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Ecological justice concerns the distribution of environments between life forms. This paper seeks to integrate this concept with Barry's theory of justice as impartiality. The latter aims to be a theory of justice that is impartial between substantive theories of the good. Issues of ecological justice are noted within Barry's theory, but are subsumed under one such substantive theory of the good, namely, ecocentrism. This subsumption of ecological justice under a substantive theory of the good turns out to imply that justice as impartiality on Barry's account is readily compatible with the extermination of other species -- if, for example, ecocentrism has few supporters. However, the concept of the "community of justice" can be separated from substantive conceptions of the good & used to develop a version of justice as impartiality, which builds ecological justice into its foundations, thereby making the justice of exterminations much harder to establish. Doing this requires pondering further the ideas of fairness & reasonable agreement in the contract situation, which is central to Barry's theory, & focusing upon the various "inarticulates" who are unable to defend their interests in contract situations. It is clear that justice as impartiality cannot avoid substantive moral dispute over such matters. 18 References. Adapted from the source document.

As more people are becoming politically engaged, the concept of social justice is rapidly becoming a hot topic. Help students learn about the concept of justice and how it relates to their lives. This book highlights not only the importance of justice but also the ways the criminal justice system can be unfair to minority groups. Students will learn about how unconscious biases affect the justice system and how they can combat them. With simple, accessible text, this book tackles the complicated topic of justice and teaches students how they can help create a better, more just society.

In the fields of planning theory and human geography, there is a growing discussion of the just city. The impression is that in order to continue the discussion of the crucial issue of the just city, certain methodological considerations and precautions are necessary. The article is focused on three in particular: (a) (urban) institutions as the first subject of justice, (b) the incomplete overlap between social justice and distributive justice, (c) the distinction between the concept and the conceptions of social justice. The impression is that these three issues are not always recognised, or at least not always to the fullest extent, in the current debate in planning theory.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Series Preface -- Introduction -- Part I The Concept of Justice -- 1 T.D. Campbell (1974), 'Humanity before Justice', British Journal of Political Science, 4, pp. 1-16 -- 2 Loren E. Lomasky (1995), 'Justice to Charity', Social Philosophy and Policy, 12, pp. 32-53 -- 3 Joel Feinberg (1974), 'Noncomparative Justice', Philosophical Review, 83, pp. 297-338 -- 4 Phillip Montague (1980), 'Comparative and Non-comparative Justice', Philosophical Quarterly, 30, pp. 131-40 -- Part II Justice - Desert - Redistribution -- 5 Michael A. Slote (1973), 'Desert, Consent, and Justice', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2, pp. 323-47 -- 6 Christopher Ake (1975), 'Justice as Equality', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 5, pp. 69-89 -- 7 Julian Lamont (1995), 'Problems for Effort-Based Distribution Principles', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 12, pp. 215-29 -- 8 Robert E. Goodin (1985), 'Negating Positive Desert Claims', Political Theory, 13, pp. 575-98 -- 9 Francis Snare (1986), 'Misfortune and Injustice: On Being Disadvantaged', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16, pp. 39-61 -- 10 Alan H. Goldman (1987), 'Real People (Natural Differences and the Scope of Justice)', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17, pp. 377-93 -- Part III Political Liberalism and Justice -- 11 John Rawls (1989), 'The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', New York University Law Review, 64, pp. 233-55 -- 12 John Rawls (1997), 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', University of Chicago Law Review, 64, pp. 765-807 -- 13 William A. Galston (1989), 'Pluralism and Social Unity', Ethics, 99, pp. 711-26 -- 14 Kurt Baier (1989), 'Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy', Ethics, 99, pp. 771-90 -- 15 Michael J. Sandel (1994), 'Political Liberalism', Harvard Law Review, 107, pp. 1765-94

pt. I. Foundations of environmental justice : race and the distribution of risk -- pt. II. New directions in environmental justice : beyond equitable risk -- pt. III. International and integenerational environmental justice -- pt. IV. Applied environmental justice : resources, climate and food.

AbstractThis symposium seeks to generate fresh theoretical thinking about the relations between justice and law. In particular, it aims to reappraise justice conceptually by insisting on a theoretical openness to justice within and beyond law, and indeed against law. The symposium's articles conceive justice and law both within their plurality and variety and in their own terms and relations. The symposium carries the inquiry into fields beyond defined categories so as to reveal some of the social, political, and ethical ideas, registers, and concealed forces at work and at stake in the domain of justice.

Studie se zabývá vztahy legalismu (zákona) a justice (práva) v teoretické i aplikativní rovině. Autor navazuje na text analyzující terminologickou disparátnost relace v anglojazyčné oblasti (viz POSPÍŠIL, L. "Law" equals "ius" and "lex": The Major Problem of Anglo-Saxon Theories of Law, Studia Ethnologica Pragensia, 2012, 1, pp. 21–28.) a pojednává o problematice v širších kulturních souvislostech. L. Pospíšil soudí, že právo reflektuje sociální strukturu každé společnosti, která prostřednictvím příslušných pravidel (zákonů) realizuje sociální kontrolu. Právní pravidla byla (jsou) v obecné rovině vnímána jako doporučení ovliňující právní rozhodování příslušných orgánů, vykonavatelů státní moci (viz právní systémy Číny, Mezopotamie, Egypta, Řecka, Atétů, Inků atd.). Ve společnostech budovaných na demokratických principech se zohledňovala (zohledňuje) zásada "rovnosti před zákonem", zatímco v autokratických (diktátorských) politických systémech byla (jsou) právní rozhodnutí činěna především v souladů se zájmy reprezentantů moci.

Studie se zabývá vztahy legalismu (zákona) a justice (práva) v teoretické i aplikativní rovině. Autor navazuje na text analyzující terminologickou disparátnost relace v anglojazyčné oblasti (viz POSPÍŠIL, L. "Law" equals "ius" and "lex": The Major Problem of Anglo-Saxon Theories of Law, Studia Ethnologica Pragensia, 2012, 1, pp. 21–28.) a pojednává o problematice v širších kulturních souvislostech. L. Pospíšil soudí, že právo reflektuje sociální strukturu každé společnosti, která prostřednictvím příslušných pravidel (zákonů) realizuje sociální kontrolu. Právní pravidla byla (jsou) v obecné rovině vnímána jako doporučení ovliňující právní rozhodování příslušných orgánů, vykonavatelů státní moci (viz právní systémy Číny, Mezopotamie, Egypta, Řecka, Atétů, Inků atd.). Ve společnostech budovaných na demokratických principech se zohledňovala (zohledňuje) zásada "rovnosti před zákonem", zatímco v autokratických (diktátorských) politických systémech byla (jsou) právní rozhodnutí činěna především v souladů se zájmy reprezentantů moci. ; 11 ; 26

AbstractThis article reflects upon the ways in which transitional justice debates and processes impacted Tunisia's transition. It explores key questions such as what demands for justice emerged in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution? Did Tunisia's transitional justice process reflect these demands? And, did international norms of transitional justice, which emerged from a field of practice that draws heavily upon European, Latin America and Sub‐Saharan experiences, but has largely excluded the Arab Middle East, serve to mediate between competing demands for justice in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution? It will be argued that transitional justice demands in Tunisia reflected a breakdown in the state–society socioeconomic bargain, which had maintained autocratic regimes since independence in 1956; however, due to the elite‐centred nature of transitional justice discourses, many transitional justice demands never resonated into mainstream transitional justice discourse. We will argue that international transitional justice entrepreneurs' attempt to import a normative framework that was ill suited to grapple with the complex legacies of socioeconomic marginalization, resulted in a growing disillusionment and disengagement from the state driven transitional justice process on the part of Tunisian society.