This book explores the issue of environmentally-induced migrations from the point of view of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international refugee law and international law of statelessness. Last few years have become a period of unprecedented growth in the number of studies devoted to the forced migration caused by climate change. The book by professor Jane McAdam, published by Oxford University Press, differs significantly from previous studies in this area. The focus of the author became a state responsibility for the situation of climate-change induced displaced people with a particular focus on legal aspects of this problem. The basis of the author`s considerations are four particular areas of public international law: international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international refugee law and international law of statelessness. The issue of climate change-induced displacement is now becoming a growing challenge for public international law. The growing number of climate change migrants becomes a challenge for the international istitutions dealing with humanitarian assistance. Sea level rise become a factor of specific legal problems, such as climatic deterritorialization of the state, state succession on the new territory, the status of people forced to leave their country submerged under the waters of ocean (forced migrants?, refugees?, stateless people?, citizens of the former country continuing its status within a new territory?).
Adjusting the legal status, and support policies for migrant workers is an issue on the agenda of international institutions for nearly a hundred years. The first efforts to protect foreign workers have been taken during the first session of the International Labour Conference in 1919. In the following decades ILO activities has led to the preparation of three international documents concerning this issue (non-binding ILO Convention No. 66 in 1939, and Convention No. 97 of 1949, and No. 143 of 1975). For many decades, the problem of the protection and assistance of migrant workers' rights was considered as a narrow issue of international labor law. Codification efforts, undertaken during seventies, has led to the adaptation of the UN document (International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families) in 1990, and inclusion this issue into more general area of international human rights law. Despite this fact, and the existence of several categories of documents concerning migrant workers within Council of Europe, the European Union, and even ASEAN, the protection of migrant workers has never been effectively functioning system. The aim of this article is the analysis of the codification of that issue, and the main obstacles to consensus on the protection of migrant workers' rights. The state parties of the UN Convention contains primarily countries of origin of migrants (such as Mexico, Morocco and the Philippines). It seems, therefore, that despite 46 ratifications the, UN convention does not have a global character, and activities of its monitoring body (Committee on Migrant Workers-CMW) reflects primarily demands of sending countries. The article closely examines particularly controversial provisions of the ILO and UN documents from the point of view of current labour migrations and policies of sending and host countries.
The European Union does not have an autonomous and self-standing public policy concerning the protection of landscape. Instead, it adopts fragmentary and incidental measures meant to protect landscape. These measures are adopted within the frameworks of other EU policies, most importantly the EU environmental policy as well as other policies which are integrated with it (such as agricultural policy or policy concerned with special planning). In all these realms, the EU shares its powers with its member states. In some important areas, such as e.g. the property regime, the member states retained their exclusive competences. This particular distribution of powers makes the implementation of the extra-EU international law instruments rather difficult and not sufficiently effective to produce a worthwhile impact. These obligations have a limited influence because most of them are obligations of "a diligent pursue" rather than "firm result". As such, they are unlikely to give rise to direct application of respective conventional provisions. Notwithstanding, their importance is much more pronounced in the area of legal reasoning, where even the EU or domestic measures have to be interpreted in the light of the EU and/or its member states' obligations arising from international conventions on landscape protection.
The article is aimed at assessing the regulations of the European Convention for the protection of vertebrate animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes, opened for signature in Strasbourg on 18 March 1986, and Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes in the context of their impact on the number of procedures which set out a model for the protection of animals used for scientific purposes in European countries, in the perspective of their impact on the reduction of the number of scientific procedures using animals carried out in European countries, including especially those involving the highest degree of suffering for animals. The starting point for this assessment was the identification of rules determining the admissibility of scientific use of animals in European countries and the impact that certain measures implemented under these rules may have on the reduction of the number of procedures involving animals. In principle, the analysis of these solutions is to specify the directions of further development of regulations aimed at protecting animals used for scientific purposes. ; Celem artykułu jest ocena regulacji Europejskiej Konwencji w sprawie ochrony zwierząt kręgowych wykorzystywanych do celów doświadczalnych i innych celów naukowych, sporządzonej w Strasburgu w dniu 18 marca 1986 r., oraz dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2010/63/UE z dnia 22 września 2010 r. w sprawie ochrony zwierząt wykorzystywanych do celów naukowych w kontekście ich wpływu na liczbę procedur, które wyznaczają model ochrony zwierząt wykorzystywanych do celów naukowych w państwach europejskich, w perspektywie ich wpływu na ograniczenie liczby procedur naukowych z wykorzystaniem zwierząt przeprowadzanych w państwach europejskich, w tym w szczególności procedur wiążących się z najwyższym poziomem doznawanych przez zwierzęta cierpień. Punktem wyjścia do tej oceny było określenie zasad determinujących dopuszczalność wykorzystania zwierząt do celów naukowych w państwach europejskich, a także wpływu, jaki określone środki wdrażane w ramach tych zasad mogą wywierać na ograniczenie liczby procedur z wykorzystaniem zwierząt. W założeniu analiza tych rozwiązań ma pozwolić na wskazanie kierunków dalszego rozwoju regulacji mających na celu ochronę zwierząt wykorzystywanych w celach naukowych.
Operations under the auspices of the Security Council mandate span over 70 years. Repeatedly involved in resolving armed conflicts, they have made a significant contribution to ensuring security and stability around the world. In practice, they have taken the form of operations by individual states, coalitions, other international organizations or simply as United Nations missions composed of contingents provided by Troop Contribution Countries (TCC). While operations under the auspices of the United Nations have been involved on several occasions in offensive activities under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and the question of responsibility for these actions has been the subject of many legal analyses and judgments, missions organized by the United Nations are always recognized as neutral, and their activities as conciliatory and focused on monitoring the cessation of hostilities, or supervising the disengagement between the parties of the conflict, with the use of force limited to self-defence. Thus, such operations benefited from legal protection, and any action against them was considered a violation of international law. The current engagement of United Nations goes far beyond the traditional understanding of peacekeeping operations. UN missions are frequently authorized to employ all necessary means, up to and including the use of lethal force or even neutralization of the armed group. This creates a situation where in the light of International Humanitarian Law, such actions can be recognized as involvement in armed conflict. This article is intended to show the problems that the international community will soon face to in using United Nations' missions as an instrument for resolving armed conflicts and as a tool for restoring peace and providing stability and securityin the area of operations. It presents the processes of decision-making and subordination, which in some circumstances might result in the United Nations missions being deprived of legal protection and, in addition, made liable for non-compliance with the provisions of International Humanitarian Law. ; Operations under the auspices of the Security Council mandate span over 70 years. Repeatedly involved in resolving armed conflicts, they have made a significant contribution to ensuring security and stability around the world. In practice, they have taken the form of operations by individual states, coalitions, other international organizations or simply as United Nations missions composed of contingents provided by Troop Contribution Countries (TCC). While operations under the auspices of the United Nations have been involved on several occasions in offensive activities under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and the question of responsibility for these actions has been the subject of many legal analyses and judgments, missions organized by the United Nations are always recognized as neutral, and their activities as conciliatory and focused on monitoring the cessation of hostilities, or supervising the disengagement between the parties of the conflict, with the use of force limited to self-defence. Thus, such operations benefited from legal protection, and any action against them was considered a violation of international law. The current engagement of United Nations goes far beyond the traditional understanding of peacekeeping operations. UN missions are frequently authorized to employ all necessary means, up to and including the use of lethal force or even neutralization of the armed group. This creates a situation where in the light of International Humanitarian Law, such actions can be recognized as involvement in armed conflict. This article is intended to show the problems that the international community will soon face to in using United Nations' missions as an instrument for resolving armed conflicts and as a tool for restoring peace and providing stability and securityin the area of operations. It presents the processes of decision-making and subordination, which in some circumstances might result in the United Nations missions being deprived of legal protection and, in addition, made liable for non-compliance with the provisions of International Humanitarian Law.
The subject of this paper touches upon the prohibition to use force, and military force in particular, by States in self-defence. This is a classical example of an important and still very topical issue in international law practice. The right of each State to self-defence is perceived as one of the fundamental rights provided for in customary as well as positive international law. And yet, the exercise of this right has always raised many controversies and questions resulting, on the one hand, from the fact that the concept of self-defence has evolved over years, and, on the other hand, because of the recent tendencies to legalise different military actions carried out outside the framework of the United Nations Charter. These tendencies, presented in the paper in the context of military actions taken by states in situations of a potential terrorist attack, are described as either a pre-emptive, or a preventive use of military force. The author then concludes that although in the event of a pre-emptive military action taken by a State in reliance of its right to self-defence it may be justified to rely on the legal construction of self-defence, in the context of a preventive military operation, such reliance would be much more risky, if not inadmissible. A preventive use of military force fails to meet the criteria of legality of self-defence set forth in the UN Charter, as well as those resulting from international customary law. ; Problematyka artykułu nawiązuje do klasycznej, ale niezwykle ważnej i aktualnej w praktyce międzynarodowej problematyki zakazu użycia siły, zwłaszcza siły zbrojnej. Dotyczy bowiem możliwości podejmowania i realizowania przez państwa działań zbrojnych pod postacią samoobrony. Prawo każdego państwa do użycia siły w ramach samoobrony było i jest postrzegane jako jedno z praw fundamentalnych, gwarantowanych zarówno przez zwyczajowe, jak i pozytywne prawo międzynarodowe. Jego realizacja w praktyce budzi jednak wiele kontrowersji i pytań. Są one związane zarówno z ewolucją samej instytucji samoobrony, jak również z nowymi tendencjami w zakresie legalizowania różnych akcji zbrojnych dokonywanych poza ramami Karty Narodów Zjednoczonych. Autor prezentuje te tendencje, zwłaszcza w kontekście działań zbrojnych podejmowanych przez państwa w sytuacji potencjalnego zagrożenia atakami terrorystycznymi, a określanych jako uprzedzające i prewencyjne użycie siły. W konkluzji autor stwierdza, że o ile w wypadku zbrojnej operacji uprzedzającej uzasadnione jest odwoływanie się do konstrukcji prawnej samoobrony, o tyle w wypadku zbrojnej operacji prewencyjnej jest to znacznie bardziej ryzykowne, a wręcz nieuprawnione. Prewencyjne użycie siły zbrojnej nie spełnia bowiem kryteriów legalności samoobrony – zarówno tych określonych w Karcie Narodów Zjednoczonych, jak i tych wynikających z prawa zwyczajowego.
