Suchergebnisse

Das vorliegende Werk hat in erster Linie den Wert einer Quelle zu den gegenüber dem Islam mit einem radikalen serbischen Nationalimus verbundenen Bedrohungsvorstellungen, Feindbildern und Expansionszielen. Insbesondere der erste, von Miroljub Jevtic (einem Professor der Politologie an der Universität Belgrad) verfaßte Teil zu den angeblichen geopolitischen Ambitionen der bosnischen und albanischen Muslime auf dem Balkan und zur Bedrohung der serbischen Kultur durch die den Muslimen inhärente Tendenz zum Gottesstaat ist unter diesem Aspekt zu sehen. Jevtic wird in den serbischen Medien oft als renommierter Islamkundler gehandelt. Er entwickelt hier Vorstellungen von einer islamischen Bedrohung des beim Zerfall Jugoslawiens um sein Selbstbestimmungsrecht betrogenen serbischen Volkes, von den bosnischen Muslimen als islamisierten Serben u. ä., die allesamt als klassische nationalistische Momente der aktuellen serbischen politischen Propaganda gelten können. Etwas wissenschaftlicher ist der von Milovan Pecelj verfaßte Teil, der die internationalen Vorschläge zur Konfliktlösung in Bosnien in den Jahren 1993 und 1994 behandelt. Auch bei seinen Interpretationen ist freilich der nationalistische Standpunkt unübersehbar. (SOI-Clw)

Ethnic minorities and minorities-related conflicts have always been one of the most important security issues for international community. The durability of ethnic conflicts in certain regions and the difficulties in thei resolution, have resulted in the outbreak of many armed conflicts, the collapse of multi-ethnic states, the changes of borders and of demographic relations. Despite the increasing number of security challenges and needs, it is still not possible to talk about a certain uniform and universally accepted model of solving the problems among ethnic minorities. It is obvious that in the postcoldwar period this is going to be an increasingly pressing need of international community. The paper deals with most basic security problems which are caused by the unsettled relationships between ethnic minorities and majority; it also covers the policies of their resolution. By analysing the model of resolving ethnic conflicts in South Tyrol, two groups of ethnic conflicts' resolution policies are looked into: the policy of the elimination of differences and the policy of managing differences. (SOI : PM: S. 59)

The Serbo-Albanian conflict on Kosovo has had direct repercussions for the Balkan security in the last 150 years. That is why the international community would from time to time pay more attention to this conflict, but never long enough to resolve it for good. Both the Serbian and the Albanian side put in a lot of effort towards the resolution of the conflict and came up with several proposals, ranging from various modes of Kosovo autonomy to the idea of cantonisation and re-federalisation of SR Yugoslavia to the independence of Kosovo or its being turned into a protectorate. All these suggestions had mostly been one-sided, either pro-Serbian or pro-Albanian, none of them conducive to a compromise. All this eventually resulted in a military conflict and the attempt to impose solutions by force. Nevertheless, after the NATO intervention, negotiations will have to be resumed and the familiar proposals for the resolution of the Kosovo question will have to be rehashed, only this time this will require much more good will and willingness to make compromises, both on the Albanian and the Serbian side, as well as a considerable support of international community. (SOI : S. 60)

The original NATO strategy regarding Yugoslavia has, despite its military triumphs, proved deficient for achieving the planned political objectives. That is why the existing alliance strategy has been given up and replaced by a new one. This change of direction is under way; the success of NATO's entire military action hinges on its success, as do the relations on the Balkans and the future of NATO's new strategic concept designed in late April at the Washington summit. (SOI : S. 67)

International pressure prevented Croatia from ending the occupation of eastern Slavonia by military means. The author claims that the policy of peaceful integration and the UNTAES mandate are rife with risks which might jeopardize the eventual Croatian control of that region. He points out a set of contentious issues related to the occupied territory: the incomplete demilitarization, dual government (parallel UNTAES and Serbian authorities), no return for the non-Serbian refugees, staying on of the Serbs from other parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. Particularly risky for Croatia are the efforts of the local Serbs to retain absolute ethnic majority as the grounds for establishing territorial autonomy which would enable the militant accolytes of Greater Serbian politics to remain in the region and push for the secession and annexation by Serbia, the efforts which would in all probability be given military support by Serbia, this time under the circumstances which would be much more unfavourable for Croatia than in 1995. The author concludes that for Croatia the only acceptable solution is the total integration of eastern Slavonia and the establishment of full Croatian sovereignty while the creation of a Serbian autonomous province in that region must on no account be permitted. (SOI: PM: S. 188)

The author analyses the genesis and the scenarios of the Kosovo crisis resolution, as well as the possible political reverberations of the NATO military intervention. The premise is that the Kosovo crisis is only a continuation of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, that Kosovo has for centuries been a separate entity largely populated by Albanians, that the policy of Serbian nationalism has permanently discriminated against the Albanian population and that prior to the recent air strikes against Yugoslavia Serbia had systematically led an ethnic-cleansing campaign on Kosovo. Although the author recognises that the support for the NATO military action can hardly be found in the tenets of the UN Charter, he argues that it can nevertheless be justified by international law. He points out that NATO's military campaign enjoyed a broad support of the people of NATO member countries, but that it has made a rift in the European left. The new left was in the forefront of the action, while the old, dogmatic and sectarian left, found itself in the ranks of its most vocal opponents. The author claims that Milosevic, with his overall politics, and particularly his policy on Kosovo, had propelled the West into an action it could not extricate itself from. He concludes that the consequences of Belgrade's defeat will be: 1. The collapse of Milosevic' regime (the beginning of his end); 2. The final incapacitation of Milosevic' politics to create new conflicts; 3. The protectorate over Kosovo and its autonomy, with a factual independence from Serbia; 4 The independence of Montenegro; 5. Reinforcing the Dayton policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (eliminating centrifugal tendencies); 6. The organised participation of the West in the transitional processes in this region (The Pact on the Stability of Southeast Europe); 7. Bolstering the democratic and weakening the undemocratic tendencies in the region. (SOI : S. 14)

In the first part of the article, the author analyses the latest dimensions of on the territory of the former Yugoslavia stemming from the Dayton and Paris accords. His starting point is the geographical criterion which produces five trouble spots which may jeopardize the process of security-building. He concludes that only a determined application of political, diplomatic and economic pressures, as well as military presence, may bring about a new dimension of security in Southeastern Europe. The second part of the article gives a review the analyses of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the creation of new state this part of Europe, as well as of the concepts and schemes for a certain degr linkage and bringing together, the most prominent of which is the American initiative for the co-operation in Southeastern Europe. It is obvious that this region will go on being viewed through different lenses and that the interests of the observers, more than those of the peoples living in this part of Europe, will get precedence. (SOI : PM: S. 23)