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"International commercial arbitration and litigation are often seen as competing fora, fields of law, or markets. This intersection is at its highest at the forefront of any proceedings, at the jurisdictional stage. The analysis of jurisdictional issues at the forefront of an arbitration has been confined in a descriptive analysis of the law and jurisprudence, dealing with jurisdictional intersections almost in a mechanistic manner. These are not, however, issues which can be treated as mere mechanical rules. They are issues pertaining to core notions of authority, sovereignty, their origins and their allocation. At the same time, the pragmatic and practical domination of party autonomy is a fact which cannot be disregarded when one considers the normative and theoretical foundations of any model of dealing with these issues. This book moves beyond an analysis of arbitration and jurisdiction clauses to reconcile theory and practice, and provides an underlying theoretical model to explain and regulate jurisdictional intersections at the early stages of an arbitration from a private international law perspective. It combines both an in-depth engagement with the theoretical literature as well as a close examination and analysis of its practical consequences in the form of a restatement of the law of England and Wales. From a methodological perspective, it utilises contemporary theories in private international law to propose a coherent model of regulating arbitral jurisdictions which promotes autonomy and freedom of the parties at this stage. Demonstrating how the theoretical model can be applied in practice and second to provide a basis for a potential future top-down or bottom-up approach of adopting the proposed model, it includes a succinct and practical codification of the current state of affairs in relation to the whole spectrum of jurisdictional issues in England and Wales to serve as a useful tool for practitioners considering jurisdictional issues both from the perspective of State courts and from the perspective of arbitral tribunals, as well as academics researching in these areas"--

"This examination of the jurisdiction of international courts and the admissibility of cases before them analyses jurisdictional and admissibility rules in light of the roles assumed by international courts in international life and in light of the roles that jurisdictional and admissibility rules play in promoting the effectiveness and legitimacy of international courts. The theory pursued views jurisdiction as a form of delegation of power (the power to exercise judicial power and decide the law) and regards admissibility as a framework for deciding upon the propriety of exercising such power. On the basis of this theoretical framework, the author critically evaluates the exercise of judicial discretion in the existing case law of a variety of international courts, distinguishing between the category-based case selection implicit in jurisdictional rules and the case-by-case analysis and selection implicit in rules on admissibility"--

In this chapter, the concept of jurisdiction as exercised by states (or regional organizations such as the European Union) is analysed. Such jurisdiction is concerned with the reach of a state's law: what link, if any, is required for a state to apply its laws to situations and persons? Jurisdiction is an aspect of a state's sovereignty, as the right to prescribe and enforce laws is an essential component of statehood. In the classic Westphalian understanding, this right has been limited to a state's territory, a limitation that at the same time ensures that no state intervenes in another state's affairs (2.1). This idea is no longer strictly applied, if it ever was. Exceptions that allow for limited extra-territorial jurisdiction have been carved out, and, moreover, the territoriality principle has been construed rather liberally (2.2). To be true, some states employ a rather strict presumption that the legislature does not normally intend to apply its laws extra-territorially, but such a presumption does not limit the discretion of the legislature to do just that if it so desires (2.3). The overlapping assertions that result from multiple states' invocation of permissive principles of jurisdiction may almost unavoidably result in international friction. This friction may be mitigated by a 'rule of reason', which instructs courts and regulators to balance the interests and connections of the case with the different states involved (2.4).

In this ground-breaking study, taken on the initiative of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Thomas M. Franck, and Gregory H. Fox explore the use of international law decisions by national courts, providing in-depth materials for answers to such critical and practical questions as: To what extent do national judges treat the decisions of their international colleagues as binding or persuasive? Do national judges regard the outcomes of international decisions as res judicata? As evidence of law or fact? Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint

It has been said that consent is the cornerstone of international law. Even if, strictly speaking, the progression of international lawmaking has taken us beyond that view on matters of substance, surely the proposition maintains traction on matters of jurisdiction. The increase in international treaties conferring courts and tribunals with competence to resolve disputes has tied many states to the mast, but, like Odysseus, we must remember that the origin of that conferral is consent.

"This book explores the debate over universal jurisdiction in international criminal law, aiming to unpack a practice in which international lawyers continue to disagree over the concept of universal jurisdiction. Using Martti Koskenniemi's work as a foil, this book exposes the argumentative techniques in operation in national and international adjudication since the 1990s. Drawing on overarching patterns within the debate, [the author] argues that it is bounded by a tension between contrasting political preferences or positions, labelled as moralist ('ending impunity') and formalist ('avoiding abuse') and she reads the debate as a movement of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic positions that struggle for hegemonic control. However, she draws out how these positions (moralist/formalist) merge into one another and this produces a tendency towards a "middle" position that continues to prefer a particular preference (moralist or formalist). Aisling O'Sullivan then traces the transformation towards this tendency that reflects an internal split among international lawyers between building a utopia ("court of humanity") and recognizing its impossibility of being realized

Comment and correspondence: 161-3 Ag, 252-3 S '60.

When, on October 24, 1983, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California handed down its decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America and denied U.S. jurisdiction out of regard for the Honduran "system of justice," there may have been some surprise that the case was still pending. The Timberlane decision of 1976 of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the matter to the district court, had already become a classic, even though it was preceded by the 1968 decision in United States v. First National City Bank on the production of documents located abroad. The Timberlane approach outlined by Judge Choy, under which the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction has to be restrained by a case-by-case analysis of various factors, was widely discussed (and usually praised) in legal writing, and was also followed by federal courts of the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.