Suchergebnisse

USA hadde ingen doktriner for opprørsbekjempelse (COIN) da operasjonene i Afghanistan og Irak startet. Mens krigene pågikk ble det, til tross for stor uenighet, innført en slik doktrine i 2007. Krigene førte også til både endringer i organisering og utrustning av amerikanske styrker, og til store endringer av planlagte investeringer av militært ustyr. Begge krigene endte i nederlag, og i tiden etter har USA på ny fokusert på stormaktsrivalisering. Men utgiftene til krigføringen i Afghanistan og Irak, og endringene i investeringsmønster, har svekket USAs evne til å konkurrere militært med Kina og Russland.
Abstract in EnglishAfghanistan, Iraq and the Development of US Military PowerThe United States had no doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq started in 2001 and 2003, respectively. In 2001 the US armed forces were designed for Great Power competition and conflict. During the course of the wars, substantial changes were made in the organization and equipment of the forces, and a COIN doctrine was introduced in 2007. In turn, large scale modernization of, and investments in, equipment suited for Great Power conflict were reduced in scale or cancelled. The cost of the wars and the changes in operational focus have blunted the US's ability to compete militarily with China and Russia.

Det er gått en generasjon siden krigen i Bosnia-Hercegovina var over. Likevel lever landets innbyggere fortsatt i fattigdom og frustrasjon. Det kan virke som et mysterium at Bosnias stabile politiske elite holder seg ved makten i valgperiode etter valgperiode, uten å bli alvorlig utfordret. Dette på tross av at de jevnlig er involvert i korrupsjonsskandaler som tapper staten for ressurser, hindrer en velfungerende administrasjon og ødelegger tilliten mellom borgerne. Hva er det politikerne gir sine velgere, når de ikke kan gi dem fremskritt og velstand? En viktig del av svaret er: ideen om «etnisk rene» stater. Denne ideen betinger fortsatt mye av politikken i Bosnia-Hercegovina så vel som i flere av de andre jugoslaviske etterfølgerstatene. Aktører utenfra utnytter dette for å oppnå egne mål. Spesielt ser det ut som om Republika Srpskas sterke mann, Milorad Dodik, får russisk hjelp i stadige forsøk på å ytterligere sementere etniske skillelinjer i Bosnias statsordning. Men like lite som på 1990-tallet gir ideen om etnisk separasjon svar på hvordan landene i regionen kan oppnå velstand og leve i fred med naboene.
Abstract in English:«Isto sranje, novo pakovanje». 25 Years after Srebrenica: The Idea of Ethnically Pure States Still Influential in Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 years have passed since the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In spite of this, the citizens live in poverty and frustration. It is hard to grasp how Bosnia's enduring political elite can stay in power without being seriously challenged. Even though they regularly figure in corruption scandals that drain the state's resources, hobble the administration and institutions and destroy mutual trust within the population. What, then, do the politicians offer their voters, when they cannot deliver progress and prosperity? A key part of the answer is: the idea of an 'ethnically pure' state. This idea still has a large impact on politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in the other Yugoslav successor states. External actors are exploiting the idea for their own purposes; in particular it seems the Republika Srpska strongman, Milorad Dodik, is getting Russian help in his continuing endeavour to further cement ethnic divisions in Bosnia. But just like in the 1990s, the idea of ethnic separation fails to offer solutions as to how the region's countries can become prosperous and live in peace with their neighbours.

Artikkelen ser på mulighetene og utfordringene med avskrekking som strategisk tilnærming til det stadig viktigere cyberdomenet, fra et småstatsperspektiv. Forfatterne argumenterer for at det er essensielt å opprette og ansvarliggjøre en multinasjonal og multidepartemental/-sektoriell cyberorganisasjon for at reell cyberavskrekking skal være mulig å generere.
Innledningsvis beskriver artikkelen den klassiske og utvidete oppfatningen av avskrekking, og hvilke kriterier som må ligge til grunn for å kunne oppnå avskrekkende effekt: kapasitet, kredibilitet og evnen til å kommunisere effektivt. Sett fra et globalt sikkerhetsperspektiv har muligheten til å generere avskrekkende effekt vært med på å forme verden, spesielt i perioden 1945 til 1990. Kompleksiteten i sikkerhetssektoren har imidlertid økt signifikant siden da, mye grunnet økt global konnektivitet og fremveksten av cyberdomenet.
Artikkelen diskuterer hvordan kriteriene for avskrekking utfordres når strategien skal appliseres i cyberdomenet, med fokus på problemene knyttet til antallet aktører/vektorer, ulike motiver for handlinger, manglende felles grunnlag som utgangspunkt for å adressere utfordringene, og forskjellig oppfatning omkring attribusjon og proporsjonalitetsprinsippet. Forfatterne fremholder at disse utfordringene gjør det vanskeligere, men desto viktigere å identifisere hvordan man kan generere avskrekking i cyberdomenet – spesielt for høyteknologiske småstater, som Norge. Å håndtere dette på en god måte forutsetter at man ser på bredden av avskrekkingsteori i sammenheng over tid, og småstater må erkjenne sine svakheter og spille på sine styrker. Anbefalingene som fremlegges, er åpningstrekk som gjør nettopp dette, og som samtidig bereder grunnen for å dra veksler på komplementære effekter av ulike dimensjoner ved avskrekkingststrategi på lengre sikt.
Abstract in English
This article explores the possibilities and challenges associated with deterrence as strategy in the increasingly significant cyber-domain, from a small state perspective. The authors argue that genuine cyber-deterrence is contingent upon the creation of an accountable cyberorganization, with a multinational and multi-departmental/sectorial composition.
The article addresses classical and broader deterrence, and the criterions that must be met in order to successfully deter; capability, credibility, and the ability to communicate effectively. From a global perspective, the ability to generate effective deterrence has been key to shape the international security landscape in the period from 1945 to 1990. However, the complexity of the security sector has increased significantly since then – much due to the seemingly ever-growing global connectedness and the emergence of the cyber-domain.
The article further explores and discusses how the criteria for effective deterrence is tested when applied to the cyber-domain, with emphasis on the problems associated with the number of actors/vectors, varying motives for actions, the lack of a shared conceptual foundation as a basis to address the challenges, and differing opinions concerning attribution and proportionality. The authors argue that these problems make it difficult, but thus the more important to identify how to generate effective deterrence in the cyber-domain – especially for high-tech small states such as Norway. Effective management of the problem-complex requires exploration of the whole range of deterrence theory over time, and small states must recognize their inherent weaknesses and play to their strengths. The recommendation put forth here is an initial move which allows just that, and which at the same time sets the stage for more elaborate strategies that exploit the complementary effects of different dimensions of and approaches to deterrence.

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.