Suchergebnisse

This contribution revisits the phenomenon of 'reverse discrimination in the light of the latest Treaty amendments, recent developments in the CJEU's case law and evolutions in the law of selected Member States. It follows that 'reverse discrimination' caused by national measures applying to internal situations in non-harmonized policy fields remains acceptable under EU law as a matter of principle. The Union's non-unitary constitutional structure compels the CJEU to exercise judicial restraint when reviewing such rules against the fundamental freedoms of the Treaties as long as the Union legislator does not address the issue. Although the CJEU's traditional and increasingly incoherent case-law on 'purely internal situations' is not a necessary corollary of this reasoning, alternative judicial approaches risk unduly undermining Member States' competences and constitutional identities. Whilst much of the academic debate on reverse discrimination focuses on possible remedies under EU law, this paper also looks at solutions available under national law. Member States are well equipped to address reverse discrimination and to progressively live up to their responsibility in this respect. Evidence from different Member States suggests that national law (subject to an external control of the ECtHR) can provide a valuable and effective tool to assess whether or not restrictions of individual freedoms can be justified by overriding constitutionally recognized principles.

The article proposes: to group the approach that is common in the classification of state functions (depending on the sphere of social life into political, economic, etc.) with the social functions of the branch; to group the actual legal functions of the branch to adapt one of the approaches proposed by experts in the theory of state and law to classify the functions of law. An appeal to popular Ukrainian textbooks on the theory of state and law allows to summarize: analyzing the functions of law, scientists distinguish between protective and regulatoryfunctions (including regulatory static and regulatory dynamic). In general, almost none of the specialists -authors of educational and methodical publications in this discipline does not ignore the classification of the functions of the right to regulatory and security. Sometimes the authors detail this classification, sometimes they integrate it into the author's systems of legal functions. But it is unlikely that there is now a publication that covers theoretical issues related to the grouping of legal functions, and does not mention the regulatory and protective functions. Based on this, it is hardly appropriate not to apply this classification when grouping the functions of the field of constitutional law. One of the classifications of legal functions, which should be borrowed to group the functions of the constitutional law of Ukraine, is the classification of legal functions depending on their special legal nature into regulatory and protective. Given that this classification reflects the functions inherent in law in general, it is clear that they are also inherent in the field of constitutional law of Ukraine. Therefore, it is advisable to recommend not just to apply this classification when distinguishing the functions of the branch of constitutional law, but to refer to it as a potential element of a complex classification of functions of the branch of constitutional law of Ukraine. The analyzed classification will indicate the kind of special legal characteristics of a function inherent in the branch of constitutional law. Thus, its classification should be combined with one or more classifications of a less general nature, which will reveal the features inherent in the functions of the branch of constitutional law. ; У статті запропоновано: для угруповання соціальних функцій галузі адаптувати підхід, що є поширеним при класифікації функцій держави (залежно від сфери соціального життя на політичні, економічні тощо); для угрупування власне юридичних функцій галузі адаптувати один із підходів, який пропонується фахівцями з теорії держави і права для класифікації функцій права. Звернення до популярних українських підручників із теорії держави та права дозволяє резюмувати: аналізуючи функції права, вчені виділяють охоронну та регулятивну функції (у т. ч. регулятивну статичну та регулятивну динамічну). Загалом майже жоден із фахівців - авторів навчально-методичних видань із цієї дисципліни не оминає увагу класифікацію функцій права на регулятивну й охоронну. Інколи автори деталізують цю класифікацію, інколи інтегрують її в авторські системи функцій права. Але навряд чи зараз є видання, у якому висвітлюються теоретичні питання, пов'язані з угрупуванням функцій права та не згадувалося б про регулятивну й охоронну функції. Виходячи з цього, навряд чи доцільно не застосовувати цю класифікацію при угрупуванні функцій галузі конституційного права. Одною з класифікацій функцій права, яку доцільно запозичити для угрупування функцій галузі конституційного права України, є класифікація функцій права залежно від їх спеціально-юридичного характеру на регулятивну й охоронну. Враховуючи, що ця класифікація відображає функції, притаманні праву загалом, зрозуміло, що вони притаманні також і галузі конституційного права України. А тому доцільно рекомендувати не просто застосувати цю класифікацію при виокремленні функцій галузі конституційного права, а й звернутися до неї як до потенціального елементу складної класифікації функцій галузі конституційного права України. Аналізована класифікація вказуватиме на різновид спеціально-юридичної характеристики тієї чи іншої функції, притаманної галузі конституційного права. Отже, її класифікацію доцільно поєднати з однією чи кількома класифікаціями менш загального характеру, які будуть розкривати особливості, притаманні функціям саме галузі конституційного права.

Compares the value orientation of constitutional law and its reliance on principles of natural law and human rights in Germany and the US.

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.

Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration (Government Administration Law) has set the scope of discretion in Indonesian legal system. But the form of discretion is limited in scope government decision (KTUN) and factual actions of the government. The restriction implicates circulars or others policy rule is not a form of discretion. In addition, the provisions concerning the terms of use discretion, procedures and legal effect of discretion in the Government Administration Law are not applicable to the use of policy rule. In fact, the substance of discretion in policy rule (e.g. circulars and instructions) has the potential of conflicting laws and regulations and/or General Principles of Good Administration. The legal issues in this study are the constitutionality of the scope of discretion in Article 1 point 9 and Article 23 paragraph (1) of the Government Administration Law. This analysis showed that limits the scope of discretion in Government Administration Law contrary to formal elements, substantive, and control mechanisms within the rule of law. This analysis also suggests the expansion of the scope of discretion in the Government Administration Law and setting policy rules as the object of the petition for judicial review so that there is a control mechanism by trial to discretion in the form of policy rule.

Intro -- Contents -- Table of Cases -- Table of Legislation -- Introduction -- I. The Constitutional Context -- II. The Leading Two Theories on Public Power and an Alternative Reading of the Constitution -- III. The Nuanced Constitution -- IV. Common Law Constitutional Rights -- V. The Questions this Book Sets Out to Answer -- VI. The Structure, Style and Chapters of this Book -- PART I: A THIRD ALTERNATIVE - THE NUANCED CONSTITUTION -- 1. An Introduction to the Nuanced Constitution -- I. The Two Competing Forms of Constitutionalism -- II. Not One or the Other, but Both: Thesis and Methodology -- III. Why the UK Constitution is not Political in Nature -- IV. Why is the Nuanced Constitution not the Common Law Constitution? -- V. Taking Stock -- VI. How Did We Get Here? -- VII. A Closer Look at the Constitution and Common Law Constitutional Rights -- 2. A Closer Look at the Nuanced Constitution Through Four Case Studies -- I. R (Privacy International) v IPT -- II. R (Miller) v Prime Minister -- III. The Common Law Constitutionalist Side of the Spectrum: Themes, Characteristics and Vulnerabilities -- IV. R (Begum) v Special Immigration Appeals Commission -- V. R (O (A Child)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department -- VI. Rights, Reasoning and Precedent on the Political Constitutionalist Side of the Spectrum -- PART II: COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS -- 3. A Short History of Common Law Constitutional Rights -- I. Three Famous Antecedents: A Tale of Precedents, Mythmaking and Common Law Legacy -- II. The First Modern Phase of Common Law Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence -- III. Phase Two: In the Shadow of the Human Rights Act? -- IV. Contemporary Common Law Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court: Putting the Common Law Back on the Map -- 4. The Nature and Characteristics of Common Law Constitutional Rights.

In the common law world, Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922) is known as the high priest of orthodox constitutional theory, as an ideological and nationalistic positivist. In his analytical coldness, his celebration of sovereign power, and his incessant drive to organize and codify legal rules separate from moral values or political realities, Dicey is an uncanny figure. This book challenges this received view of Dicey. Through a re-examination of his life and his 1885 book Law of the Constitution, the high priest Dicey is defrocked and a more human Dicey steps forward to offer alternative ways of reading his canonical text, who struggled to appreciate law as a form of reasoned discourse that integrates values of legality and authority through methods of ordinary legal interpretation. The result is a unique common law constitutional discourse through which assertions of sovereign power are conditioned by moral aspirations associated with the rule of law.