and outer threats that the state encountered. So its nuclear programme could be considered as an aggressive mobilization programme, but also could be seen as the deffensive strategy and as an action taken to realize its ambitions. Comprehensive analysis of the material Iran's capabilities has recovered that Iran still doesn't have mass destruction weapons, still Iran is producing a wide range of middle and long range ballistic missiles, what means that Iran while attacked will defend itself not only in the zone of the attack but also will try to revenge. Comprehensive analysis of ideological Iran's capabilities has shown that Iran's ambitions are restricted by the functionating system of religious and cultural ideas, which has a power of law in Islamic Republic of Iran. Which means that the defence is obligatory for everyone, but the offence can't be prosecuted while imam Mahdi is in occultation. Present leadership is limited in their decisions: they are not allowed to declare offensive jihad. In conclusion it could be said that Iran is not causing potential threat, still it's deterrence, provocation or coercion strategy can cause limited danger. Still the situation will dramatically change if Iran would be attacked. His defence can hurt interests at least of the countires in the Middle East region.

Since Islamic Revolution in 1979 relations between Iran and international community are tensed. Though current situation, which could be described as impasse, has emerged just in the 2002, when the scope of Iran's nuclear capabilities was first made public by the Iranian opposition group. Still the 2005 could be considered as a date, when Iran's and international communities relations gained current structure. In the 2005 new president M.Ahmedi-Nejad has been elected and nuclear works were resumed. Whereupon Iran is demonstrating determinacy to continue its nuclear enrichment and officials who are involved in decision making process are using aggressive rhetoric in account to U.S. an Israel. Though mentioned rhetoric is directed towards U.S. and Israel, other interrelated countries have arrogated these signals to themselves. And they were understood completely different: from assessment that their meaning is coincident with Iran's peaceful purpose declaration to judgement that they are direct menace towards Western world. Consequently the assessment of Iran's behaviour and intentions became complicated and that happened for several reasons: first, Iran's rhetoric is controversial – averment that nuclear programme is peaceful logically don't merge with declared willingness to destroy opponents. Second, rhetoric and behaviour don't match - peaceful programme doesn't go with a concealment of nuclear activities. Third, political assessment still rest upon realism postulates that only materialistic factors form foreign politics. In such manner ideological factors are considered not influential. Still in the context of the Islamic Republic their influence could be count not only in cognitive level, but also they could be considered as one of the official formers of the foreign policy. So the main objective of the paper is to find out the type of the strategy Iran is performing. The answer is it offensive or defensive strategy, will also make clear if Iran's strategy causes potential threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East Region and Israel state or not. As the objects of analysis have been chosen Iran's nuclear programme, rhetoric and strategic context. In the process of Iran's strategic context analysis, the main motives there excluded which could form defensive and offensive strategies. And then these motives were checked in the context of Iran's materialistic and ideological capabilities. For the purpose to find out, if Iran has enough material recourses and doesn't have ideological restraints to follow the motives. Obviously, Iran's behaviour and rhetoric is correlated with it's ambitions and inner and outer threats that the state encountered. So its nuclear programme could be considered as an aggressive mobilization programme, but also could be seen as the deffensive strategy and as an action taken to realize its ambitions. Comprehensive analysis of the material Iran's capabilities has recovered that Iran still doesn't have mass destruction weapons, still Iran is producing a wide range of middle and long range ballistic missiles, what means that Iran while attacked will defend itself not only in the zone of the attack but also will try to revenge. Comprehensive analysis of ideological Iran's capabilities has shown that Iran's ambitions are restricted by the functionating system of religious and cultural ideas, which has a power of law in Islamic Republic of Iran. Which means that the defence is obligatory for everyone, but the offence can't be prosecuted while imam Mahdi is in occultation. Present leadership is limited in their decisions: they are not allowed to declare offensive jihad. In conclusion it could be said that Iran is not causing potential threat, still it's deterrence, provocation or coercion strategy can cause limited danger. Still the situation will dramatically change if Iran would be attacked. His defence can hurt interests at least of the countires in the Middle East region.

It should be noted that any military action against Iran would receive not only a fierce response, but also revenge. For this purpose, Iran is preparing its weaponry and developing state and non-state networks in both the Middle East and beyond. The article is concluded with the statement that the current Iranian threat lies, first, in its ability to incite countries in the region against the U.S. and Israel and, second, in the Iranian defense capabilities. Presumably, the Iranian foreign policy is not directed towards attacking the U.S. and Israel. Apparently, the aggressive rhetoric, strong non-government and government ties, involvement in the management of Iraq and Afghanistan (and thus gained deterrent power) bring Iran to all its major foreign policy goals, and a direct attack would be difficult to rationalize not only in terms of the security policy, but also in regard to the religious doctrine.

It should be noted that any military action against Iran would receive not only a fierce response, but also revenge. For this purpose, Iran is preparing its weaponry and developing state and non-state networks in both the Middle East and beyond. The article is concluded with the statement that the current Iranian threat lies, first, in its ability to incite countries in the region against the U.S. and Israel and, second, in the Iranian defense capabilities. Presumably, the Iranian foreign policy is not directed towards attacking the U.S. and Israel. Apparently, the aggressive rhetoric, strong non-government and government ties, involvement in the management of Iraq and Afghanistan (and thus gained deterrent power) bring Iran to all its major foreign policy goals, and a direct attack would be difficult to rationalize not only in terms of the security policy, but also in regard to the religious doctrine.

It should be noted that any military action against Iran would receive not only a fierce response, but also revenge. For this purpose, Iran is preparing its weaponry and developing state and non-state networks in both the Middle East and beyond. The article is concluded with the statement that the current Iranian threat lies, first, in its ability to incite countries in the region against the U.S. and Israel and, second, in the Iranian defense capabilities. Presumably, the Iranian foreign policy is not directed towards attacking the U.S. and Israel. Apparently, the aggressive rhetoric, strong non-government and government ties, involvement in the management of Iraq and Afghanistan (and thus gained deterrent power) bring Iran to all its major foreign policy goals, and a direct attack would be difficult to rationalize not only in terms of the security policy, but also in regard to the religious doctrine.

It should be noted that any military action against Iran would receive not only a fierce response, but also revenge. For this purpose, Iran is preparing its weaponry and developing state and non-state networks in both the Middle East and beyond. The article is concluded with the statement that the current Iranian threat lies, first, in its ability to incite countries in the region against the U.S. and Israel and, second, in the Iranian defense capabilities. Presumably, the Iranian foreign policy is not directed towards attacking the U.S. and Israel. Apparently, the aggressive rhetoric, strong non-government and government ties, involvement in the management of Iraq and Afghanistan (and thus gained deterrent power) bring Iran to all its major foreign policy goals, and a direct attack would be difficult to rationalize not only in terms of the security policy, but also in regard to the religious doctrine.

The paper attempts to prove that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) due to the absence of mutual agreement between its permanent members and frequent usage of veto right, sanctions the usage of preventive self-defence notably rarely. The problem then occurs: because of the ineffectiveness of the UNSC in sanctioning the usage of preventive self-defence, the states implement the preventive self-defence by themselves, in this way violating one of the main international law principles – refraining from threatening or using force principle. This situation encouraged some big states (permanent members of the UNSC) to foresee the possibility to use unilateral preventive self-defence in their military doctrines in this way ignoring international law. The current situation requires dealing with this issue either legalizing the usage of preventive self-defence or searching for the ways how to force the UNSC to implement its primary task – to maintain international peace and security. The goal of the paper – to reveal the issues of the states' usage of preventive self-defence emphasizing the Middle East region. The following objectives have been formulated for achieving the goal: 1. To discuss the concept of refraining from threatening or using force principle, the consolidation of this principle in contemporary law as well as analysis of exceptions. 2. To analyze the types of states' self-defence and find Lithuanian equivalents to English terms of states' self-defence types: preemptive and preventive self-defence. 3. To analyze the demand and opportunities to legalize the unilateral usage of states' preventive self-defence. 4. To analyze the potential usage of preventive self-defence towards Iran. The object of this paper – the usage of the states' preventive self-defence. While determining the research boundaries, the object of the research has been stated - the possible usage of Israel's preventive self-defence towards Iran. The following issues have been addressed in the paper – should the right to use preventive self-defence be stated in the international law even in the case if UNSC would not sanction the usage of preventive military measures? The answer to the question is negative. It is feared that the legalizing of preventive self-defence could have irrecoverable consequences because each state would use preventive self-defence at own discretion and all this would not contribute to the UN efforts to ensure peace and security in the world. It is recommended to deal with the current situation not by legalizing preventive self-defence but by increasing the UNSC efficiency in analyzing and sanctioning the usage of preventive force. Three institutional models that enable to increase the efficiency of the UNSC directly and indirectly while dealing with the usage of preventive force issues and sanctioning it are analyzed in the paper. The possible usage of Israel's preventive self-defence towards Iran was analyzed during the survey. It was assessed whether there were assumptions for Israel to attack Iran and if Israel will eventually attack Iran despite the fact that this kind of attack would be unlawful according to the international law. The historical comparative method was used while answering the question. The bombing of the Iraqi Osirak reactor by the Israeli Air Force in 1981 was analyzed and Iraq's nuclear programme assessed. The author claims that all assumptions for Israel to attack Iran do exist – Israel suspects that Iran is making nuclear weapon and that it will be used against Israel. At present Israel is deterred from attacking only because of the USA position and the absence of the precise data regarding Iran nuclear objects. In the course of the time the USA position can change and the data (reasoned or not) regarding Iran nuclear objects' location can occur. If it happens, in this case it is possible that Israel will decide to attack Iran.

The paper attempts to prove that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) due to the absence of mutual agreement between its permanent members and frequent usage of veto right, sanctions the usage of preventive self-defence notably rarely. The problem then occurs: because of the ineffectiveness of the UNSC in sanctioning the usage of preventive self-defence, the states implement the preventive self-defence by themselves, in this way violating one of the main international law principles – refraining from threatening or using force principle. This situation encouraged some big states (permanent members of the UNSC) to foresee the possibility to use unilateral preventive self-defence in their military doctrines in this way ignoring international law. The current situation requires dealing with this issue either legalizing the usage of preventive self-defence or searching for the ways how to force the UNSC to implement its primary task – to maintain international peace and security. The goal of the paper – to reveal the issues of the states' usage of preventive self-defence emphasizing the Middle East region. The following objectives have been formulated for achieving the goal: 1. To discuss the concept of refraining from threatening or using force principle, the consolidation of this principle in contemporary law as well as analysis of exceptions. 2. To analyze the types of states' self-defence and find Lithuanian equivalents to English terms of states' self-defence types: preemptive and preventive self-defence. 3. To analyze the demand and opportunities to legalize the unilateral usage of states' preventive self-defence. 4. To analyze the potential usage of preventive self-defence towards Iran. The object of this paper – the usage of the states' preventive self-defence. While determining the research boundaries, the object of the research has been stated - the possible usage of Israel's preventive self-defence towards Iran. The following issues have been addressed in the paper – should the right to use preventive self-defence be stated in the international law even in the case if UNSC would not sanction the usage of preventive military measures? The answer to the question is negative. It is feared that the legalizing of preventive self-defence could have irrecoverable consequences because each state would use preventive self-defence at own discretion and all this would not contribute to the UN efforts to ensure peace and security in the world. It is recommended to deal with the current situation not by legalizing preventive self-defence but by increasing the UNSC efficiency in analyzing and sanctioning the usage of preventive force. Three institutional models that enable to increase the efficiency of the UNSC directly and indirectly while dealing with the usage of preventive force issues and sanctioning it are analyzed in the paper. The possible usage of Israel's preventive self-defence towards Iran was analyzed during the survey. It was assessed whether there were assumptions for Israel to attack Iran and if Israel will eventually attack Iran despite the fact that this kind of attack would be unlawful according to the international law. The historical comparative method was used while answering the question. The bombing of the Iraqi Osirak reactor by the Israeli Air Force in 1981 was analyzed and Iraq's nuclear programme assessed. The author claims that all assumptions for Israel to attack Iran do exist – Israel suspects that Iran is making nuclear weapon and that it will be used against Israel. At present Israel is deterred from attacking only because of the USA position and the absence of the precise data regarding Iran nuclear objects. In the course of the time the USA position can change and the data (reasoned or not) regarding Iran nuclear objects' location can occur. If it happens, in this case it is possible that Israel will decide to attack Iran.

The paper attempts to prove that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) due to the absence of mutual agreement between its permanent members and frequent usage of veto right, sanctions the usage of preventive self-defence notably rarely. The problem then occurs: because of the ineffectiveness of the UNSC in sanctioning the usage of preventive self-defence, the states implement the preventive self-defence by themselves, in this way violating one of the main international law principles – refraining from threatening or using force principle. This situation encouraged some big states (permanent members of the UNSC) to foresee the possibility to use unilateral preventive self-defence in their military doctrines in this way ignoring international law. The current situation requires dealing with this issue either legalizing the usage of preventive self-defence or searching for the ways how to force the UNSC to implement its primary task – to maintain international peace and security. The goal of the paper – to reveal the issues of the states' usage of preventive self-defence emphasizing the Middle East region. The following objectives have been formulated for achieving the goal: 1. To discuss the concept of refraining from threatening or using force principle, the consolidation of this principle in contemporary law as well as analysis of exceptions. 2. To analyze the types of states' self-defence and find Lithuanian equivalents to English terms of states' self-defence types: preemptive and preventive self-defence. 3. To analyze the demand and opportunities to legalize the unilateral usage of states' preventive self-defence. 4. To analyze the potential usage of preventive self-defence towards Iran. The object of this paper – the usage of the states' preventive self-defence. While determining the research boundaries, the object of the research has been stated - the possible usage of Israel's preventive self-defence towards Iran. The following issues have been addressed in the paper – should the right to use preventive self-defence be stated in the international law even in the case if UNSC would not sanction the usage of preventive military measures? The answer to the question is negative. It is feared that the legalizing of preventive self-defence could have irrecoverable consequences because each state would use preventive self-defence at own discretion and all this would not contribute to the UN efforts to ensure peace and security in the world. It is recommended to deal with the current situation not by legalizing preventive self-defence but by increasing the UNSC efficiency in analyzing and sanctioning the usage of preventive force. Three institutional models that enable to increase the efficiency of the UNSC directly and indirectly while dealing with the usage of preventive force issues and sanctioning it are analyzed in the paper. The possible usage of Israel's preventive self-defence towards Iran was analyzed during the survey. It was assessed whether there were assumptions for Israel to attack Iran and if Israel will eventually attack Iran despite the fact that this kind of attack would be unlawful according to the international law. The historical comparative method was used while answering the question. The bombing of the Iraqi Osirak reactor by the Israeli Air Force in 1981 was analyzed and Iraq's nuclear programme assessed. The author claims that all assumptions for Israel to attack Iran do exist – Israel suspects that Iran is making nuclear weapon and that it will be used against Israel. At present Israel is deterred from attacking only because of the USA position and the absence of the precise data regarding Iran nuclear objects. In the course of the time the USA position can change and the data (reasoned or not) regarding Iran nuclear objects' location can occur. If it happens, in this case it is possible that Israel will decide to attack Iran.

The paper attempts to prove that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) due to the absence of mutual agreement between its permanent members and frequent usage of veto right, sanctions the usage of preventive self-defence notably rarely. The problem then occurs: because of the ineffectiveness of the UNSC in sanctioning the usage of preventive self-defence, the states implement the preventive self-defence by themselves, in this way violating one of the main international law principles – refraining from threatening or using force principle. This situation encouraged some big states (permanent members of the UNSC) to foresee the possibility to use unilateral preventive self-defence in their military doctrines in this way ignoring international law. The current situation requires dealing with this issue either legalizing the usage of preventive self-defence or searching for the ways how to force the UNSC to implement its primary task – to maintain international peace and security. The goal of the paper – to reveal the issues of the states' usage of preventive self-defence emphasizing the Middle East region. The following objectives have been formulated for achieving the goal: 1. To discuss the concept of refraining from threatening or using force principle, the consolidation of this principle in contemporary law as well as analysis of exceptions. 2. To analyze the types of states' self-defence and find Lithuanian equivalents to English terms of states' self-defence types: preemptive and preventive self-defence. 3. To analyze the demand and opportunities to legalize the unilateral usage of states' preventive self-defence. 4. To analyze the potential usage of preventive self-defence towards Iran. The object of this paper – the usage of the states' preventive self-defence. While determining the research boundaries, the object of the research has been stated - the possible usage of Israel's preventive self-defence towards Iran. The following issues have been addressed in the paper – should the right to use preventive self-defence be stated in the international law even in the case if UNSC would not sanction the usage of preventive military measures? The answer to the question is negative. It is feared that the legalizing of preventive self-defence could have irrecoverable consequences because each state would use preventive self-defence at own discretion and all this would not contribute to the UN efforts to ensure peace and security in the world. It is recommended to deal with the current situation not by legalizing preventive self-defence but by increasing the UNSC efficiency in analyzing and sanctioning the usage of preventive force. Three institutional models that enable to increase the efficiency of the UNSC directly and indirectly while dealing with the usage of preventive force issues and sanctioning it are analyzed in the paper. The possible usage of Israel's preventive self-defence towards Iran was analyzed during the survey. It was assessed whether there were assumptions for Israel to attack Iran and if Israel will eventually attack Iran despite the fact that this kind of attack would be unlawful according to the international law. The historical comparative method was used while answering the question. The bombing of the Iraqi Osirak reactor by the Israeli Air Force in 1981 was analyzed and Iraq's nuclear programme assessed. The author claims that all assumptions for Israel to attack Iran do exist – Israel suspects that Iran is making nuclear weapon and that it will be used against Israel. At present Israel is deterred from attacking only because of the USA position and the absence of the precise data regarding Iran nuclear objects. In the course of the time the USA position can change and the data (reasoned or not) regarding Iran nuclear objects' location can occur. If it happens, in this case it is possible that Israel will decide to attack Iran.