CAB [U.S. civil aeronautics board] falling into rate pothole
In: National journal reports, Band 7, S. 669
ISSN: 0091-3685
In: National journal reports, Band 7, S. 669
ISSN: 0091-3685
In: National journal reports, Band 6, S. 1851
ISSN: 0091-3685
In: National journal reports, Band 7, S. 279
ISSN: 0091-3685
In: Forschungsberichte des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge 1
In: Der Staat: wie viel Herrschaft braucht der Mensch?, S. 217-236
Am Beispiel von Daniel Defoes Figur Robinson zeigt der Verfasser, dass das, was ihn während der unglaublich langen Zeit in der Einsamkeit aufrechterhält, gerade nicht ein naturwüchsiges Selbstvertrauen und ein konventionsloser Nonkonformismus sind, sondern die Segnungen der Zivilisation, die er - mangels Zivilisation - in Form von Ritualen und Konventionen in seinem unvergleichlichen Leben installiert. Robinson entwickelt sich zu einem exemplarischen Zwangsneurotiker. Er liebt und verehrt Konventionen. Er hält an ihnen fest, auch und gerade wenn ihnen jede reale Grundlage entzogen ist. Gerade die Abwesenheit des Staates verleiht dessen Symbolen, Ikonen und Ritualen eine übermächtige Präsenz und: verleiht rückwirkend dem Staat Transzendenz - vergleichbar der Präsenz und Transzendenz eines abwesenden Gottes. Robinson ist nicht nur Herrscher und Volk, er ist auch der Priester des vergöttlichten Staates. Nicht ein individueller Anarchismus wird im Robinson Crusoe besungen: Die Vorteile einer alle und zwar tatsächlich alle menschlichen Tätigkeiten regelnden Organisation werden in einem 'Labor' aufgeführt und vorgeführt, eine nach der anderen geprüft und sämtliche als gut empfohlen. Robinson Crusoes Geschichte stellt sich als das Modell einer bis in ihre letzte Konsequenz durchdachten Totalisierung des Staates dar. Wenn sich der Staat auf eine einzige Person reduziert, füllt er diese Person zur Gänze aus und wird absolut. Der absolute Staat hat einen absoluten Herrscher, der vom absolut Höchsten eingesetzt wurde. (ICF2)
Just a few months after the federal elections in Germany, the so called pension package entered into force. It mainly contains three measures: higher pensions for mothers with children born before 1992 ("mother pension"), a reduced retirement age for persons who contributed to the pension system for at least 45 years ("pension with 63") and boost pensions of people who cannot work due to disability ("disability pensions augmentation"). In this paper, we derive the effects of these measures in a computable general equilibrium model on the contribution and replacement rates, as well as on employment, the capital stock and GDP. Furthermore, we analyse the welfare effects of these three measures. Our results indicate that the reforms induce a higher contribution rate, a lower replacement rate, as well as negative, but small employment, capital and GDP effects. Moreover, the strongest beneficiaries will be already retired persons, people between 50 and 65 years, who contributed to the pension system for at least 45 years, and people who will receive a disability pension in the future.
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Cast your students in the roles of reporters, lawyers, and detectives at the scene of a crime with this complete guide of detailed instructions and reproducibles. These interdisciplinary activities, based on an award-winning unit, help build valuable reasoning skills while developing knowledge in areas of language, science, history, and more.||Who did it? How did they do it? Why did they do it? How do you prove it? Cast your students in the roles of reporters, lawyers, and detectives at the scene of a crime with this complete guide of detailed instructions and reproducibles. Excitement builds
Das Gesetz über Leistungsverbesserungen in der Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung ist am 1.7.2014 in Kraft getreten. Zu einer Reduktion der Altersarmut - wie die Aussagen im Bundestagswahlkampf 2013 vermuten ließen - trägt zumindest die abschlagsfreie Rente mit 63 nicht bei. Die Autoren aus dem Sachverständigenrat Wirtschaft bewerten die einzelnen Maßnahmen des Gesetzes differenziert und befürchten hohe Mehrausgaben, die die Zukunftsfähigkeit des Rentensystems gefährden. ; In the summer of 2014 Germany will witness the most substantial expansion of pension expenditures since the 1950s. Yet, while this reform package was motivated mainly by the dismal prospect of rising old age poverty rates, it does little to alleviate this problem. On the contrary, its two central elements, an expansion of the pension claims of mothers whose children were born before 1992, and access to early retirement at age 63 for workers with a long insurance history, tend to benefi t rather privileged groups of the insured. These measures endanger the sustainability of the German pension system and will necessitate future generations to work even longer than would have been the case otherwise.
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There is an intensive debate about old-age poverty in Germany that has induced political parties to develop proposals for higher pensions of poor pensioners in light of the federal elections of September 2013. In addition, several proposals from economists aim at reforming the pension system in a way that mitigates oldage poverty. In this paper, we consider these proposals in a computable general equilibrium model in order to derive their effects on the income distribution, on employment, on the capital stock and on GDP. Our results indicate that negative employment, capital and GDP effects are induced by such reforms as compared to the alternative of basic means-tested social welfare in old-age. Moreover, the strongest beneficiaries would be the currently higher age employees with low income and much less the respective younger employees, while younger and higher age employees with high and medium incomes will lose.
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There is an intensive debate about old-age poverty in Germany that has induced political parties to develop proposals for higher pensions of poor pensioners in light of the federal elections of September 2013. In addition, several proposals from economists aim at reforming the pension system in a way that mitigates old-age poverty. In this paper, we consider these proposals in a computable general equilibrium model in order to derive their effects on the income distribution, on employment, on the capital stock and on GDP. Our results indicate that negative employment, capital and GDP effects are induced by such reforms as compared to the alternative of basic means-tested social welfare in old-age. Moreover, the strongest beneficiaries would be the currently higher age employees with low in-come and much less the respective younger employees, while younger and higher age employees with high and medium incomes will lose.
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In: Schriftenreihe Schriften zum Verbraucherrecht Band 5
In: Polity, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 548-556
ISSN: 1744-1684